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1 Executive Summary 
The effort described herein supports NASA's Aviation Safety Program’s System-wide Safety 
Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project, which is conducting research directed at improving the 
safety of current and future aircraft operating in the National Airspace System.  Under SSAT a 
technical challenge has been raised that targets the assurance of flight critical systems – a 
technical challenge to address, among other things, the sound assurance of safety-critical 
distributed systems properties and the complex interactions between systems and subsystems. 
 
There is an ongoing trend in the aviation industry of increasing adoption of ever more 
sophisticated computer-based technology to realize aircraft systems performing a wide variety 
of functions with different safety criticality levels.  State-of-the-art aircraft avionics are network-
centric systems of systems that are highly complex, software-intensive, and functionally 
integrated.  The use of legacy components and multiple vendors to supply different functions 
that must share resources on a common distributed platform adds further complexity to these 
systems.  The intricate patterns of interaction resulting from large-scale functional integration 
and distributed processing can expose a system to many non-intuitive failure mechanisms with 
a potential for severe safety-relevant effects.  The level of rigor in the development process is 
determined by considerations of complexity and safety criticality.  The predictability and 
robustness of the integrated system in the face of uncertainty in interactions and health status of 
components is of major importance in the “certifiability” of the system. 
 
The SAE International (formerly the Society of Automotive Engineers [SAE]) Aerospace 
Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754, Revision A (hereafter ARP4754A) describes a 
recommended process-based development assurance framework for systems that implement 
and support aircraft-level functions. 
 
The purpose of ARP4754A is to provide guidelines for the generation of evidence to 
substantiate with adequate confidence (i.e., assurance level) that errors in requirements, 
design, and implementation of the system have been identified and corrected and that the 
system satisfies the applicable certification regulations.  ARP4754A states what objectives need 
to be accomplished based on system development assurance level (DAL) assignments, but it 
does not provide a justification for the guidelines and its application requires significant 
engineering judgment. 
 
  2 
2 Scope, Motivation and Objectives of this Report 
This report documents applications of ARP4754A to the development of modern computer-
based (i.e., digital electronics, software and network-based) aircraft systems.  This study is to 
offer insight and provide educational value relative to the guidelines in ARP4754A and provide 
an assessment of the current state-of-the-practice within industry and regulatory bodies relative 
to development assurance for complex and safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems. 
 
The primary objectives of this study are to: 
 
 Develop case studies on the application of ARP4754A to the development and 
assurance of computer-based aircraft systems with architecture level complexity 
representative of state-of-the-art technology, 
 Generate guidelines on the application of ARP4754A to the development and assurance 
of computer-based aircraft systems and to, 
 Identify issues of concern in the current guidance, policy, and practice (i.e., processes, 
methods, tools or techniques) of development and assurance for computer-based 
aircraft systems. 
 
As the above objectives were being accomplished, additional topics were also addressed. The 
following areas of study are detailed in Appendices C and D: 
 
 Justification for ARP4754A guidelines, 
 How to transition from safety analysis to system architecture, 
 Relationship between risk mitigation and ARP4754A, 
 Development Assignment levels in AC23.1309.1E vs ARP4754A (AC 20-174), 
Differences – Why? Are the levels assigned equivalent?, 
 Insight as to why Options 1 / 2 of ARP4754A Table 3 are equivalent, 
 Engineering judgment, 
o ARP4754A requires significant engineering judgment – which parts, 
o How engineering judgment is leveraged / used in ARP4754A, 
o How to make up for “missing” engineering judgment for new comers in order to 
apply the recommended practice. 
  3 
3 Case Study Scenario Development Summary 
Three case studies on the development and assurance of computer-based aircraft systems (i.e., 
avionics) at the architecture level following the guidelines in ARP4754A were developed.  The 
case studies captured the following characteristics: 
 
 Are representative of current state-of-the-art systems in terms of complexity and safety 
criticality, 
 Include examples of the application of the DAL assignment guidelines with system 
architecture consideration, 
 Are performed at a level of detail that ensures educational value and allows insight into 
the sorts of development and assurance problems requiring engineering judgment, 
 Enable the identification of issues of concern in the current guidance, policy, and 
practice of system development and assurance.  
 
Appendix A captures the three scenarios developed in support of this study effort.  Each 
scenario synopsizes the development activities to accomplish ARP4754A objectives and 
responds to the objectives identified above. 
 
  4 
4 ARP4754A Application Guidelines Summary 
Upon completion of the case studies outlined in section 3, development and assurance 
guidelines on the application of ARP-4754A based on lessons learned and insight gained in the 
course of performing the case studies were developed.  These ARP4754A application 
guidelines provide insight into the rationale for development assurance level (DAL) assignments 
with system architecture consideration as well as consider the system complexity and safety 
criticality. 
 
A review of the notes and activities associated with the case study developments identified a 
few general guidelines. Additional material derived from a questionnaire and roundtable 
discussions were collected from industry to enhance the lessons learned material.  This 
additional solicited experience information is summarized in Appendix B.   
 
The study results indicate that ARP4754A provides a systematic path for aircraft function design 
and development.  It provides for early removal of errors resulting in less iteration to get a 
function design correct.  The ARP establishes compatibility with the other industry standards 
and processes (DO-178, DO-254 and DO-297).  Users advocate tailoring the activities outline in 
the ARP according to their individual scope of work and criticality of function being developed. 
 
FDAL/IDAL Assignment Guidelines 
 
For almost all development project scenarios, the functional development assurance level 
(FDAL) can and will be assigned using the functional hazard assessment classification with the 
assurance level assigned per ARP4754A Table 2 or ARP4754A Table 3 using the single 
member functional failure set (FFS) column.  Most project developments, especially at the 
aircraft function level, provide minimum opportunity to use the functional independence attribute.   
 
Similarly, the Item development assurance level (IDAL) will be assigned commensurate with the 
FDAL (and therefore the hazard) supported or implemented by the Item. 
 
No special tools need to be used to assign the FDAL and IDAL.  A common mode analysis 
(CMA) evaluates for satisfaction of the independence characteristics. 
 
Engineering Judgment Guidelines 
 
In general, the key engineering use areas in ARP4754A include planning, requirements capture 
and requirements validation.  The requirement management objectives rely the most on 
engineering judgment.  The generation of acceptable, clear, concise requirement text relies on 
experience and engineering judgment.  Validation of requirements is primarily accomplished 
through the application of knowledgeable experience. 
 
Aircraft Level:  Optimum planning to support the ARP4754A objectives relies on substantial 
engineering judgment in order to organize the project into an efficient, executable development 
process which creates the necessary evidence.  In conjunction with the planning efforts, 
establishing the initial certification position with regards to how the project will satisfy the 
development assurance objectives also relies heavily on engineering judgment. 
 
 
 
  5 
System Level:  Engineering judgment is a key element in the re-use of systems and/or items.  
The judgment experience is used in understanding the baseline system and item functionality so 
as to plan and implement the desired re-use evolution.  The ability to determine the system 
functionality which is not changing and that which is changing as part of a new application 
optimizes the project efforts to satisfy ARP4754A development objectives and simplify the 
certification efforts. 
 
 
Re-Use Guidelines 
 
ARP4754A facilitates re-use but the advantages lie primarily at system and Item levels.  
Validation and verification objective activities can be minimized to those necessary for only new 
or changed requirements.   
 
For aircraft manufacturers, evaluation and application of ARP4754A should be considered early 
in the development process.  By actively contracting development of the airplane level avionic 
requirements from the system supplier re-applying the certificated system will help mitigate 
some of the aircraft level objective evidence that must be created on the new airplane for the 
“old” system. 
 
  6 
5 ARP4754A Application Guidance, Policy or Practice Issues 
Summary 
 
The study sought also to identify issues regarding current guidance, policy and practice of 
ARP4754A development and assurance of computer-based aircraft systems.  The case study 
application insights and the author’s previous lessons learned experiences in applying 
ARP4754A were used to identify and summarize these issues. 
 
Issues with the current guidance, policies and practices were also solicited from Industry 
through a questionnaire and discussion roundtable as detailed in Appendix B.  The following 
issues summarize the major concerns regarding the on-going invocation of ARP4754A. 
 
ARP4754A Application Criteria 
 
The primary issue identified by the industry responses was the certification authorities’ 
inconsistent understanding and application of ARP4754A as part of the overall certification 
process, both within a single authority as well as between the various regulatory authorities 
worldwide.  The certification authorities represented a divergence of opinion across projects on 
the depth and extent of ARP development process application as well as the acceptable 
evidence for showing objective satisfaction. 
 
Industry participants were inconsistent on what would help mitigate these inconsistencies. Some 
respondents wanted a detailed checklist applied, similar to the DO-178 Job Aid, to create a level 
playing field. Other wanted acceptance of their existing processes as they are shown to satisfy 
the ARP objectives. 
 
The level of certification authority involvement in the ARP development process, the 
inconsistency and alignment of ARP application and the ARP interpretation that “recommended” 
really means “required” were all highlighted as project obstacles.  Finally, the late resolution of 
acceptable ARP4754A “compliance” evidence impacted timely project development. 
 
 
FDAL/IDAL Assignment 
 
All respondents of the questionnaire indicated a difficulty in applying the assurance level 
assignment process.  A review of the examples provided in the questionnaire responses 
indicates that there remain problems differentiating between failure and error mitigation 
techniques.  Confusion and misunderstandings were encountered during assignment 
interpretation. (It should be noted that only 25% of the respondents indicated that they had 
received training on the ARP).  There were a number of examples of issues associated with 
assigning assurance level when the functional failure set included non-complex Items. 
 
No special tools were used to aid in the assurance assignment level process. Error trees, fault 
trees and common mode analysis were used by some to visualize the development process 
architecture. 
 
A number of respondents would like to see a “how to”, step by step detailed explanation for 
FDAL and IDAL assignment. 
 
ARP Application General 
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ARP4754A application requires a steep learning curve for those non-legacy ARP4754 literate 
industry members.  General industry interpretation is that the ARP increases documentation 
efforts. 
 
Validation of requirements is a problematic effort.  First, there is the interpretation of the 
validation method table in the ARP, which seems to imply to some industry readers that a 
minimum of two methods are recommended in the absence of clear ARP text descriptions.  
Secondly, most design engineers have experience defining and verifying but not justifying their 
requirement set.  This activity is viewed as being new and unfulfilling work.  And finally, 
validation puts additional demands on the scarce experienced personnel resources. 
 
A number of respondents would like to see more “how to” information in order to address the 
steep learning curve.  “How To”: 
 
 Satisfy the derived requirement review and analysis objective, 
 Accomplish process assurance, 
 Establish aircraft/system requirement standards to satisfy capture and validation 
objectives. 
 
One ARP application observation of note was that it’s not just about what is being done but who 
does it as well.  Expertise (skills and experience) matters. 
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6 Results and Recommendations 
The industry questionnaire responses indicate that ARP4754A is viewed favorably by the 
engineering groups for development.  The ARP establishes a structured process with known 
communications which was viewed positively.  Company managements tended to view the ARP 
as only adding costs since they were not focused on reducing future project costs. 
 
Industry was unanimous in wanting consistency in interpretation of the ARP across the 
certification authority environment. 
 
ARP4754A and the Item development process standards (RTCA DO documents) form a 
consistent strategy to mitigate error sources in support of regulation compliance.  The individual 
processes act in concert to provide a comprehensive safety development solution. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Certification authorities should study and implement an effective way of evaluating, within the 
certification framework, satisfaction of ARP4754A objectives.  The goal of this activity should be 
to mitigate the existing large disparity in ARP interpretations during project application. 
 
Industry should initiate an effort to synergize the objectives and configuration control criteria 
across the industry process documents.  ARP4754A, DO-178, DO-254 and DO-297 differences 
lead applicants to apply the most severe common denominator across a project and thus are 
not optimizing the development objectives to support a common safety perspective. 
 
More examples and “how to” information are also recommended to accelerate the learning 
curve of new ARP4754A applicants.  It is worth noting that the current ongoing revision to 
ARP4761 will address some of industry identified issues.  The details of how to assign 
FDAL/IDAL as well as identifying independence attributes and principles are being addressed. 
 
The study scenarios herein also aid in addressing some industry comments in the application of 
ARP in during reuse scenarios (ARP4754A section 6).  The equivalence of ARP4754A Table 3 
options discussed herein may also help in the understanding of the FDAL/IDAL assignment 
process. 
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Appendix A Case-Study Data 
Three different but related airplane development scenarios were developed and evaluated as 
part of the ARP4754A Task Study effort.  These architecture level studies are synoptic in nature 
so as to focus on following the guidelines in ARP4754A while developing computer-based 
avionic airplane systems.  The three case studies presented in this appendix accomplish the 
goals of the task including: 
 
 Are representative of current state-of-the-art systems in terms of complexity and safety 
criticality,  
 Include examples of the application of the DAL assignment guidelines with system 
architecture consideration, 
 Are performed at a level of detail to provide educational value and allow insight into the 
sorts of development and assurance problems requiring engineering judgment, 
 Have enabled the identification of issues of concern in the current guidance, policy, and 
practice of system development and assurance.  
 
The three architecture scenarios developed represent examples of three different development 
cases presented in ARP4754A Section 6, “Modifications to Aircraft or Systems”.  Each of the 
scenarios artifacts are uniquely identified with postulated configuration control strategies just as 
they would be on a “real” development program.  The contents of each of the scenario 
developed ARP4754A artifact is presented in an abbreviated, outline format to highlight only the 
content needed to address the ARP objectives. 
 
The scenarios include: 
 
 Baseline Architecture, 
 Study Architecture 1, 
 Study Architecture 2. 
 
Each of the scenarios is briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
 
It should be noted that the intent of the case studies is to provide insight into satisfying 
ARP4754A development objectives for the scenarios postulated.  The artifacts or process 
activities may not identify or address all representative certification aspects of the particular 
scenario. 
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BASELINE ARCHITECTURE 
 
The baseline architecture captures the activities associated with development of a new airplane 
type to be certificated under 14CFR Part 25.  The airplane itself is of conventional construction 
and conventionally controlled (non-electronic flight controls).  The avionics suite to be included 
in the design is a re-application of an Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) based avionic system 
previously certificated on a different airplane manufacturer’s type airplane. 
 
The functions included in the IMA avionics include: 
 Autopilot (autoflight)   (ATA22)1, 
 Communications   (ATA23), 
 Displays    (ATA31), 
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), 
 Maintenance    (ATA45). 
Note 1 - Air Transport Association function nomenclature has been used to enhance readability. 
 
Artifact examples of the following airplane level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 Airplane Certification Plan, 
 Avionics Certification Plan, 
 Avionics Development Plan, 
 Avionic System Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment (PASA). 
 
Artifact examples of the following system level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 
 Avionic System Development Plan. 
 
 
STUDY ARCHITECTURE 1 
 
This architecture scenario captures the development of an update to an existing IMA avionic 
system implementation on the same legacy airplane as originally certificated.  A revision to an 
existing IMA avionic function as well as the introduction of a new function to the IMA is explored.  
No airplane function changes are contemplated.  The IMA system architecture, with the same 
initial function set, as that postulated in the baseline architecture scenario is used. 
 
In this scenario, revision artifacts are developed for updates to one of the existing implemented 
functions (Flight Management (ATA34)) and for the addition of new functionality to the 
maintenance function (ATA45).  The new function addition affects multiple elements within the 
implementation which are also explored. 
 
Artifact examples of the following airplane level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 Project Specific Certification Plan (PSCP). 
 
Artifact examples of the following system level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 Avionic System Development Plan. 
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STUDY ARCHITECTURE 2 
 
This architecture scenario captures the development of an airplane and an existing IMA avionic 
system implementation update on a legacy airplane for the introduction of airborne ground 
proximity warning equipment (AGPWS) certificated to Technical Standard Order 92c (TSO-92c).  
The IMA system architecture, with the same function set, as that postulated in the baseline 
architecture scenario is used.  Both airplane and avionic system changes are contemplated and 
developed.   
 
In this scenario, revision artifacts are developed for updates to multiple existing functions due to 
the addition of the AGPWS TSO equipment.   
 
Artifact examples of the following airplane level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 Airplane Project Specific Certification Plan. 
 
Artifact examples of the following system level ARP4754A objectives are developed: 
 Avionic System Development Plan. 
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Appendix A.1 Baseline Architecture 
(aka SAAB-EII 100) 
Introduction 
 
An example of planning the development of flight deck functionality for a new airplane that uses an 
existing “certificated” avionic system from another airplane.  For the purposes of this scenario 
development, the airplane is identified as the SAAB-EII 100 to provide a common reference framework for 
the development activities. 
 
Example documentation developed: 
 
Airplane Level 
 
Airplane Certification Plan (CP010) 
Avionics Certification Plan (CP100) 
Avionics Development Plan (ADP100) 
PASA CMA/Development Assurance assignment excerpt (SE100PASA) 
 
Systems Level 
 
Avionic System Development Plan (ASDP100) 
 
Item Level 
 
None – not a feature of study 
Title Airplane Certification Plan Doc No. CP010 Date 2/18/2015
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NASA Study
Baseline Architecture
Example Study Excerpt
SAAB-EII 100
Airplane Certification Plan
ARP4754A 5.8.4.1
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
A CP010 A
SCALE 1 : 1 SHEET 1 OF 2
 
REVISIONS
CN No. REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
-
46
-
A
Initial release
Updated Figure 1 with revised document numbers.
2 Feb 2015
18 Feb 2015
J  Allen
J  Allen
 
Editor Note:  Configuration control of the certification plan document is per system control category 1, 
under full problem report/change management process control. 
 
  
Title Airplane Certification Plan Doc No. CP010 Date 2/18/2015
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A.1 CP010 1 System Description:  
 New airplane type development, aka SAAB-EII 100. 
 Certificated under 14CFR Part 25 as Transport Category airplane. 
 Conventional aluminum construction. 
 Two underwing mounted XYZ high thrust turbofan engines 
 Conventional mechanical flight control system (ATA 27) certificated using conventional techniques 
defined in advisory material. 
 Advanced avionics flight deck featuring LCD “glass” displays & IMA mechanization. 
A.1 CP010 2 Certification Planning: 
 This plan provides an overview of the certification activities for the SAAB-EII 100 to show 
compliance with the certification regulations. 
 Certification will be accomplished by a series of aircraft function/system certification plans as 
shown in Figure 1.  The following airplane function plans will be generated: 
 
o Avionics Certification Plan (CP100), 
 Includes FMS, Displays, Crew Alerting, Radios & Autopilot 
o Flight Control Certification Plan (CP200), 
o Electrical Power Certification Plan (CP300), 
o Hydraulics Certification Plan (CP400), 
o Environmental Control Certification Plan (CP500), 
o Water, Waste Certification Plan (CP600), 
o Thrust Management Certification Plan (CP700), 
o etc. 
  
Title Airplane Certification Plan Doc No. CP010 Date 2/18/2015
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Figure 1 SAAB-EII-100 Certification Plan Hierarchy 
 
A.1 CP010 3 FHA Summary: 
 A summary of the planned airplane level functions is shown in Figure 2. 
 Catastrophic and hazardous functional failure conditions will be identified for the SAAB-EII 100. 
 See individual function/system plans for a summary of failure condition associated with each 
specific function area. 
 
  
SAAB-EII 100 
Airplane 
Certification Plan – 
Overview CP010
Avionics 
Certification Plan – 
CP100
Flight Controls 
Certification Plan – 
CP200
Electrical Power 
Certification Plan – 
CP300
Hydraulics 
Certification Plan – 
CP400
Environmental 
Control Certification 
Plan – CP500
Water/Waste 
Certification Plan – 
CP600
Thrust Management 
Certification Plan – 
CP700
Other Functions 
Certification Plan – 
CPxxx
Title Airplane Certification Plan Doc No. CP010 Date 2/18/2015
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Figure 2 Airplane Function Diagram 
 
A.1 CP010 4 Safety Objectives and Assurance Levels: 
 The safety assessment process will follow the activities outlined in ARP4754A using the methods 
and tools described in ARP4761. 
 Safety objectives will be identified from safety assessments and prior experience. 
 Development assurance levels will be assigned as recommended in ARP4754A as advised in 
AC20-174 guidance material. 
 See individual function/system certification plans (as noted in section 2) for the safety objectives 
and assigned functional development assurance levels (FDALs) associated with each 
function/system specific area. 
 Safety Activities Management for the SAAB-EII 100 is outlined in the SAAB-EII 100 Safety 
Program Plan.   
 
Editor Note: The Safety Program Plan was not developed as part of the scenario example artifacts. 
 
Airplane Level Function
1. Provide
Structural 
Integrity
Provide 
Control 
in the Air
6. Provide Power 
Generation & 
Distribution
7. Provide Loading, 
Maintenance, Ground 
Handling & Occupant 
Accommodation
2. Provide
Stability & 
Control
3. Provide
Control of 
Energy
4. Provide
Operational
Awareness
5. Provide a 
Controlled 
Environment
8. Provide Control 
on the Ground
4.1 Situational 
Awareness:
4.1.1 Primary Flight 
Display
4.1.2 Communication
4.1.3 Navigation
2.1 Control Pitch
3.1 Control Thrust
Pressurization
4.3 Configuration
4.4 Vision
4.2 Awareness of
Emergency
3.2 Control Lift &
Drag
2.2 Control Roll
2.3 Control Yaw
2.4 Flight Control
Augmentation
2.5 Automatic 
Flight Control &
Guidance
Control 
Temperature
Provide 
Breathable
Environment
Control Speed
Control Direction
Landing Gear 
Extension & 
Retraction
Emergency 
Prevention & 
Management
Title Airplane Certification Plan Doc No. CP010 Date 2/18/2015
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A.1 CP010 5 Novel or Unique Design Features: 
 Avionic system will be implemented using state-of-the-art IMA platform technology.  
 See Avionics Certification Plan (CP100) for more details. 
A.1 CP010 6 Certification Basis: 
 SAAB-EII 100 airplane will be certificated to 14CFR Part 25: 
o Current amendments, 
o Current advisory material. 
A.1 CP010 7 Compliance Methods: 
 Compliance to the regulations will be shown by analysis, inspection and test. 
 See individual function/system certification plans for regulations and compliance associated with 
each specific area. 
 Summary for 14CFR 25.1309, Systems, equipment and installations: 
o Airplane function and system development process per AC20-174 using ARP4754A at 
assigned FDAL, 
o Airborne electronic hardware development per AC20-152 using DO-254 at assigned IDALs, 
o Airborne software development per AC20-115C using DO-178C at assigned IDALs, 
o Safety assessments (FHA, PSSA, SSA) per ARP4761. 
 IMA development per AC-148 and AC-170. 
 Airplane mechanical systems per AC25-21 and AC25-22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------End of CP010 Airplane Certification Plan Excerpt------- 
 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
 
  18 
NASA Study
Baseline Architecture
Example Study Excerpt
SAAB-EII 100
Avionics Certification Plan
ARP4754A 5.8.4.1
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
A CP100 -
SCALE 1 : 1 SHEET 1 OF 1
 
REVISIONS
CN No. REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
- - Initial release
 
Editor Note:  Configuration control of the certification plan document is per system control category 1, 
under full problem report/change management process control. 
 
  
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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A.1 CP100 1 System Description: 
The avionic system integrates the following airplane level functions into a single system implementation: 
 
 Provide Stability & Control 
o Automatic Flight Control & Guidance, 
 Provide Operational Awareness 
o Situational Awareness: Primary Flight Display, Communication, Navigation, 
o Awareness of Emergency 
o Configuration 
 Provide Loading, Maintenance, Ground Handling & Occupant Accommodation 
o Maintenance. 
 
The Company “A” Advanced Flight Deck integrates the following functions into a single avionic system 
implementation: 
 
 Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) (see Figure 3) from Company “A” 
o Company “A” IMA implementation certificated on other aircraft. 
o IMA includes the following functions:  
 Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23),  
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
 Maintenance (ATA 45). 
 
A.1 CP100 2 Certification Support Planning:  
 Certification will be accomplished by a series of airplane function certification plans. 
 The Avionics Certification Plan (this document) defines the regulations and compliance 
methodology for the included avionic functions.  This Avionics Certification Plan interacts with the 
following aircraft level function/system plans: 
 
o Flight Control Certification Plan (CP200), 
o Thrust Management Certification Plan (CP700), 
o Electrical Power Certification Plan (CP300), 
o etc. 
 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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Figure 3 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics Architecture 
 
A.1 CP100 3 FHA Summary: 
 The associated average flight profile for the SAAB-EII 100 Airplane is presented in Figure 4 with 
flight phase description identified in Table 1. 
 The functional failure conditions developed for the Avionic System are summarized in Table 2 (see 
SE100AVFHA for the full FHA analysis).  
 
 
Editor’s Note: SE100AVFHA was not developed as part of the scenario example artifacts.   
Editor’s Note: Normally, only the catastrophic and hazardous failure conditions would be included and 
summarized in the certification plan.  Major and minor failure conditions have been included as part of this 
scenario development since they will be used later in the example. 
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Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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Figure 4 Average Flight Profile 
 
Table 1 SAAB-EII 100 Flight Phase Descriptions 
G - Ground 
G1 Taxi (General) Pushback, ground taxi, takeoff runway align 
G2 Reverse Thrust (General) Weight on Wheels, high speed, reverse thrust & braking 
G3 Braking (Roll Out) Weight on Wheels, low speed, reverse thrust stow & braking 
T - Take Off 
T1 Take Off (General) Airplane aligned for Take Off, acceleration on ground through decision speed, rotation 
speed and rotate 
T1A Take Off Roll before V1 Airplane on ground prior to decision speed V1 
T1B Take Off Roll after V1, before VR Airplane on ground after V1 but before rotation speed VR 
T2 Take Off after Rotation  Nose gear off the ground (@ rotation speed VR).  T2 is the Phase between lift-off and the 
initiation of gear retraction. This time should be not less than 3 seconds and may be longer 
than 3 seconds if, on a particular airplane type, a longer delay is found to be appropriate 
(§25.111 (b)). 
F - Flight 
F1 Climb (General) Airborne flight after rotation, climb, capture altitude for cruise flight 
F2A Landing Gear Up Gear retraction 
F2B Landing Gear Down Gear extension 
F3 Clean Up Flap retraction, Climb configuration 
F4 Cruise Level flight at selected altitude(s) 
F5 Descent Deceleration, Descent to approach until flare transition 
F6 Approach (General) Landing configuration, gear down 
GA – Go Around 
GA1 Go Around Airborne flight transition from approach to clean up. 
L - Landing 
L1 Landing Flare Airplane transition approach - flare, Weight off Wheels 
L2 Ground Roll Airplane after Touch Down, Weight on Wheels, Thrust Reverse, active braking to taxi speed 
 
 
 Ta
xi
-O
u
t 
(S
ta
rt
 U
p
; E
n
gi
n
e 
St
ar
t;
 R
o
ll)
 
Ta
ke
 O
ff
 R
o
ll 
1
 (
b
e
fo
re
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
 s
p
ee
d
 
V
1
) 
Ta
ke
 O
ff
 R
o
ll 
2
 (
af
te
r 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
  
sp
ee
d
 V
1
) 
Ta
ke
 O
ff
 A
ft
er
 R
o
ta
ti
o
n
 
In
it
ia
l 
C
lim
b
 (
n
o
 c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
) 
G
ea
r 
U
p
; C
le
an
 U
p
 
C
lim
b
 
C
ru
is
e
 
D
ec
el
e
ra
ti
o
n
 &
 D
e
sc
en
t 
A
p
p
ro
ac
h
 
G
ea
r 
D
o
w
n
 
La
n
d
in
g 
Fl
ar
e 
(B
ef
o
re
 T
o
u
ch
 D
o
w
n
   
->
 
W
o
ff
W
) 
G
ro
u
n
d
 R
o
ll 
(A
ft
er
 T
o
u
ch
 D
o
w
n
   
   
 -
>
 
W
o
n
W
) 
Tr
an
si
ti
o
n
 t
o
 R
ev
e
rs
e 
Th
ru
st
 
In
 R
ev
e
rs
e 
Th
ru
st
 
B
ra
ki
n
g 
(R
o
ll 
O
u
t)
 
Tr
an
si
ti
o
n
 t
o
 T
h
ru
st
 R
ev
e
rs
e
r 
St
o
w
 
Ta
xi
-I
n
 
 
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
  G1 T1A T1B T2 F1, F2A, F3 F1 F4 F5 F6 F6,F2B L1 L2 L2, G2 L2, G3 G1  
                        
 Ground Time  Airborne (= In-Flight Time) Ground Time 
                        
  Average Flight Duration 
                        
  Taxi Out Take Off Climb Cruise Descent Approach & Landing Taxi 
In 
 
          
 min 10 1 20 45 18 6 5 min 
                  
 General:                   G (Ground)  --  G1 (Taxi)  --  G2 (Reverse Thrust)      --      T (Take Off)      --      F (Airborne)  --  F1 (Climb)  --  F6 (Approach)      --      L (Landing) 
 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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Table 2, Avionic FHA Summary summarizes the following functional hazard assessment information: 
Column 1: Description of the airplane level functional area 
Column 2: Unique failure condition (hazard) tracking identification number 
Column 3: Failure condition (hazard) description 
Column 4: Flight phase(s) of interest for the postulated failure condition identified in column 3. 
Column 5: Failure condition effects on airplane, occupants and crew qualitative description. 
Column 6: Failure condition classification based on the descriptions entered in column 5. 
 
Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
Situational 
Awareness:  
 
Primary Flight 
Display (4.1.1) 
31.01 
Loss of all attitude display 
information in cockpit 
(including standby) 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane attitude using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.02 
Display of misleading pitch or 
roll attitude to both pilots 
simultaneously (including 
standby) 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane attitude using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.03 
Display of misleading pitch or 
roll attitude to one pilot. 
Flight 
Excessive crew workload. Crew must 
use cross-side display and standby 
attitude instrument to recognize 
condition. 
Hazardous 
31.04 
Loss of primary attitude 
display to both pilots 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely on standby 
instrument for attitude reference 
information 
Major 
31.05 
Loss of all airspeed display 
information including standby 
airspeed 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane airspeed using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.06 
Loss of primary airspeed 
display information to both 
pilots 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely on standby 
instrument for airspeed reference 
information. 
Major 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
31.07 
Erroneous standby airspeed 
display combined with 
airspeed miscompare on 
primary displays 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane airspeed using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.08 
Erroneous airspeed displayed 
to both pilots simultaneously. 
All 
Excessive crew workload. Crew must 
use cross-check with standby airspeed 
instrument to recognize condition. 
Hazardous 
31.09 
Erroneous airspeed display 
information to one pilot 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must use cross-side display and 
standby airspeed instrument to 
recognize condition. 
Major 
31.10 
Erroneous airspeed displayed 
on standby instrument 
All 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must use cross check with 
primary displays to recognize 
condition. 
Major 
31.11 
Loss of all altitude display 
information including standby 
altitude 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane altitude using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.12 
Erroneous standby altitude 
display combined with 
altitude miscompare on 
primary displays 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane altitude using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.13 
Loss of primary altitude data 
to both pilots 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely on standby 
instrument for altitude reference 
information. 
Major 
31.14 
Erroneous altitude display 
information to one pilot 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must use cross-side display and 
standby altitude instrument to 
recognize condition. 
Major 
31.15 
Erroneous altitude displayed 
on standby instrument 
All 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must use cross check with 
primary displays to recognize 
condition. 
Major 
31.16 
Loss of all heading display 
information including standby 
heading 
Flight 
Crew is unable to determine correct 
airplane heading using flight deck 
instruments resulting in loss of 
airplane.  
Catastrophic 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
31.17 
Loss of stabilized heading 
display information to both 
pilots 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely on compass for 
heading reference information. 
Major 
31.18 
Erroneous heading display 
information to both pilots 
simultaneously 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must recognize condition and 
rely on compass for heading 
reference information. 
Major 
31.19 
Loss of primary engine 
parameters display for both 
engines 
Flight 
Crew is unable to optimally control 
engine operation and must rely upon 
FADEC operation or displayed 
secondary engine parameters and 
independent airplane monitoring. 
Excessive crew workload. 
Hazardous 
31.20 
Loss of primary engine 
parameter display from a 
single engine 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely on FADEC operation 
and throttle lever position. 
Major 
31.21 
Erroneous primary engine 
parameter displays for both 
engines 
Take off 
Excessive crew workload. Crew must 
control engines based on throttle 
lever position and rely on nominal 
FADEC control operation. 
Hazardous 
31.22 
Erroneous primary engine 
parameter displays from a 
single engine 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must control engine based on 
throttle lever position and rely on 
nominal FADEC control operation. 
Major 
Situational 
Awareness:  
 
Communications 
(4.1.2) 
23.01 
Loss of all navigation and 
communication information 
(non-restorable) 
Flight 
Flight crew unable to navigate and 
communicate resulting in resulting in 
loss of airplane. 
Catastrophic 
23.02 Loss of all communications Flight 
Loss of all voice and data 
communications from the airplane. 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely upon alternative 
navigation communication resources. 
Major 
23.03 
Erroneous datalink 
communication information 
Taxi, 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew verifies received datalink 
information via voice 
communications. 
Major 
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
Situational 
Awareness:  
 
Navigation 
(4.1.3) 
34.01 
Loss of navigation information 
display 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must rely upon communication 
with air traffic control and backup 
heading display information to 
establish position. 
Major 
34.02 
Loss of navigation guidance 
information (flight 
management) 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must manage flight plan 
through manual operation of 
navigation resources. 
Major 
34.03 
Erroneous display of 
navigational or positional 
information to both pilots 
simultaneously. 
Take off, 
Approach 
Excessive crew workload. Crew must 
identify positional error using other 
navigation sources or 
communications cross-checks. 
Hazardous 
34.04 
Erroneous display of radio 
altitude data to both pilots 
simultaneously. 
Approach, 
Go 
Around 
Crew makes hard landing due to 
misjudged or missing flare maneuver. 
Crew may recognize discrepancy with 
barometric altitude and/or glideslope 
presentation. Excessive crew 
workload. 
Hazardous 
34.05 Erroneous Lateral Navigation Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must identify positional error 
using other navigation sources or 
communications cross-checks. 
Major 
34.06 
Loss of Lateral Navigation – 
High altitude flight 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must manage flight plan 
through manual operation of 
navigation resources. 
Major 
34.07 
Loss of Lateral Navigation – 
Low altitude flight 
Approach, 
Landing, 
Go 
Around 
Excessive crew workload. Crew must 
identify positional error using other 
navigation sources or 
communications cross-checks. 
Hazardous 
34.08 
Loss of or erroneous Vertical 
Navigation 
Flight 
Significant increase in crew workload. 
Crew must manage flight plan 
through manual operation of 
navigation resources. 
Major 
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
Situational 
Awareness:  
 
Emergency 
Awareness (4.2) 
31.23 
Loss of aural annunciation of 
caution or warning for 
identified conditions 
Taxi, 
Flight 
Crew must rely upon visual 
annunciations or other flight deck 
effects of caution and warning 
conditions.  
Major 
31.24 
Loss of visual display of 
caution or warning identified 
conditions 
Taxi, 
Flight 
Crew must rely upon aural 
annunciations or other flight deck 
effects of caution and warning 
conditions.  
Major 
31.25 
Erroneous display of caution 
or warning conditions 
Taxi, 
Flight 
Crew must rely upon cross-check of 
other flight deck information to 
identify erroneous/nuisance warning. 
Major 
31.26 
Loss of landing gear aural 
warning 
Landing, 
Flight 
Crew must rely upon redundant 
landing gear hand position and 
landing gear position indicators. 
Major 
Situational 
Awareness:  
 
Configuration 
(4.3) 
31.27 
Loss of take-off configuration 
warning combined with 
erroneous aircraft 
configuration 
Take Off 
Airplane is not in correct 
configuration for take-off resulting in 
loss of airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.28 
Erroneous display of aircraft 
configuration 
Take Off 
Airplane is not in correct 
configuration for take-off resulting in 
loss of airplane. 
Catastrophic 
31.29 
Loss of take-off configuration 
warning 
Take Off 
Crew not notified if aircraft is not 
appropriately configured for takeoff. 
Configuration warning is auxiliary 
feature to supplement normal crew 
procedure. 
Major 
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
Provide Stability 
& Control: 
 
Automatic 
Stability & 
Control (2.5) 
22.01 
Erroneous engagement of 
autopilot at low altitude 
Take off, 
Landing, 
Go 
Around 
May reduce crew capability for 
controlling the airplane during 
specific maneuvers.  Interference with 
crew control near the ground may 
jeopardize continued safe flight and 
landing. 
Hazardous 
22.02 
Erroneous autopilot 
disengagement at low altitude 
without annunciation 
Approach, 
Landing, 
Go 
Around 
Airplane deviates from planned 
vertical and/or lateral flight path and 
airspeed resulting in unsafe flight 
near to the ground until recognized 
by the crew. Airplane may land hard 
and/or short of runway due to 
incomplete or no flare. Landing gear 
or fuselage damage resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
22.03 
Erroneous autopilot 
command which exceeds 
authority limits 
Flight 
Airplane structural damage may result 
due to unrestricted pitch, roll or yaw 
commands. May result in rapid flight 
path responses, unsafe airplane flight 
paths and loss of altitude.  Possible 
ground contact if occurs at low 
altitude resulting in loss of airplane. 
Catastrophic 
22.04 
Erroneous autopilot 
command with failure of 
override or disengagement 
capability 
Flight 
Unsafe airplane flight path due to 
inability of crew to regain control 
resulting in loss of airplane. 
Catastrophic 
22.05 
Loss of automatic stability & 
control capability (loss of 
autopilot) 
Flight 
Crew continues flight under manual 
control. 
Major 
22.06 
Loss of normal control surface 
capability due to erroneous 
operation of autopilot 
Flight 
Crew must recognize erroneous 
control behavior and coordinate 
autopilot disconnect with necessary 
autopilot function override forces to 
maintain desired flight path. 
Major 
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Table 2 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics FHA Summary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Function FC # 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew Classification 
Provide Stability 
& Control: 
 
Crew Control 
Guidance (2.5) 
22.07 
Loss of flight director 
commands, guidance cues. 
Approach, 
Landing, 
Go 
Around 
Crew may need to abort an 
instrument approach. 
Major 
22.08 
Erroneous flight director 
commands, displays and 
annunciations 
Approach, 
Landing, 
Go 
Around 
Crew follows erroneous commands 
until discrepancy detected through 
cross-checks with other flight deck 
visual cues. 
Major 
Maintenance (7) 45.01 
Incorrect data loaded into 
avionics platform without 
detection 
All 
Possible incorrect functional 
operation of multiple avionic 
functions leading to incorrect crew 
airplane operation resulting in loss of 
airplane. 
Catastrophic 
Provide Control 
of Energy: 
 
Control Thrust 
(3.1) 
33.01 
Erroneous automatic thrust 
control performance 
prediction/thrust targets 
Take-off 
Potential inadequate takeoff thrust 
control settings. Crew manually 
adjusts engine performance during 
takeoff roll. 
Major 
33.02 
Erroneous takeoff data 
provided to FADECs 
Take off 
Potential inadequate takeoff thrust 
control settings. Crew must cross 
check displayed engine data against 
settings provided to FADEC. 
Hazardous 
33.03 
Loss of ability to automatically 
control thrust 
Flight 
Crew must manage energy through 
manual means. 
Minor 
33.04 
Erroneous automatic thrust 
control commands 
Flight 
Crew recognizes throttle reduction 
through aural and flight path 
deviation and takes over control of 
engines manually. 
Major 
33.05 
Erroneous automatic thrust 
control (retard) 
Take off 
Crew recognizes throttle reduction 
through aural and flight path 
deviation and takes over control of 
engines manually. 
Major 
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A.1 CP100 4 Safety Objectives and Assurance Levels: 
 Safety objectives will be established using ARP4761 safety activities.  
 Development assurance per ARP4754A, commensurate with assigned functional development 
assurance levels, will ensure structured development mitigation of errors. 
 Airplane safety activities managed in accordance with the airplane safety program plan. 
A.1 CP100 5 Novel or Unique Design Features: 
 Avionic system will be implemented using state-of-the-art IMA platform technology.  
A.1 CP100 6 Certification Basis:  
 The avionics functions for the SAAB-EII 100 airplane will be certificated to 14CFR Part 25; 
o Current amendments, 
o Current advisory material. 
 
 Table 3 Applicable Regulations & Certification Plan Cross Reference identifies the regulations 
applicable to the avionics system functions including non-system specific regulations. 
 A letter (e.g. “(a)”) included with the Applicable Certification Plan document number identifies a 
specific regulation sub-paragraph for which compliance is planned for demonstration in that 
certification plan. 
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Table 3 Applicable Regulations & Certification Plan Cross Reference 
Regulation 
Applicable Cert Plan 
Avionics Others 
SUBPART A - General   
General   
25.1 Applicability CP100  
SUBPART B - FLIGHT  CP200 
SUBPART C - STRUCTURE  CPxxx 
SUBPART D – DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION  CP200, CPxxx 
Design & Construction – General   
25.611 Accessibility provisions CP100  
25.631 Bird strike damage CP100  
Design & Construction – Control Systems   
25.672 Stability augmentation & automatic & power-operated 
systems 
(a) CP100 CP200 
25.677 Trim systems (b) CP100 CP200 
25.703 Takeoff warning system CP100 CP200 
SUBPART E – POWERPLANT  CPxxx 
SUBPART F – EQUIPMENT   
General   
25.1301 Function and installation CP100 CPxxx 
25.1303 Flight and navigation instruments CP100  
25.1305 Powerplant instruments CP100  
25.1307 Miscellaneous equipment CP100  
25.1309 Equipment, systems and Installation CP100 (e) CP300 
25.1310 Power Source Capacity and Distribution (a) CP100 CP300 
25.1316 System Lightning Protection CP100 CP200, CPxxx 
25.1317 High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection CP100 CP200, CPxxx 
25.1321 Arrangement and visibility CP100  
25.1322 Flight crew alerting CP100 CP200, CPxxx 
25.1323 Airspeed indicating system CP100  
25.1325 Static pressure systems CP100  
25.1326 Pitot heat indication systems CP100  
25.1327 Magnetic direction indicator CP100  
25.1329 Flight guidance system CP100  
25.1331 Instruments using a power supply CP100 CP300 
25.1333 Instrument systems CP100  
25.1337 Powerplant instruments CP100  
Electrical Systems and Equipment  CP300 
Lights  CPxxx 
25.1381 Instrument Lights CP100  
Miscellaneous Equipment   
25.1431 Electronic equipment CP100 CPxxx 
SUBPART G – OPERATING LIMITATIONS and INFORMATION   
Operating Limitations   
25.1629 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness CP100 CPxxx 
Marking and Placards   
25.1541 General CP100  
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Table 3 Applicable Regulations & Certification Plan Cross Reference 
Regulation 
Applicable Cert Plan 
Avionics Others 
25.1543 Instrument markings – general CP100  
25.1545 Airspeed limitation information CP100  
25.1549 Powerplant and auxiliary power unit instruments CP100  
25.1551 Oil quantity indication CP100  
25.1553 Fuel quantity indication CP100  
25.1555 Control markings CP100  
25.1563 Airspeed placard CP100  
SUBPART H – ELECTRICAL WIRING INTERCONNECTION 
SYSTEMS (EWIS) 
  
25.1705 Systems and functions: EWIS CP100  
25.1707 System separation: EWIS CP100  
25.1709 System safety: EWIS CP100  
25.1729 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS CP100  
 
Editor Note: In this example excerpt only the means of compliance for 25.1301 & 25.1309 (yellow highlight 
in Table 3) have been developed. See Table 4. 
 
Compliance Methods 
 Compliance to the regulations will be shown by analysis, inspection and test as identified in Table 
4.  The following means of compliance (MoC) summaries are used: 
o Inspection (may be on or off airplane, review), 
o Test (laboratory, ground, flight or equipment qualification), 
o Analysis (safety, simulation, numerical calculation). 
 
 Table 4 Content Description: 
o Column 1 – Regulation number and sub-paragraph identification (as applicable). 
o Column 2 – Regulation text. 
o Column 3 – Compliance approach description, discussion of industry standards, advisory 
material used to support compliance. 
o Column 4 – Sequentially numbered list of the means of compliance. The sequential 
numbers match with compliance artifacts identified in Column 5. 
o Column 5 – Sequentially numbered list of compliance artifacts (e.g. documents, reports, 
analyses, inspections) which contain evidence of rule compliance. 
 
 Development process at the airplane and system levels for the avionic system functionality will 
satisfy the objectives in ARP4754A. 
 
 See the SAAB-EII 100 Avionics Development Plan for the details of the planned airplane level 
function and system development life cycle process. 
 
 Note that Company “A” will be using similarity to satisfy ARP4754A development objectives at the 
system level for the evolution of their existing IMA avionic system to the SAAB-EII 100 airplane 
application. 
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Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
25.1301 Function and installation    
(a) 
Each item of installed equipment must –    
(1) Be of a kind and design 
appropriate to its intended function 
The Avionics system operation will be 
described in a System Description 
Document and demonstrated to be 
appropriate for its intended function 
through inspection, analysis and test. 
 
AC20-115C – Airborne Software 
Assurance 
 
AC-152 – DO-254, Design Assurance 
Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
 
AC20-145 Guidance for Integrated Modular 
Avionics (IMA) that Implement TSO-C153 
Authorized Hardware Elements 
 
AC20-148 – Reusable Software 
components 
 
AC20-170 Change 1 – Integrated Modular 
Avionics Development, Verification, 
Integration and Approval using DO-297 & 
TSO C153 
 
AC20-174 - Development of Civil Aircraft 
and Systems 
 
ARP4754A – Guidelines for Development 
of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
 
1 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Test 
 
4 Inspection 
 
5 Inspection, 
Analysis 
 
6 Inspection 
 
7 Inspection, 
Analysis 
 
8 Inspection 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 Avionics IMA Qualification Test Reports 
 
4 Avionics IMA PHACs 
 
5 Avionics IMA CEH deliverables 
 
 
6 Avionics IMA PSACs 
 
7 Avionics IMA software deliverables 
 
 
8 Avionics equipment assembly drawings 
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Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
DO-178C – Software considerations in 
Airborne Systems & Equipment 
Certification 
 
DO-254 – Design Assurance Guidance for 
Airborne Electronic Hardware 
 
DO-297 – Integrate Modular Avionics (IMA) 
Development Guidance and Certification 
Considerations 
 
(2) Be labeled as to its identification, 
function, or operating limitations, or 
any applicable combination of these 
factors 
All equipment will be labeled for 
identification and function. Any identified 
operating limitations will be included as 
placards or as part of the airplane flight 
manual. 
1 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Inspection 
 
4 Inspection 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 Avionics equipment assembly drawings 
 
4 Airplane Flight Manual 
(3) Be installed according to 
limitations specified for that 
equipment; and 
Equipment will be installed as specified on 
SAAB-EII 100 airplane and Avionics 
Company “A” installation drawings. 
1 Inspection 1 Avionics equipment assembly drawings 
(4) Function properly when installed Equipment will be tested on ground and 
airborne for correct function operation. 
1 Test 
 
2 Test 
1 Flight Test Certification Report 
 
2 Ground Test Certification Report 
(b) EWIS must meet the requirements of 
subpart H of this part 
See Subpart H for complete EWIS compliance approach and MoC statements. 
Title Avionics Certification Plan Doc No. CP100 Date 2/18/2015
 
  34 
Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
25.1309 Equipment, systems and installations   
(a) The equipment, systems, and 
installations whose functioning is 
required by this subchapter, must be 
designed to ensure that they perform 
their intended functions under any 
foreseeable operating condition. 
The Avionics system operation will be 
described in an Airplane Flight Manual, 
System Description Document and 
demonstrated to be appropriate for its 
intended function through inspection, 
analysis and test. 
 
AC20-115B – Airborne Software Assurance 
 
AC-152 – DO-254, Design Assurance 
Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
 
AC20-145 Guidance for Integrated Modular 
Avionics (IMA) that Implement TSO-C153 
Authorized Hardware Elements. 
 
AC20-148 – Reusable Software 
components 
 
AC20-170C1 – Integrated Modular Avionics 
Development, Verification, Integration and 
Approval using DO-297 & TSO C153. 
1 
 
 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Test 
 
4 Inspection 
 
5 Inspection, 
Analysis 
 
6 Inspection 
 
7 Inspection, 
Analysis 
 
8 Inspection 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Flight Manual 
   SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 Avionics IMA Qualification Test Reports 
 
4 Avionics IMA PHACs 
 
5 Avionics IMA CEH deliverables 
 
 
6 Avionics IMA PSACs 
 
7 Avionics IMA software deliverables 
 
 
8 Avionics equipment assembly drawings 
(b) The airplane systems and associated 
components, considered separately and 
in relation to other systems, must be 
designed so that – 
(1) The occurrence of any failure 
condition which would prevent the 
continued safe flight and landing of 
the airplane is extremely improbable, 
and 
The Avionics Safety Analysis will show 
through analysis that the occurrence of any 
failure conditions which would prevent safe 
flight and landing are extremely improbable 
and that other failure conditions which 
reduce the capability of the airplane or 
crew to cope with adverse operating 
conditions are improbable. 
 
1 
 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Analysis 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety Analysis 
(ASA) - Avionics 
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Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
 
 
(2) The occurrence of any other 
failure conditions which would reduce 
the capability of the airplane or the 
ability of the crew to cope with 
adverse operating conditions is 
improbable. 
 
 
AC20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft 
and Systems 
 
ARP4754A – Guidelines for Development 
of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
 
AC/AMJ25.1309 System Design and 
Analysis, RTCA Draft Arsenal revised 2002 
(c) Warning information must be provided 
to alert the crew to unsafe system 
operating conditions, and to enable 
them to take appropriate corrective 
action. Systems, controls, and 
associated monitoring and warning 
means must be designed to minimize 
crew errors which could create 
additional hazards 
Warnings will be provided to the crew for 
unsafe operating conditions and to enable 
corrective actions. The warning system will 
be designed to minimize crew errors to 
mitigate creating additional hazards. 
Warnings for specific airplane and system 
failure conditions will be evaluated through 
simulation as well as ground and airborne 
test. 
1  
 
 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Test 
 
4 Test 
 
5 Test 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Flight Manual 
   SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 Avionics Certification Lab Test Report 
 
4 Flight Test Certification Report 
 
5 Ground Test Certification Report 
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Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
(d) Compliance with the requirements of 
paragraph (b) of this section must be 
shown by analysis, and where 
necessary, by appropriate ground, 
flight, or simulator tests. The analysis 
must consider— 
(1) Possible modes of failure, 
including malfunctions and damage 
from external sources. 
(2) The probability of multiple failures 
and undetected failures. 
(3) The resulting effects on the 
airplane and occupants, considering 
the stage of flight and operating 
conditions, and 
(4) The crew warning cues, corrective 
action required, and the capability of 
detecting faults. 
The Avionics Safety Analysis will evaluate 
through analysis system failures and 
combinations of failures in support of the 
regulatory objectives identified in 
paragraph (b).  This analysis will be 
supplanted by ground, flight and simulator 
testing for specific failures and/or failure 
combinations. 
 
AC20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft 
and Systems 
 
AC/AMJ25.1309 System Design and 
Analysis, RTCA Draft Arsenal revised 2002 
1 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Analysis 
 
 
4 Test 
 
5 Test 
 
6 Test 
1  
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety Analysis 
(ASA) - Avionics 
 
4 Avionics Certification Lab Test Report 
 
5 Flight Test Certification Report 
 
6 Ground Test Certification Report 
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Table 4 Avionics Function Means of Compliance (MoC) Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation Regulation Text Compliance Approach MoC Compliance Artifacts 
(e) In showing compliance with paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this section with regard to 
the electrical system and equipment 
design and installation, critical 
environmental conditions must be 
considered. For electrical generation, 
distribution, and utilization equipment 
required by or used in complying with 
this chapter, except equipment covered 
by Technical Standard Orders 
containing environmental test 
procedures, the ability to provide 
continuous, safe service under 
foreseeable environmental conditions 
may be shown by environmental tests, 
design analysis, or reference to 
previous comparable service 
experience on other aircraft. 
The Avionics system electrical power 
sources will be designed, qualified and 
installed to comply with these objectives.  
The electrical power system will be 
described in the Airplane Flight Manual and 
the Avionics System Description 
Document. Electrical generation and 
distribution compliance to this paragraph is 
provided in the Electrical Power 
Certification Plan, CP300. 
 
AC20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft 
and Systems 
 
AC/AMJ25.1309 System Design and 
Analysis, RTCA Draft Arsenal revised 2002 
1 
 
 
 
2 Inspection 
 
3 Analysis 
 
 
4 Test 
1 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Flight Manual 
   SAAB-EII 100 Avionics System 
Description 
 
2 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
3 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety Analysis 
(ASA) - Avionics 
 
4 Avionics IMA Qualification Test Reports 
 
(f) EWIS must be assessed in accordance 
with the requirements of §25.1709. 
The Avionics System Safety Analysis will 
include the associated airplane wiring 
system as one of the functional elements 
being assessed for showing compliance to 
this requirement. 
1 Inspection 
 
2 Analysis 
1 Avionics Certification Summary 
 
2 SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety Analysis 
(ASA) - Avionics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------End of CP100 Airplane Avionics Certification Plan Excerpt------- 
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Editor Note:  Configuration control of avionics development plan document is per system control category 
2, using version change management process control. 
 
  
NASA Study
Baseline Architecture
Example Study Excerpt
SAAB-EII 100
Avionics Development Plan
ARP4754A 5.8.4.3
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
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SCALE 1 : 1 SHEET 1 OF 1
REVISIONS
REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
-
Revised figure 6 to separate maintenance level testing requirements into two 
independent sets. See Figure 7.
A 18 Feb 2015
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A.1 ADP100 1 Introduction: 
 This Plan describes the airplane level development process for avionics functions to be installed 
on the SAAB-EII 100 airplane. 
 Plan addresses engineering life cycle including function design, requirements generation, analysis, 
requirements validation, function verification. 
 Plan includes the identification and assignment of the appropriate Functional Development 
Assurance Level (FDAL) rigor to be performed at the airplane level as well as the flow down 
system tiers. 
A.1 ADP100 2 Avionics Development Overview: 
 The avionics development process will ensure support of the certification process outlined in 
CP100.  
 The avionics development process is structured to ensure satisfaction of ARP4754A objectives 
commensurate with the rigor of the assigned development assurance level (FDAL). 
 The avionics development process is based on re-use of an integrated modular avionic 
implementation certificated on another airplane. 
 The SAAB-EII 100 avionics development process will generate the necessary project artifacts for 
the airplane functionality to support the existing Company “A” Advanced Flight Deck functions as 
well as generating the documentation needed to define unique SAAB-EII 100 airplane 
characteristics (e.g. interfaces, functional properties, installations). 
 Figure 5 presents a high level summary of the Avionics development activities.  It should be noted 
that the non-linear aspects of the development activities (feedback paths) are not shown. 
 
 
Figure 5 Avionic System Development Requirement Activities 
Concept Development
Production/
Operation
Avionics Function 
Development
Avionic System 
Development (By 
Company “A”
Production, test 
& operation 
data
Airplane
Company “A” 
Existing Functions & 
Characteristics
Avionic 
Function 
Verification
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A.1 ADP100 3 System Description: 
Avionics Flight deck will include Company “A” Advanced Flight Deck which integrates multiple avionic 
functions into a single system implementation: 
 Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) from Company “A” 
o Company A IMA implementation certificated on other aircraft. 
o IMA includes the following system functions:  
 Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23),  
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
 Maintenance (ATA 45). 
 
A.1 ADP100 4 Avionics Function Requirements Development: 
 Airplane Avionic function requirements will be captured and validated for the following functions: 
o Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
o Communications (ATA23),  
o Displays (ATA31),  
o Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
o Maintenance (ATA 45). 
 
 Airplane Avionic Function Development initial life cycle is shown in Figure 6. 
 Airplane Avionics Development ARP4754A objective activities accomplished to the level of rigor 
assigned for each function. 
 See Table 5 FDALs assigned based on results identified in Avionics PASA (Document 
SE100PASA), section FDAL Assignment. 
 Airplane Avionic Function Development life cycle post PASA recommended updates shown in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 6 Airplane Avionic Function Development Life Cycle - Initial 
 
 
Table 5 SAAB-EII 100 Avionic Function FDAL Assignments 
Avionic Function FDAL 
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA22) A 
Communications (ATA23) A 
Displays (ATA31) A 
Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34) B 
Maintenance (ATA45)  
Maintenance A Testing & 
Data/Program Loading 
A 
System(s) Maintenance Testing D 
Platform A 
 
  
Airplane Avionics Function Requirements
Autoflight/
Autopilot Function 
Requirements
Communication 
Function 
Requirements
Display Function 
Requirements
Navigation/Flight 
Management 
Function 
Requirements
Airplane Maintenance 
Function Requirements
Avionic Platform 
Requirements
Airplane Function Requirement 
Allocated to Systems
Airplane Avionics Function Verification
System Requirement 
Allocated to Items
System Level 
Verification
Item 
Implementation
Reqts
Autoflight/
Autopilot 
Integration & Test
Communication 
Function 
Integration & Test
Display Function 
Integration & Test
Navigation/Flight 
Management 
Integration & Test
Airplane Maintenance 
Function Integration & 
Test
Avionic Platform 
Integration & Test
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Figure 7 Airplane Avionic Function Development –Life Cycle - Post PASA 
 
A.1 ADP100 4.1 Requirements Capture & Validation: 
 
 Requirements for each of the avionic functions will be captured and managed independently but 
may be combined into a single document structure for transmittal to the avionic system supplier. 
o Maintenance function development further split into Level A maintenance and Level D 
maintenance to facilitate different criticalities and optimize project development activities. 
 Requirements captured using database style requirements documentation tool. 
 Requirements validated using process and techniques outlined in ARP4754A. 
o Requirements validated using combination of methods: 
o Methods of validation include: 
 Traceability,  
 Analysis, 
 Test,  
 Modeling or, 
 Inspection (engineering review).  
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A.1 ADP100 4.2 Avionic Function Verification: 
 
 Verify avionic system implementation satisfies captured airplane level requirements. 
 Airplane Level Requirements verified using process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
o Function requirements verified using a combination of methods. 
o Methods of verification include: 
 Inspection (engineering review),  
 Analysis and, 
 Test (demonstration). 
 Avionic safety assessments accomplished by integrating Company “A” avionic safety assessment 
data into Airplane Safety Group generated SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety Assessment. 
 Preferred method of avionic function verification will be test. 
 Requirements based functional verification procedures will be developed and executed against the 
final installed avionics functions, on ground and in-flight. 
 
A.1 ADP100 5 ARP4754A Objectives Mapping: 
 
 Table 6 presents a high level mapping of ARP4754A objectives to program artifacts which provide 
evidence for satisfaction of the ARP objectives. 
  
Title Avionics Development Plan Doc No. ADP100 Date 2/18/2015
 
  44 
Table 6 Avionics System ARP4754A (Appendix A) Summary of Objectives Mapping 
ARP4754A SAAB-EII 100 
Objective 
Ref No Objective Description Output Reference Data 
1.0 Planning 
1.1 / 1.2 
System development and integral 
processes activities are defined and 
include transition criteria and 
interrelationships. 
Certification Plan 
SAAB-EII 100 Certification 
Plan,CP010 
Avionics Certification Plan, ACP100 
Safety Program Plan 
Avionics Safety Program Plan, Doc 
# TBA 
Development Plan 
Avionics Development Plan, 
ADP100 (this document) 
Validation Plan 
Verification Plan 
Configuration Management 
Plan 
Doc # TBA 
Process Assurance Plan Doc # TBA 
2.0 Aircraft and System Development Process and Requirements Capture 
2.1 Aircraft-level functions, functional 
requirement, functional interfaces and 
assumptions are defined 
List of Aircraft-level functions 
Aircraft-level Requirements  
SAAB-EII 100 Avionics Function 
Requirements, Doc # TBA 
2.2 Aircraft functions are allocated to 
systems 
System Requirements  
Company “A” objective 
2.3 System requirements, including 
assumptions and system interfaces are 
defined. 
System Requirements  
2.4 System derived requirements (including 
derived safety-related requirements) 
are defined and rationale explained. 
System Requirements  
2.5 System architecture is defined. System Design Description 
2.6 System requirements are allocated to 
the items. 
Item Requirements  
2.7 Appropriate item, system and aircraft 
integrations are performed. Verification Summary 
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
3.0 Safety Assessment Process 
3.1 
The aircraft/system functional hazard 
assessment is performed. 
Aircraft FHA 
 
 
System FHA 
 
SAAB-EII 100  Airplane (Avionics) 
FHA, SE100AvFHA  
 
Avionic System FHA is Company 
“A” objective. 
3.2 
The preliminary aircraft safety 
assessment is performed. 
PASA 
SAAB-EII 100 Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA), 
SE100PASA 
3.3 
The preliminary system safety 
assessment is performed. 
PSSA Company “A” objective 
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ARP4754A SAAB-EII 100 
Objective 
Ref No Objective Description Output Reference Data 
3.4 
The common cause analyses are 
performed. 
Particular Risk Assessment Docs TBA 
Common Mode Analysis 
SAAB-EII 100 Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA), 
SE100PASA 
Zonal Safety Analysis Docs TBA 
3.5 
The aircraft safety assessment is 
performed. 
ASA 
SAAB-EII 100 Airplane Safety 
Assessment (ASA), SE100ASA 
3.6 
The system safety assessment is 
performed. 
SSA Company “A” objective 
3.7 
Independence requirements in 
functions, systems and items are 
captured 
System, HW, SW Requirements 
PASA 
PSSA 
SAAB-EII 100 Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA), 
SE100PASA provides airplane level 
 
PSSA is Company “A” objective 
4.0 Requirements Validation Process 
4.1 
Aircraft, system, item requirements are 
complete and correct. 
Validation Results 
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
 
System level – See Company “A” 
artifacts 
4.2 Assumptions are justified and validated Validation Results 
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
4.3 
Derived requirements are justified and 
validated. 
Validation Results 
4.4 Requirements are traceable. Validation Results 
4.6 
Validation compliance substantiation is 
provided. 
Validation Summary (including 
Validation Matrix) 
5.0 Implementation Verification Process 
5.1 
Test or demonstration procedures are 
correct. 
Verification Procedures Avionics Function Verification 
Procedures, Doc # TBA 
5.2 
Verification demonstrates intended 
function and confidence of no 
unintended function impacts to safety. 
Verification Procedures  
Verification Results 
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
 
Flight Test Certification Report 
 
Ground Test Certification Report 
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ARP4754A SAAB-EII 100 
Objective 
Ref No Objective Description Output Reference Data 
5.3 
Product implementation complies with 
aircraft, and system requirements. 
Verification Procedures  
Avionics Function Verification 
Procedures, Doc # TBA 
Verification Results 
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
 
Flight Test Certification Report 
 
Ground Test Certification Report 
5.4 Safety requirements are verified. 
Verification Procedures and 
Results 
ASA,  
SSA 
Avionics Function Verification 
Procedures, Doc # TBA  
Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
5.5 
Verification compliance substantiation 
is included. 
Verification Matrix Airplane level – Avionics Function 
Validation & Verification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
 
Flight Test Certification Report, Doc 
# TBA 
 
Ground Test Certification Report, 
Doc # TBA 
Verification Summary 
5.6 
Assessment of deficiencies and their 
related impact on safety is identified. 
Verification Summary  
Problem Reports 
6.0 Configuration Management Process 
6.1 Configuration items are identified. CM Records 
Title and Doc # TBA 
6.2 
Configuration baseline and derivatives 
are established. 
Configuration Baseline Records 
6.3 
Problem reporting, change control, 
change review, and configuration 
status accounting are established. 
Problem reports CM Records 
6.4 Archive and retrieval are established. CM Records 
7.0 Process Assurance Process 
7.1 
Assurance is obtained that necessary 
plans are developed and maintained for 
all aspects of system certification. 
Evidence of Process Assurance 
Title and Doc # TBA 
7.2 
Development activities and processes 
are conducted in accordance with those 
plans. 
Evidence of Process Assurance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------- End of ADP100 Avionics Development Plan Excerpt------- 
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NASA Study
Baseline Architecture
Example document excerpt.
SAAB-EII 100
Avionic System Preliminary Aircraft 
Safety Assessment (PASA)
ARP4754A 5.1.2
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
A SE100PASA -
SCALE 1 : 1 SHEET 1 OF 1
 
 
REVISIONS
CN No. REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
- Initial release 12 Feb 2015
 
Editor Note:  Configuration control of safety document is per system control category 1, under full problem 
report/change management process control.  Background color used to highlight this as safety assessment 
document. 
Editor Note:  Extract contains only the PASA information pertinent to FDAL assignment. 
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Avionic System PASA Section FDAL Assignment 
 
 Avionics Functionality – Table PASA-1 Columns 1 and 2 summarize failure conditions and 
classifications from SE100AVFHA. 
 Table PASA-2 Column 3 identifies assigned FDAL based only on single failure condition 
classifications. 
 Table PASA-1 Column 4 highlights where the PASA-CMA has identified that independence 
characteristics exist such that the FDAL assignment may take credit for architectural error 
mitigation.  The assignment is based on the Failure Condition Classification and the existence of 
functional independence.  Functional independence is established if the development exhibits 
different functions with different requirements. 
 Table PASA-1 Column 5 identifies assigned FDAL based on an evaluation of the independence 
characteristics associated with the development process need to support each Avionic Function.  
The assigned FDAL is based on most severe failure condition being supported.  In this case, 
multiple catastrophic FCs will be implemented resulting in the common hardware and software 
functionality requiring FDAL A assurance. 
 
Table 7 PASA-1 Avionic Functions FDAL Assignment 
1 2 3 4 5 
Avionic Function FC ID Numbers 
FC 
Classification FC FDAL 
Functional 
Independent 
Attribute 
(Y/N) 
Assigned 
FDAL 
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA22)   N A 
22.02, 22.03, 22.04 Catastrophic A   
22.01 Hazardous B   
22.05, 22.06, 22.07, 22.08 Major C   
Communications (ATA23)   N A 
23.01 Catastrophic A   
23.02, 23.03 Major C   
Displays (ATA31)   N A 
31.01, 31.02, 31.05, 31.07, 31.11, 
31.12, 31.16, 31.27, 31.28 
Catastrophic A 
 
 
31.03, 31.08,31.19, 31.21 Hazardous B   
31.04, 31.06, 31.09, 31.10, 31.13, 
31.14, 31.15, 31.17, 31.18, 31.20, 
31.22, 31.23, 31.24, 31.25, 31.26, 
31.29 
Major C 
 
 
Navigation/Flight Management 
(ATA34) 
  
N 
B 
34.03,31.04, 31.07 Hazardous B   
34.01, 34.02, 31.05, 31.06, 34.08 Major C   
Maintenance (ATA45)   N1 A & D1 
45.01 Catastrophic A   
45.xx Minor D   
Platform   N A2 
Multiple FC IDs     
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Note 1: Development process for Maintenance functionality will need to be partitioned during the 
development life cycle so that maintenance functions supporting multi-assurance levels may be 
accomplished OR all maintenance functionality must be developed to FDAL A. 
 
Editor’s Note: The independence requirements summarized in the PASA Section CMA to follow were 
developed through evaluation of the planned avionic architectural implementation using fault tree analysis, 
dependency diagrams or other requirement identification techniques.  The use of “independence” 
conforms to the definition identified in ARP4754A (1) – “concept which minimizes the likelihood of 
common mode errors and cascade failures”. 
Avionic System PASA Section CMA 
 
Independence Requirement Summary: 
1. Display of Primary Attitude information shall be independent of standby attitude information 
2. Display of Primary Airspeed information shall be independent of standby airspeed information. 
3. Display of Primary Altitude information shall be independent of standby airspeed information. 
4. Display of Primary Heading information shall be independent of standby airspeed information. 
5. Left engine parameter displays shall be independent of right engine parameter displays. 
6. Navigation capability shall be independent of communication capability. 
7. Captain displayed navigation/position information shall be independent of First Officer displayed 
navigation/position information. 
8. Take off configuration monitoring shall be independent of aircraft configuration. 
9. Autopilot engagement monitoring/warning shall be independent of autopilot. 
10. Autopilot command monitoring/limiting shall be independent of autopilot command generation. 
11. Maintenance data load monitoring/annunciation shall be independent of maintenance data load. 
 
Individual independence requirement evaluations are presented in Tables CMA-1 through CM-7. 
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Table 8 PASA-2 Avionic System FDAL Assignment Summary 
Avionic Function 
Independence 
Attribute FDAL 
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA22) N A 
Communications (ATA23) N A 
Displays (ATA31) N A 
Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34) N B 
Maintenance (ATA45) N1 A1 
1 .Maintenance A Testing & Data/Program 
Loading (45.01) 
Y A 
2. Misc. Airplane Function Maintenance Testing 
(45.xx) 
Y 
D 
Platform N A 
 
 
Note 1: Maintenance (ATA45) Independence Attribute:   
The Maintenance Function Independence attribute is not demonstrated in current planned development 
activity. If PASA recommendations are accepted; to capture Maintenance functionality in two 
independently managed requirement sets, then independence criteria will be satisfied and ARP4754A 
option 1 or 2 may be used to assign the FDAL for Maintenance A Testing (1) and Misc. Airplane Function 
Maintenance Testing (2).  
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Table 9 PASA CMA-1 
1. Display of Primary Attitude information shall be independent of standby attitude information. 
2. Display of Primary Airspeed information shall be independent of standby airspeed information. 
3. Display of Primary Altitude information shall be independent of standby altitude information. 
4. Display of Primary Heading information shall be independent of standby heading information. 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Redundant primary and standby displays will 
each be electrically powered from circuit 
breaker protected independent power 
sources. 
 Data Source (input) Failure Redundant sensors are used to provide 
information to primary displays. Standby 
instrument contains independent sensors for 
local display. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Primary and standby displays of attitude, 
airspeed, altitude and heading will be 
implemented using different technologies by 
different manufacturers. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Primary and standby displays of attitude, 
airspeed, altitude and heading will be 
implemented using different software 
languages by different manufacturers using 
different toolsets. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for display of flight deck 
information (attitude, airspeed, altitude, 
heading) causes failure condition of 
interest due to error in common 
requirement. 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements. Error 
mitigation is acceptably established between 
functions. However, functionality within a 
specific functional area (e.g. Displays ATA31) 
may have common requirements, common 
development processing and potential for 
common requirement misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for these 
independence requirements. FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 10 PASA CMA-2 
5. Left engine parameter displays shall be independent of right engine parameter displays 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Redundant primary and standby displays will 
each be electrically powered from circuit 
breaker protected independent power 
sources. 
 Data Source (input) Failure The left and right engine data sources and 
interface paths will be independent. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Primary engine display hardware will be 
developed to assurance level commensurate 
with functional hazard. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Primary engine display software will be 
developed to assurance level commensurate 
with functional hazard. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for display of left and right 
engine parameter information causes 
failure condition of interest due to error in 
common requirement(s). 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  
Error mitigation is acceptably established 
between functions. However, functionality 
within a specific functional area (e.g. Displays 
ATA31) may have common requirements, 
common development processing and 
potential for common requirement 
misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement. FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 11 PASA CMA-3 
6. Navigation capability shall be independent of communication capability 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Redundant communication and navigation 
function items will each be electrically 
powered from circuit breaker protected 
independent power sources. 
 Data Source (input) Failure  
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Navigation and communication hardware will 
be developed to assurance level 
commensurate with functional hazard. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Navigation and communication software will 
be developed to assurance level 
commensurate with functional hazard. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for communication function 
causes failure condition of interest due to 
error in common requirement(s). 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  
Error mitigation is acceptably established 
between functions. However, functionality 
within a specific functional area (e.g. 
Communications ATA23) may have common 
requirements, common development 
processing and potential for common 
requirement misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement.  FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 12 PASA CMA-4 
7. Captain displayed navigation/position information shall be independent of First Officer 
displayed navigation/position information 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Captain and First officer 
navigational/positional displays and sensor 
information paths will each be electrically 
powered from circuit breaker protected 
independent power sources. 
 Data Source (input) Failure Redundant and independent sensor inputs 
will be selected and validate for use in 
displayed navigation information. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Captain and First Officer 
navigational/positional displays developed 
assurance level commensurate with functional 
hazard. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Captain and First Officer 
navigational/positional displays developed 
assurance level commensurate with functional 
hazard. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for communication function 
causes failure condition of interest due to 
error in common requirement(s). 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  
Error mitigation is acceptably established 
between functions. However, functionality 
within a specific functional area (e.g. 
Communications ATA23) may have common 
requirements, common development 
processing and potential for common 
requirement misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement.  FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 13 PASA CMA-5 
8. Take off configuration monitoring shall be independent of aircraft configuration 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
 Data Source (input) Failure Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for configuration monitoring 
function causes failure condition of 
interest due to error in common 
requirement(s). 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  
Error mitigation is acceptably established 
between functions. However, functionality 
within a specific functional area (e.g. 
Communications ATA23) may have common 
requirements, common development 
processing and potential for common 
requirement misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement.  FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 14 PASA CMA-6 
9. Autopilot engagement monitoring/warning shall be independent of autopilot. 
10. Autopilot command monitoring/limiting shall be independent of autopilot command generation. 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
 Data Source (input) Failure Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for configuration monitoring 
function causes failure condition of 
interest due to error in common 
requirement(s). 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  
Error mitigation is acceptably established 
between functions. However, functionality 
within a specific functional area (e.g. 
Communications ATA23) may have common 
requirements, common development 
processing and potential for common 
requirement misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement.  FDAL will be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
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Table 15 PASA CMA-7 
11. Maintenance data load monitoring/annunciation shall be independent of maintenance data load. 
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  DESIGN ARCHITECTURE 
Common Mode Sources Common Modes Failure /Errors Analysis / Discussion 
External Sources Electrical Power Distribution failure  Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
 Data Source (input) Failure Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  TECHNOLOGY, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Redundant, Similar Hardware 
 
Hardware development errors 
Common components fail (type, usage, 
etc.) 
Verification tools  
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
Redundant, Similar Software Common software development errors 
Common software development tools 
Verification tools 
Editor – Not pertinent to ARP4754A example. 
   
CONCEPT & DESIGN:  SPECIFICATIONS 
Same specification Specification for maintenance monitoring 
function causes failure condition of 
interest due to error in common 
requirement(s) with data load function. 
Avionics Development Plan indicates that 
avionic function requirements will be captured 
and managed as independent elements.  Error 
mitigation is acceptably established between 
functions. However, functionality within a 
specific functional area (e.g. Maintenance 
ATA45) may have common requirements, 
common development processing and 
potential for common requirement 
misinterpretation. 
 
A functional development independence 
attribute is not demonstrated for this 
independence requirement.  FDAL shall be 
assigned based on most severe failure 
condition – Level A. 
 
It is recommended that the Avionic 
Maintenance function requirement 
specification be subdivided into the elements 
of Maintenance which must support 
catastrophic (Level A) failure conditions and 
those that must support normal airplane 
maintenance functions. Using this life cycle 
process, there would be no common errors in 
Maintenance Level D functionality which may 
cause or contribute to a Level A FC. 
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------- End of SE100PASA Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment excerpt -------- 
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Title Avionic System Development Plan Doc No. SDP100 Date 4/24/2015
A.1 SDP100 1 Introduction: 
 Plan describes the system development process for Avionics functions to be installed on the 
SAAB-EII 100 airplane. 
 Plan addresses engineering life cycle including function design, requirements generation, analysis, 
requirements validation, function verification for re-used functionality and modified functionality. 
 Plan includes the identification and assignment of the appropriate Item Development Assurance 
Level (IDAL) rigor to be performed for airborne electronic hardware and software development. 
 Plan fulfills the intent of ARP4754A objectives planning for: 
o Development (section 4), 
o Requirements Management (section 5.3), 
o Validation (section 5.4), 
o Verification (section 5.5). 
A.1 SDP100 2 Avionics System Description: 
The Company “A” Avionics Flight Deck integrates multiple avionic functions into a single Integrated 
Modular Avionic (IMA) system implementation: 
 The Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) includes the following functions: 
o IMA implementation certificated on “OTHER” aircraft  
o Baseline IMA includes the following system functions:  
 Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23),  
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
 Maintenance (ATA 45). 
 
A.1 SDP100 3 Avionics System Development Overview: 
 The avionics system development process will ensure support of the certification process outlined 
in the SAAB-EII 100 Avionics Certification Plan (CP100). 
 The avionics system development process is structured to ensure satisfaction of ARP4754A 
objectives commensurate with the assigned development assurance level (FDAL). 
 This plan responds to the following ARP4754A planning objectives: 
o Requirements Management, 
o Requirements Validation, 
o Requirement Verification, 
o Configuration Management, 
o Process Assurance. 
 The avionics system development process is based on re-using an integrated avionic 
implementation certificated on another airplane. 
 The SAAB-EII 100 avionics system development process will use a combination of 
similarity/service experience to previous program ARP4754A objective data and the generation of 
new objective evidence for the unique airplane functionality to satisfy the SAAB-EII 100 ARP4754A 
development life cycle. 
 Figure 8 presents a high level summary of the Avionics System development activities. 
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Figure 8 Generalized Avionics System Development Life Cycle 
 
A.1 SDP100 3.1 Reuse Analysis Plan: 
 Table 16 presents the top level SAAB-EII Avionics Development plan and strategy for reuse of 
baseline avionic system functionality. 
 Table 17 presents the planned program strategy nomenclature descriptions. 
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Table 16 SAAB-EII 100 Avionics Reuse Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
System Functional Area
System 
Func or 
Item
Existing 
FDAL 
/IDAL
New 
FDAL 
/IDAL
Rigors 
Differ
Program 
Strategy
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA 22) Sys A A No Adapt
SW - AFCS App Item A A No RWC
HW - AP Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Roll Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Yaw Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch Trim Servo Item B B No Reuse
Communications (ATA 23) Sys A A No Reapply
SW - Radio Tune App - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Datalink Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Audio Control Panel Item Reuse
HW - TCAS Item Reuse
Displays (ATA 31) Sys A A No Adapt
SW - PFD Graphics Common App Item A A No Reuse
SW - PFD Graphics Instrument "T" App Item B B No Reuse
SW - Warn Function App Item RWC
SW - Warn Function Common App Item Reuse
SW - WX Graphics App Item Reuse
HW - Display Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Standby Instrument Item Reuse
HW - Display Unit - PFD Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - EICAS Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - MFD Item B B No RWC
Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34) Sys B B No Adapt
SW - Flight Management App Item Reuse
SW - Take off Performance App Item RWC
SW - MCDU Host App Item Reuse
SW - GPS Nav App Item Reuse
SW - Radio Tune App - Nav Item Reuse
HW - Inertial Sensor Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Nav Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Nav Item Reuse
HW - GPS Antenna Item Reuse
HW - MCDU Item Reuse
Maintenance (ATA45) Sys A A No Adapt
SW - CMC App Item D D RWC
SW - Dataload App Item A A Reuse
IMA Platform Sys A A No Adapt
SW - Operating System App Item A A Reuse
SW - Middleware Apps Item A A Reuse
SW - HW Abstraction Layer App Item A A RWC
SW - Comm Network Core App Item A A RWC
SW - Comm Network Messaging App Item A A RWC
HW - Power Supply Item A A Reuse
HW - Cabinets Item A A Reuse
HW - Multipurpose computers Item A A Reuse
HW - Comm Network Item A A Reuse
HW - Airplane Interfaces Item C C New
Sensors Sys D D No Reapply
HW - Weather Radar Item Reuse
HW - Weather Radar Controller Item Reuse
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Table 17 Reuse Strategy Nomenclature 
 
A.1 SDP100 4 Avionic System Safety: 
 The system safety process includes requirements development as well as implementation 
verification activities that support the avionic system development.  
 This process provides a methodology to evaluate airplane function failure conditions and the 
avionic system design performing these functions to establish that the identified hazards have 
been properly addressed.   
 The avionics systems development process will include the following safety activities: 
 
o Avionic System Functional Hazard Analysis, 
o Preliminary Avionic System Safety Assessment, 
 Safety requirement development 
 FDAL / IDAL assignment (assignment substantiation) 
o Avionic System Safety Assessment, 
o Avionic System Common Cause Analysis, 
o Avionic System Level FMEA, 
o Equipment Level Safety Assessment(s)(as needed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reuse
Reusing an item (SW Application or HW element) from another aircraft program 
without modification to the item itself.
Reuse with Change (RWC) Reusing an item from another airplane program with modifications to the item.
New
Develop a new item; i.e. this is the first instance of this function 
implementation.
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reapply
Select Reapply if the entire system is being reused from another airplane 
program (i.e., all of the items in the system are identified as Reapply).  The 
activities are related to adding traceability from existing system requirements 
to new airplane program Function requirements and integration of the system.
Adapt
Select Adapt if one or more of the items is identified as Reuse with Change with 
other items are identified as Reuse.
Determining the Item Change Type
Determining the System Change Type
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A.1 SDP100 5 Avionic System Requirements Development, Validation & 
Verification: 
 Requirements development, validation and avionic system requirement verification plans are 
discussed in this section. 
 Figure 9 presents the high level avionics system development process flow. 
 Any changes in FDAL or IDAL assignments between the established baseline artifact level of rigor 
and the SAAB-EII 100 program assigned level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for a 
negotiated development approach. 
o Note- FDAL assignments A-B-C have minimal differences with respect to ARP4754A 
process objectives. 
 
A.1 SDP100 5.1 Requirements Development & Management: 
 
 The Avionic System “X.Y” requirements set will form the baseline for the SAAB-EII 100 Avionic 
System. 
 The baseline requirements were developed to the level of rigor identified in Column 3 of Table 16 
and include the following information: 
o Unique requirement identifier, 
o Requirement text, 
o Rationale (reason for having the requirement if requirement was derived), 
o Parent trace linkage capability, 
o Safety related attribute. 
 
 As part of the SAAB-EII 100 development process, the baseline Company “A” avionic system 
requirement set will be evolved to include traceability information between the SAAB-EII 100 
requirement specifications and the baseline avionic requirement set.  See Figure 10 for artifact 
evolution plan. 
 Requirements that need to be modified to satisfy SAAB-EII OEM requirements will be managed 
through the configuration management process to ensure traceability to the baseline. 
 Changed requirements will be revalidated using the requirement validation process. 
 New requirements will be introduced to the baseline requirement set using the CM process and 
validated using the validation process. 
 All SAAB-EII 100 baseline requirement set validation attributes will be set initially to invalid status. 
 An illustration of the requirement levels and tracing between these levels is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 9 System Requirements Activity Plan 
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Figure 10 Baseline X.Y Evolution on SAAB-EII 100 
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Figure 11 Baseline Requirements and Tracing 
 
A.1 SDP100 5.2 Requirements Validation: 
 The validation of requirements and specific assumptions ensures that the specified requirements 
are sufficiently correct and complete so that the developed product will provide the intended 
functionality. 
o Validation is a structured process for ensuring the correctness and completeness of the set 
of captured requirements. 
o The validation process also includes capture and evaluation of assumptions made during 
the requirement capture process to ensure: 
 Assumptions have been explicitly stated, 
 Assumptions are appropriately disseminated and,  
 Assumptions are justified by supporting data. 
 Validation activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their validation 
status. 
 Validation activities accomplished and the completed validation matrix will be included in the 
Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the validation process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
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A.1 SDP100 5.2.1 Requirements Validation Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be validated using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be validated using combination of methods: 
 Methods of validation include: 
o Traceability,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Test,  
o Similarity or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 It is anticipated that the bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be validated through 
similarity to the certificated baseline. 
 Traceability will be established between the baseline requirement set and the SAAB-EII 100 
avionic function requirement set, where appropriate. 
 Baseline requirement set derived requirements and assumptions will be revalidated as part of the 
SAAB-EII 100 validation process. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the validation process for all requirements. 
 For simplicity of process, validation of requirement sets supporting FDALs A through C will be 
accomplished with independence. 
  Requirements supporting FDAL assignments A thru C will be summarized in a validation matrix. 
 This matrix tracks the validation status of each requirement or assumption and captures the 
validation methods used to establish the validation result and artifact references capturing the 
evidence. 
 An example validation matrix shown in Table 18. 
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Table 18 Example Completed Validation Matrix 
    
Validation 
Method   
Unique ID 
Text 
(Requirement or Assumption) S
a
fe
ty
 
Requirement 
Source I
n
s
p
e
c
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
is
 
S
im
il
a
ri
ty
 
T
e
s
t 
T
ra
c
e
 
Validation Artifact 
Reference 
Reqt 
Valid  
(Y/N) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y AVACFT-R-1464 X  X  X CN-1465 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N Derived X  X   CN-1465 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N Assumption X     ECM-SAABEII-CompA-14 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N AVACFT-R-1490 X  X  X CN-1465 Y 
AVSYS-R-456           
           
           
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
Requirement Sources: Parent Reqt ID, Derived, Assumption 
Validation Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); S – Similarity; Test – Test; Trace -Traceability; 
Reqt Valid – Y if requirement has completed validation effort and artifact has found requirement valid. 
CN = Change Notice 
ECM = Engineering Communication Memo 
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A.1 SDP100 5.3 Requirements Verification: 
 Verification of requirements and specific assumptions is the process of ensuring that the 
completed system has successfully implemented the requirements. 
 Verification is a structured process for ensuring implementation complies with the set of captured 
requirements. 
 Verification activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their 
verification status. 
 Verification activities accomplished and the completed verification matrix will be included in the 
Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the verification process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
A.1 SDP100 5.3.1 Requirements Verification Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be verified using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be verified using combination of methods: 
 Methods of verification include: 
o Test,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Service Experience or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 It is anticipated that the bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be verified through test. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the verification process for all requirements. 
 Verification artifacts will be managed appropriate for the function development assurance level. 
 
 Requirements supporting functions with FDAL A will be verified with independence. 
 Requirements supporting functions with FDAL B & C will be verified with independence as a 
process goal but may be verified by requirement originators as necessary. 
 For simplicity of process, verification test procedures supporting FDALs A thru C will be managed 
using change management control level 1. 
 Requirements supporting FDALS A thru C will be summarized in a verification matrix. 
 This matrix tracks the verification status of each requirement and captures the verification 
method(s) used to establish the verification result and artifact references capturing the verification 
evidence. 
 An example verification matrix shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Example Completed Verification Matrix 
  
   Verification 
Method(s) 
 
  
Unique ID Requirement Text 
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Verification 
Procedure 
Reference 
Verification 
Artifact 
Reference 
Pass / 
Fail 
(P/F) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y A Displays  X   NA 
Avionic System 
SSA 
P 
AVSYS-R-xxx            
AVSYS-R-xxx            
AVSYS-R-xxx            
AVSYS-R-456            
            
            
 
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
 
Verification Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); Service – Service Experience; Test – Test (Demonstration) 
NA – not applicable 
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A.1 SDP100 6 Avionic System Configuration & Change Management: 
 Configuration management of development artifacts are the responsibility of the originating group. 
 The central Company “A” CM organization provides tools, services and process to assist in this 
task. 
 Artifacts created during the development and used as part of the certification process will be 
managed per the detailed process described in the “Company A Configuration Management Plan” 
appropriate to the level of rigor established for the artifact. 
 Artifacts to be managed include: 
o Avionic System Development Plan (this document), 
o Avionic system requirements documentation, 
o Avionic system safety assessments, 
o Avionic system validation evidence, 
o Avionic system verification procedures, 
o Avionic system verification evidence, 
o Avionic system validation & verification accomplishment summary. 
 Requirements, safety assessment and verification procedure artifacts will be managed using detail 
change management process (Change control level 1 aka CM Level 1) 
 All other program artifacts will be managed using version control change management process 
(change control level 2 aka CM Level 2). 
A.1 SDP100 7 Avionic System Process Assurance: 
 Process assurance is integral to the development activities to ensure that the system development 
and supporting processes are appropriate, maintained, and followed.  
 Process assurance is performed by the Company “A” Quality Assurance (QA) organization. 
 Process assurance is evaluated against: 
o ARP4754A objectives based on development assurance rigor (FDAL) 
o DO-178 objectives based on development assurance rigor (IDAL).  See PSAC for specific 
details. 
o DO-254 objectives based on development assurance rigor (IDAL).  See PHAC for specific 
details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------- End of SDP100 Avionic System Development Plan excerpt ------- 
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Appendix A.2 Study Architecture 1 
(aka SAAB-EII 200) 
Introduction 
 
An example of planning specific change activities to avionics system hosted functionality being used on 
the same airplane as was previously certificated.  Legacy avionic system (IMA) developed per ARP4754. 
 
Example project ARP4754A artifacts developed include: 
 
Airplane Level 
Airplane Project Specific Certification Plan (PSCP200) 
 
Systems Level 
Avionic System Development Plan (ASDP200) 
 
Item Level 
None – not a feature of study 
 
  
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
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NASA Study
Architecture 1
SAAB-EII 200
Project Specific 
Certification Plan
6.6.1, 6.6.4
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
A PSCP200 -
SCALE 1 : 1 SHEET 1 of 1
ARP4754A, 6.2(a)(b)ARP4754A, 6.2(a)(b)(c)
 
REVISIONS
CN No. REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
- -
A
Initial release
Revised per Change Request 165.
06 Mar 2015
03 Jul 2015
J  Allen
 
Editor Note:  Configuration control of certification plan document is per system control category 1, under 
full problem report/change management process control. 
 
  
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
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A.2 PSCP200 1 Plan Purpose: 
 This project specific certification plan (PSCP) defines the certification activities planned as part of a 
modification to the IMA avionics platform on the SAAB-EII 200 airplane. 
 The plan will highlight the specific modifications planned for the Company “A” IMA avionics system, 
the implementation strategy for the modification and the safety aspects of the planned changes. 
A.2 PSCP200 2 Project Background: 
 Legacy airplane certificated under 14CFR Part 25 Transport Category airplane 
o Legacy airplane certificated per conventional development processes  
 
Editor Note: Conventional development processes denotes that no ARP4754A process artifacts were 
created. 
 
 Company “A” provided Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) using the architecture 
presented in Figure 12. 
 
 IMA developed to ARP4754, DO-178B, DO-254 & DO-297 
 IMA includes the following functions:  
o Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
o Communications (ATA23), 
o Displays (ATA31),  
o Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34) and, 
o Maintenance (ATA 45). 
 
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
 
  76 
 
Figure 12 SAAB-EII 200 Avionics Architecture 
 
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
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A.2 PSCP200 3 Planned Modifications:  
 Changes under this plan are limited to the flight deck avionics, i.e. no aircraft level modifications 
are planned. 
 Existing Avionics (IMA), Part Number IMA100, will have the following changes incorporated: 
o Existing IMA Fight Management System (FMS) function will be revised to correct for 
deficiencies and enhance performance. 
o A new IMA function “ABC” will be added to the IMA platform to provide enhanced 
situational awareness of system status and configuration. 
 Modifications will be accomplished using existing and evolved supplier system, software and 
hardware development processes satisfying ARP4754A objectives. 
 Modification activity milestone summary is presented in Table 20.  
 A high level modification process flow diagram is presented in Figure 13. 
 
Table 20 SAAB-EII 200 Avionics Modification Milestones 
Change Activity Projected Completion Schedule 
FMS Deficiency/Enhancements Per change notice tracking timeline 
“ABC” Requirement Capture Function “ABC” CDR 
Validation Matrix Update Function “ABC” CDR 
IMA Software Revisions 
Complete 
See IMA100V1 PSAC1 
Verification Procedures Update Completion of HW-SW Integration (see IMA100V1 PSAC) 
Verification Testing Two weeks prior to submittal of certification package 
V & V Summary Report System Certification Package 
 
                                               
 
 
 
1 Individual PSACs for each software component may be developed or a combined IMA PSAC plan developed for all software 
modifications as selected for this scenario example. 
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
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Figure 13 SAAB-EII 200 Avionics Modification Plan 
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A.2 PSCP200 4 Modification Impact Analysis Summary: 
A.2 PSCP200 4.1 Change Description Summary: 
 Modifications to FMS function do not impact airplane level functionality.  
 Addition of function “ABC” provides additional capabilities to Provide Operational Awareness and 
Maintenance hosted airplane level function. 
 Table 21 summarizes the IMA functional areas impacted by the change and the most sever failure 
condition classifications for that function. 
 
Table 21 SAAB-EII 200 IMA Impact Summary 
IMA Function 
Change 
Y/N Impact Description 
Failure 
Condition 
Classification 
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA22) N No new or changed autopilot functions. Catastrophic 
Communications (ATA23) N 
No new or changed communication 
functions. 
Catastrophic 
Displays (ATA31) Y 
Addition of maintenance messages to 
support new function “ABC” 
Catastrophic* 
Navigation/Flight 
Management (ATA34) 
Y 
Open system problem reports on FMS 
function deficiencies and FMS function 
performance will be implemented. 
Hazardous 
Maintenance (ATA45) Y 
New maintenance messages and test 
instructions added. 
Hazardous 
Platform N 
No new or changed aircraft level 
platform functions. 
Catastrophic 
Sensors N No new or changed sensing functions. Various 
“ABC” Y 
New aircraft configuration monitoring 
and reporting function using existing 
available sensor data 
Hazardous 
*Note: Legacy Displays IMA function implementation is partitioned to support multiple software function 
criticalities. 
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A.2 PSCP200 4.2 Change Classification Analysis: 
 The modifications have been evaluated per AC 21.101-1 and found to be non-significant. 
o The legacy certification basis for Legacy SAAB-EII 200 will be maintained. 
 The planned modification has been evaluated per AC 21-40A for classification of the change as 
either major or minor: 
o Changes have been found to have no appreciable effect on: 
 Weight, 
 Balance, 
 Structural strength, 
 Reliability, 
 Characteristics affecting airplane airworthiness. 
o Changes have been found to have a minor impact on the operational characteristics of the 
flight deck maintenance displayed information. 
o Therefore, the changes planned in this plan are anticipated classified as Minor and will be 
approved using the SAAB-EII FAA approved “Minor Airplane Change Process”. 
 
 Legacy airplane level development used conventional development techniques and as such did 
not create ARP4754A objectives evidence. 
o FDAL for Avionics functions were not developed. 
o Airplane function development evidence was not created (Requirements, Validation and 
Verification). 
 Creation of ARP4754A airplane level artifacts for the changes identified in this plan is not 
advantageous or practical and is therefore not planned.  Conventional airplane certification 
activities will be used. 
A.2 PSCP200 4.3 Safety Impact of Planned Changes: 
 Review of legacy IMA functional failure conditions indicates that: 
o FMS Loss or Erroneous operation classified as Hazardous 
o Modifications planned for the FMS function do not affect the functional hazard failure 
condition description or severity 
o Modifications planned for the FMS function do not affect any other IMA or external 
functionality. 
 Added IMA function “ABC” adds software function to provide new aircraft configuration advisories 
to enhance flight crew situational awareness 
o New function “ABC” adds two new failure conditions. 
o Preliminary FHA of function “ABC” indicates a hazardous (II) classification for erroneous 
operation and major (III) classification for loss of function. 
o Displays functionality is partitioned between caution/warn display and maintenance. 
 The System FHA will be revised to add function “ABC” failure conditions and classification. 
 FDAL for the modification activities will be assigned directly based on the most sever aircraft-level 
failure condition supported by the modified and new functionality. 
A.2 PSCP200 4.4 Modification Implementation Strategy: 
 All modifications planned under this change effort are contained to the IMA Avionics platform and 
impact only IMA avionic software  
 See Company “A” Avionics System Development Plan for details of planned modification. 
Title Project Specific Certification Plan Doc No. PSCP200 Date 7/03/2015
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A.2 PSCP200 5 Compliance Methods: 
 Compliance to the regulations will be shown by analysis, inspection and test. 
 Summary for 14CFR 25.1309, Systems, equipment and installations: 
o IMA avionic system development process per AC20-174 using ARP4754A at assigned 
FDAL 
o Airborne electronic hardware development per AC20-152 using DO-254 at assigned IDALs  
o Airborne software development per AC20-115C using DO-178B at assigned IDALs  
o Safety assessments(FHA, PSSA, SSA) per ARP4761 
 IMA development per AC-148 and AC-170. 
 See Company “A” Avionics System Development Plan for details of modification process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
----- End of PSCP200 Project Specific Certification Plan excerpt ----- 
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A.2 ASDP200 1 Introduction: 
 
 This Plan describes the system development process for modifications planned for the IMA hosted 
functionality installed on the SAAB-EII 200 airplane. 
 Plan addresses engineering life cycle evolution from ARP4754 to ARP4754A including function 
design, requirements generation, analysis, requirements validation, function verification for re-used 
functionality and modified functionality. 
 Plan includes the identification and assignment of the appropriate Functional Development 
Assurance Level (FDAL) rigor to be performed for changed or new systems functions as well as 
Item Development Assurance (IDAL) assignment for airborne software development of new 
functionality. 
 Plan fulfills the intent of ARP4754A objectives planning for: 
o Development (section 4), 
o Requirements Management (section 5.3), 
o Validation (section 5.4), 
o Verification (section 5.5). 
A.2 ASDP200 2 Avionics System Description: 
 
The Company “A” IMA100 Avionics Flight Deck integrates multiple avionic functions into a single 
Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA) system implementation: 
 The Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) includes the following functions: 
o Baseline IMA includes the following system functions:  
 Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23),  
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
 Maintenance (ATA 45). 
A.2 ASDP200 3 Avionics System Development Overview: 
 
 The legacy Company “A” IMA100 avionics system was developed in accordance with ARP4754, 
DO-178B, DO-254 & DO-297. 
 The avionics ARP4754 system development process will be evolved and structured to ensure 
satisfaction of ARP4754A objectives commensurate with a developed function development 
assurance level (FDAL) for revised and new functions. 
 FDAL/IDAL will be assigned directly based on the most sever aircraft-level failure condition 
supported by the modified and new functionality. 
 
 This plan responds to the following ARP4754A planning objectives: 
o Requirements Management, 
o Requirements Validation, 
o Requirement Verification, 
o Configuration Management, 
o Process Assurance. 
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 The avionics system development process is based on re-using an integrated avionic 
implementation previously certificated on the SAAB-EII 200 airplane. 
 The SAAB-EII 200 avionics system development process will use a combination of 
similarity/service experience to previous program ARP4754 objective data and the generation of 
new ARP4754A objective evidence for the changed IMA functionality to satisfy the SAAB-EII 200 
ARP4754A development life cycle. 
 
 Figure 14 presents a high level summary of the Avionics System development activities. 
 
o Changed FMS function: 
 Capture requirements associated with changed FMS functionality per newly 
assigned FDAL. 
 Validate new FMS requirements per ARP4754A compliant process 
 Validate unchanged FMS requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality 
 Verify old and new FMS implementation meets intended FMS function 
requirements. 
 
o New “ABC” function: 
 Capture requirements associated with “ABC” functionality per assigned FDAL. 
 Validate new “ABC” requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Verify “ABC” implementation meets intended “ABC” function requirements. 
 Capture requirements in Displays (ATA 31) and Maintenance (ATA45) associated 
with changed IMA functionality per newly assigned FDAL. 
 Validate new IMA requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Validate unchanged IMA requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality. 
 Verify old and new IMA implementation meets intended IMA function requirements. 
 
o Table 22 summarizes the objective evolution and highlights new configuration management 
(CM) system control (SC) category. 
o Modifications are anticipated to affect software only.  Should hardware modifications be 
required, the necessary PHAC(s) will be created and approved for the modification. 
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Table 22 ARP4754 Objectives & Configuration Evolution Summary 
4754 Objective / Evidence 
Legacy 
CM CC 
Category 4754A Objective / Evidence 
4754A 
CM CC 
Category 
Requirements captured (FMS 
System Requirements Document)  
NA 
Requirements changes captured - 
FMS System Requirements 
Document 
SC1 
Requirements Validation - FMS 
(validation matrix, summary) 
NA 
Requirements Validation – FMS per 
assigned FDAL 
SC2 
    
NA NA 
Requirements captured – “ABC” 
Function Requirements Document 
SC1 
NA NA 
Requirements Validation – “ABC” 
per assigned FDAL 
SC2 
Requirements captured (Display 
System Requirements Document)  
NA 
Requirements changes captured - 
Display System Requirements 
Document 
SC1 
Requirements Validation – 
Display (validation matrix, 
summary) 
NA 
Requirements Validation – Display 
per assigned FDAL 
SC2 
Verify IMA function requirements 
(Test Procedures) 
NA 
Modify existing IMA function Test 
Procedures per assigned FDAL 
SC1 
Verify IMA function requirement 
implementation (verification 
matrix, summary) 
NA 
Verify changed and unchanged IMA 
function requirement implementation 
(verification matrix, summary) 
SC2 
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Figure 14 SAAB-EII 200 Avionics System Change Implementation Development Plan 
 
A.2 ASDP200 3.1 Reuse Analysis Plan: 
 Table 23 presents the top level SAAB-EII 200 Avionics Development plan and strategy for reuse of 
baseline avionic system functionality. 
 Table 24 presents the planned program strategy nomenclature descriptions. 
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Table 23 SAAB-EII 200 Avionics Reuse Strategy 
 
Editor’s Note: Reused HW and SW implementations not impacted by the changes included in this 
example retain the legacy development assurance level (though not identified). 
1 2 3 4 5 6
System Functional Area
System 
Func or 
Item
Existing 
FDAL 
/IDAL
New 
FDAL 
/IDAL
Rigors 
Differ
Program 
Strategy
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA 22) Sys NA NA NA Reapply
SW - AFCS App Item A A No Reuse
HW - AP Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Roll Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Yaw Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch Trim Servo Item B B No Reuse
Communications (ATA 23) Sys NA NA NA Reapply
SW - Radio Tune App - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Datalink Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Audio Control Panel Item Reuse
HW - TCAS Item Reuse
Displays (ATA 31) Sys NA A Yes Adapt
SW - PFD Graphics Common App Item A A No Reuse
SW - PFD Graphics Instrument "T" App Item B B No Reuse
SW - Warn Function App Item RWC
SW - Warn Function Common App Item Reuse
SW - WX Graphics App Item Reuse
HW - Display Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Standby Instrument Item Reuse
HW - Display Unit - PFD Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - EICAS Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - MFD Item B B No RWC
Navidation/Flight Management (ATA34) Sys NA B Yes Adapt
SW - Flight Management App Item B No RWC
SW - Take off Performance App Item B No RWC
SW - MCDU Host App Item Reuse
SW - GPS Nav App Item Reuse
SW - Radio Tune App - Nav Item Reuse
HW - Inertial Sensor Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Nav Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Nav Item Reuse
HW - GPS Antenna Item Reuse
HW - MCDU Item Reuse
Maintenance (ATA45) Sys NA C Yes Adapt
SW - CMC App Item D C Yes RWC
IMA Platform Sys NA A Yes Adapt
SW - Operating System App Item A A No Reuse
SW - Middleware Apps Item A A No Reuse
SW - HW Abstraction Layer App Item A A No RWC
SW - Comm Network Core App Item A A No RWC
SW - Comm Network Messaging App Item A A No RWC
SW - Dataload App Item A A No Reuse
HW - Power Supply Item A A No Reuse
HW - Cabinets Item A A No Reuse
HW - Multipurpose computers Item A A No Reuse
HW - Comm Network Item A A No Reuse
Sensors Sys NA D No Reapply
HW - Weather Radar Item Reuse
HW - Weather Radar Controller Item Reuse
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Table 24 Reuse Strategy Nomenclature 
 
 
A.2 ASDP200 4 Avionic System Safety: 
 The system safety process includes requirements development as well as implementation 
verification activities that support the avionic system development.  
 This process provides a methodology to evaluate airplane function failure conditions and the 
avionic system design performing these functions to establish that the identified hazards have 
been properly addressed.   
 
 The avionics systems development process will include the following safety activities: 
 
o Avionic System Functional Hazard Analysis 
 Updated hazard evaluation for new function “ABC”, 
o Preliminary Avionic System Safety Assessment Supplement 
 Supplement IMA100V1 PSSA will be created to evaluate planned implementation of 
function “ABC” against new system FHA failure condition(s). 
 Safety requirement development as necessary to support “ABC” implementation 
 FDAL / IDAL assignment (assignment substantiation) for FMS revisions & “ABC” 
development 
o Avionic System Safety Assessment (revision to existing analysis to incorporate applicable 
FMS changes and addition of “ABC” failure condition analysis result), 
o Avionic System Common Cause Analysis (update as necessary to support PSSA/SSA 
revisions), 
 
 
Editor’s Note: IMA100V1PSSA not created as part of the example development. 
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reuse
Reusing an item (SW Application or HW element) from another aircraft program 
or previous certification without modification to the item itself.
Reuse with Change (RWC)
Reusing an item from another airplane program or previous certification with 
modifications to the item.
New
Develop a new item; i.e. this is the first instance of this function 
implementation.
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reapply
Select Reapply if the entire system is being reused from another/same airplane 
program (i.e., all of the items in the system are identified as Reapply).  The 
activities are related to adding traceability from existing system requirements 
to new airplane program/revised Function requirements and integration of the 
system.
Adapt
Select Adapt if one or more of the items is identified as Reuse with Change 
(RWC) with other items are identified as Reuse.
New Select New if all or nearly all items are New
Determining the Item Change Type
Determining the System Change Type
Title Avionic System Development Plan Doc No. ASDP200 Date 7/03/2015
 
  89 
A.2 ASDP200 5 Avionic System Requirements Development, Validation & 
Verification: 
 Requirements development, validation and avionic system requirement verification plans are 
discussed in this section. 
 Figure 15 presents the high level avionics system development process flow. 
 Any changes in FDAL or IDAL assignments between the established baseline artifact level of rigor 
and the modification program assigned level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for a 
negotiated development approach. 
 
A.2 ASDP200 5.1 Requirements Development & Management: 
 
 The IMA100 Avionic System “X.Y” requirements set will form the baseline for the SAAB-EII 200 
Avionic System modification program. 
 The baseline requirements were developed to the level of rigor commensurate with the level of 
assurance assigned to the implementing software (though not identified as FDAL) as shown in 
Table 23.  
 Each requirement includes the following information: 
o Unique requirement identifier, 
o Requirement text, 
o Rationale (reason for having the requirement if requirement was derived), 
o Parent trace link (if requirement traceable to a parent), 
o Safety related attribute. 
 
 As part of the SAAB-EII 200 development process, the baseline Company “A” avionic system FMS 
and Display requirement sets will be evolved from the “X.Y” baseline to new IMA100V1. 
 See Figure 16 for an artifact evolution plan. 
 
 Requirements that need to be modified will be managed through the configuration management 
process to ensure traceability to the baseline. 
 Changed requirements will be revalidated using the requirement validation process. 
 New requirements (function “ABC”) will be introduced to the baseline requirement set using the CM 
process and validated using the validation process. 
 An illustration of the requirement levels and tracing between these levels is shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 15 SAAB-EII 200 System Requirements Activity Plan 
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Item processes
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details
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implementation
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Validation & Verification 
Substantiation Report 
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NO
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FMS 
Function
Revisions
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Figure 16 Baseline X.Y Evolution on SAAB-EII 200 
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Figure 17 SAAB-EII 200 Baseline Requirements and Tracing 
 
A.2 ASDP200 5.2 Requirements Validation: 
 The validation of requirements and specific assumptions ensures that the specified requirements 
are sufficiently correct and complete so that the developed product will provide the intended 
functionality. 
o Validation is a structured process for ensuring the correctness and completeness of the set 
of captured requirements. 
o The validation process also includes capture and evaluation of assumptions made during 
the requirement capture process to ensure: 
 Assumptions have been explicitly stated, 
 Assumptions are appropriately disseminated, and  
 Assumptions are justified by supporting data. 
 
 Validation activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their validation 
status. 
 Validation activities accomplished and the completed validation matrix will be included in the 
Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the validation process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
 A comparison of the ARP4754 legacy validation process and the objectives outlined for validation 
in ARP4754A to identify any areas of the legacy validation process in need of revision. 
 The validation process will be revised as appropriate based on the results of this analysis (no 
revision is anticipated to be required). 
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A.2 ASDP200 5.2.1 Requirements Validation Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be validated using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be validated using combination of methods. 
 
 Methods of validation include: 
o Traceability,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Test,  
o Similarity or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 
 The bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be validated through similarity to the certificated 
baseline, “X.Y”. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the validation process for all changed or new 
requirements. 
o Artifacts generated based on validation method used. May include requirement inspections, 
analysis reports, test procedures or similarity (reuse) analysis. 
 Validation of requirements will be accomplished with independence commensurate with the 
assigned FDAL. 
 
 Requirements and validation status will be summarized in a validation matrix. 
 This matrix tracks the validation status of each requirement or assumption and captures the 
validation methods used to establish the validation result and artifact references capturing the 
evidence. 
 The requirements validation process is invoked as part of the change management process for 
changed or addition of new requirements. 
 An example of validation matrix content shown in Table 25. 
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Table 25 Example Completed Validation Matrix 
    
Validation 
Method   
Unique ID 
Text 
(Requirement or Assumption) S
a
fe
ty
 
Requirement 
Source I
n
s
p
e
c
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
is
 
S
im
il
a
ri
ty
 
T
e
s
t 
T
ra
c
e
 
Validation Artifact 
Reference 
Reqt 
Vali
d  
(Y/N
) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y Derived X X X  X Insp-104 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N Derived X  X   Insp-517 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N Assumption X     ECM-SAABEII-CompA-25 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N AVACFT-R-1490 X  X  X CN-1465 Y 
AVSYS-R-456  N Derived X X    CN-5137 Y 
           
           
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
Requirement Sources: Parent Reqt ID, Derived, Assumption 
Validation Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); S – Similarity; Test – Test; Trace -Traceability; 
Reqt Valid – Y if requirement has completed validation effort and artifact has found requirement valid. 
CN = Change Notice 
ECM = Engineering Communication Memo 
Insp = Inspection 
Reqt = Requirement 
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A.2 ASDP200 5.3 Requirements Verification: 
 Verification of requirements and specific assumptions is the process of ensuring that the 
completed system has successfully implemented the requirements. 
 Verification is a structured process for ensuring implementation complies with the set of captured 
requirements. 
 Verification activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their 
verification status. 
 Verification activities accomplished and the revised IMA100V1 verification matrix will be included in 
the new Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the verification process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
A.2 ASDP200 5.3.1 Requirements Verification Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be verified using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be verified using combination of methods: 
 
 Methods of verification include: 
o Test,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Service Experience or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 
 It is anticipated that the bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be verified through test. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the verification process for all requirements. 
 Verification artifacts will be managed appropriate for the function development assurance level. 
 
 Changed or New requirements supporting functions with FDAL A will be verified with 
independence. 
 Changed or New requirements supporting functions with FDAL B & C will be verified with 
independence as a process goal but may be verified by requirement originators as necessary. 
 Changed or New verification test procedures supporting FDAL A will be managed using change 
management control category 1. 
 All unchanged functions and their requirements will be re-verified through execution of legacy 
verification methodologies so as to ensure unchanged and revised capabilities provide all intended 
functionality. 
 The IMA100 X.Y baseline verification matrix will be updated for completed verification activities 
and status. 
 This matrix tracks the verification status of each requirement and captures the verification 
method(s) used to establish the verification result and artifact references capturing the verification 
evidence. 
 
 An example verification Matrix shown in Table 26. 
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Table 26 Example Completed Verification Matrix 
   
  Verification 
Method(s) 
 
  
Unique ID Requirement Text S
a
fe
ty
 
F
D
A
L
 
Associated 
Function I
n
s
p
e
c
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
is
 
T
e
s
t 
S
e
rv
ic
e
 
Verification 
Procedure 
Reference 
Verification 
Artifact Reference 
Pass 
/ Fail 
(P/F) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y A Displays  X   NA 
Avionic System 
SSA V1 
P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N B FMS X X X  FMS1275 VVTest1275 V1 P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N A ABC X  X  ABC101 VVTest1476 V1 P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N - Autopilot X  X  AP37 VVTest37 P 
AVSYS-R-456            
            
            
 
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
 
Verification Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); Service – Service Experience; Test – Test 
(Demonstration) 
NA – not applicable 
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A.2 ASDP200 6 Avionic System Configuration & Change Management: 
 
 Configuration management of development artifacts are the responsibility of the originating group. 
 The central Company “A” CM organization provides tools, services and process to assist in this 
task. 
 Artifacts created during the development and used as part of the certification process will be 
managed per the detailed process described in the “Company A Configuration Management Plan” 
appropriate to the level of rigor established for the artifact. 
 Artifacts to be managed include: 
o Avionic System Development Plan (this document), 
o Avionic system requirements documentation, 
o Avionic system safety assessments, 
o Avionic system validation evidence, 
o Avionic system verification procedures, 
o Avionic system verification evidence, 
o Avionic system validation & verification accomplishment summary. 
 
 Current ARP4754A CM objective satisfaction will be compared to ARP4754A CM objectives for 
areas of difference identification. 
 Any CM process differences will be noted for discussion and negotiated evolution. 
 Requirements, safety assessment and verification procedure artifacts will be managed using detail 
change management process (Change control category 1 aka CM Level 1). 
 All other program artifacts will be managed using version control change management process 
(change control category 2 aka CM Level 2). 
A.2 ASDP200 7 Avionic System Process Assurance: 
 Process assurance is integral to the development activities to ensure that the system development 
and supporting processes are appropriate, maintained, and followed.  
 Process assurance is performed by the Company “A” Quality Assurance (QA) organization. 
 Process assurance is evaluated against: 
o ARP4754A objectives based on development assurance rigor (FDAL), 
o DO-178 objectives based on development assurance rigor (IDAL).  See PSAC for specific 
details. 
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A.2 ASDP200 8 Certification: 
 Certification artifacts to be developed for the IMA100V1 changes include: 
 
o Avionic System Development Plan (ASDP200 – this document), 
o IMA100 Validation and Verification Summary Report for V1 Configuration, 
o System Safety Assessment (SSA) for IMA100V1 as Installed on the SAAB-EII 200 
Airplane, 
o IMA100V1 Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, 
o IMA100V1 Version Description Document, 
o Other DO-178 life cycle documents as necessary. 
 
Editor Note: Only Avionic System Development Plan developed as part of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------ End of ASDP200 Avionic System Development Plan excerpt ----- 
   99 
Appendix A.3 Study Architecture 2 
(aka SAAB-EII 300) 
Introduction 
 
An example of planning specific change activities for the addition of equipment covered by TSO to a 
certificated airplane with IMA hosted avionics functionality.   
 
Editor Note: The example scenario provides insight into satisfying ARP4754A development for the 
modification and may not address all of the certification aspects for the scenario. 
 
Example documentation developed: 
 
Airplane Level 
Airplane Project Specific Certification Plan (APSCP300) 
 
Systems Level 
Avionic System Development Plan (ASDP300) 
 
Item Level 
None – not a feature of the study. 
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NASA
Study Architecture 2
SAAB-EII 300
Project Specific 
Certification PLan
6.6.3
SIZE FSCM NO DWG NO REV
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ARP4754A, 6.2(a)(b)ARP4754A, 6.2(a)(b)(c)
 
REVISIONS
CN No. REV DESCRIPTION DATE APPROVED
- - Initial release 06 Apr 2015 J  Allen
 
Editor Note:  Configuration control of certification plan document is per system control category 1, under 
full problem report/change management process control. 
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A.3 APSCP300 1 Plan Purpose: 
 This airplane project specific certification plan (PSCP) defines the certification activities planned as 
part of an equipment addition and modification to the IMA avionics platform on the SAAB-EII 300 
airplane. 
 The plan will highlight the specific modification activities planned for the addition of a TSO-092C 
Airborne Ground Proximity Warning System (AGPWS) line replaceable unit (LRU) to the SAAB-EII 
300 airplane and integration of the AGPWS into Company “A” IMA100 avionics system.  This plan 
will describe the development and implementation strategy for the modification and the safety 
aspects of the planned changes. 
A.3 APSCP300 2 Project Background: 
 Legacy SAAB-EII 300 airplane certificated under 14CFR Part 25 Transport Category airplane 
o Legacy airplane certificated per conventional development processes  
 
Editor Note: Conventional development processes means no specific ARP4754A artifacts were created as 
part of the development effort. 
 
 Company “A” provided Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Model 100 based flight deck functionality 
(IMA – ATA 42) (see Figure 1) 
o IMA developed to ARP4754, DO-178B, DO-254 & DO-297 
o IMA includes the following functions:  
 Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23), 
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34) and, 
 Maintenance (ATA 45).  
A.3 APSCP300 3 Planned Modifications:  
 Airplane modification for installation of Company “R” TSO-092C AGPWS LRU 
o Addition of GPWS situational awareness airplane function 
 Includes additional wiring, installation tray, 
 Connection to airplane 28vdc electrical power. 
 Existing Avionics platform (IMA), Part Number IMA100, will have the following changes 
incorporated: 
o AGPWS functional changes to IMA hosted functions: 
 Activation of provisioned AGPWS software function, 
 Activation of included spare digital (ARINC 429), discrete and analog interfaces, 
 Activation of IMA communication network for AGPWS information, 
 Activation of IMA annunciation function for display of AGPWS cautions and 
warnings. 
 Modifications to the IMA100 will be accomplished using existing Company “A” supplier system, 
software and hardware development processes. 
 System architecture modifications presented in Figure 18. 
 Modification activity schedule is presented in Table 27. 
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Figure 18 SAAB-EII 300 Modification 
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Table 27 SAAB-EII 300 Modification Schedule 
Change Activity Projected Completion Schedule 
Installation modification drawings & 
wiring definitions 
Airplane Project CDR 
Initial Detailed IMA Changes Plan Company “A” Avionics PDR 
Final Detailed IMA Changes Plan Company “A” Avionics CDR 
IMA Implementation Verification IMA Integration Verification Testing 
Airplane Installation Verification Airplane Ground/Flight Testing 
PSCP Compliance Summary Airplane Certification Package Delivery 
A.3 APSCP300 4 Modification Impact Analysis Summary: 
A.3 APSCP300 4.1 Change Description: 
 SAAB-EII 300 Airplane: 
o AGPWS mounting tray installation in forward EE bay. 
o Addition of AGPWS circuit breaker in forward EE bay electrical panel #2 
o Addition of AGPWS wire harness: 
 AGPWS circuit breaker to Essential 28vdc Power Bus 2, 
 AGPWS circuit breaker to AGPWS mounting tray connector, 
 AGPWS ARINC 429 Output to Right IMA #2, 
 AGPWS Audio Output to Right IMA #2, 
 AGPWS Monitor Output to Right IMA #2, 
 Right IMA #2 Airplane status discretes (AGPWS Inhibit, Gear up/down, Flaps 
up/down) to AGPWS,  
 Right IMA #2 ARINC 429 Output to AGPWS (Radio Altitude, Glide Slope Deviation, 
Barometric Data).  
 Figure 19 presents preliminary aircraft wiring installation modification. 
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Figure 19 Preliminary SAAB-EII 300 AGPWS Wiring Updates 
 
 IMA-100 Avionic System 
o Table 28 summarizes the IMA functional areas impacted by the change and the most 
severe failure condition classifications for that function. 
Table 28 SAAB-EII 300 IMA Impact Summary 
IMA Function 
Change 
Y/N Impact Description 
FC 
Class. 
Autopilot/Autoflight 
(ATA22) 
N 
No planned new or changed autopilot 
functions. 
I 
Communications (ATA23) N 
No planned new or changed communication 
functions. 
I 
Displays (ATA31) Y 
Activation of provisioned AGPWS alerts and 
warnings. 
I* 
Navigation/Flight 
Management (ATA34) 
Y 
Activation of provisioned AGPWS software 
function. 
III 
Maintenance (ATA45) N 
No planned new or changed maintenance 
functions. 
II 
Platform Y 
Modification of IMA communication network to 
add AGPWS communications.  Activation of 
provisioned spare digital (ARINC429), discrete 
and analog interfaces to/from AGPWS 
I 
Sensors N No planned new or changed Sensor function. III 
*Note: Legacy Displays IMA function implementation is partitioned to support multiple software 
function criticalities. 
AGPWSIMA #2
Gear Up/Down, Flaps Up/Dwn
Monitor Output
Radio Altitude, GS Dev, Baro Alt
Visual Warn
Audio Output
Discrete Input/
Ouput
ARINC 429
Analog Input/
Output
CBESS #2
+28vdc
AGPWS Inhibit
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A.3 APSCP300 4.2 Change Classification Analysis: 
 The planned modifications described in section 4.1 herein have been evaluated per AC 21.101-1 
and found to be non-significant. 
o The legacy certification basis for Legacy SAAB-EII 300 will be retained. 
 The planned modification outlined in section 4.1 herein has been evaluated per AC 21-40A for 
change classification, i.e. major or minor: 
o The planned changes have been analyzed and found to have no appreciable effect on: 
 Weight, 
 Balance, 
 Structural strength, 
 Reliability, 
 Characteristics affecting airplane airworthiness. 
o Changes have been found to have a minor impact on the operational characteristics of the 
flight deck displayed information. 
o Based on the limited impact of the planned changes, the modification is preliminarily 
classified as Minor and will be approved using the SAAB-EII FAA approved “Minor Airplane 
Change Process” upon certification authority agreement. 
 
 Legacy airplane level development used conventional development techniques and as such did 
not create ARP4754A objectives evidence. 
o FDAL for Avionics functions was not developed. 
o Airplane function development evidence was not created (Requirements, Validation and 
Verification). 
 
 Creation of ARP4754A airplane level artifacts for the changes identified in this plan is not 
advantageous or practical and is therefore not planned.  Conventional airplane certification 
activities will be used.  SAAB-EII engineers will review and approve that the activated IMA-100 
GPWS avionic functionality meets airplane level functional objectives. 
 
Editor Note: The non-development of ARP4754A airplane artifacts is situationally based. As the IMA-100 
already has deactivated functionality for the AGPWS there is little error mitigation benefit in creating 
ARP4754A development process artifacts as the function and implementation already exists.  SAAB-EII 
review of the Avionics system level artifacts is sufficient to assure the implemented function will be what is 
desired (validation).  If the IMA functionality did not exist or if the added TSO equipment was more than 
flight crew supplemental information, then a more rigorous satisfaction of ARP4754A objectives may be 
warranted. 
 
 
A.3 APSCP300 4.3 Safety Impact of Planned Changes: 
 
 AGPWS is an aid to aircrew intended to supplement existing flight instrument data annunciating 
the onset of conditions leading to inadvertent contact with the ground.  
o As a supplement, the loss of this warning function is classified as “No Effect”. 
o Erroneous warning by the AGPWS function is “Minor” due to in slight increase in crew 
workload to validate warning through a crosscheck flight instruments and silence erroneous 
warning using added AGPWS inhibit capability.  
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 Review of legacy IMA functional failure conditions indicates that: 
o Modifications planned for the Display function do not affect the functional hazard failure 
condition description or severity. However, the System FHA will be revised to add the 
AGPWS function failure conditions. 
o Modifications planned for the Platform function may affect other IMA functionality due to 
added information on communication backbone.  IMA backbone communications hardware 
and software were developed to Level A. Changes to these implementations will follow a 
Level A change process and be fully analyzed and tested. 
A.3 APSCP300 4.4 Modification Implementation Strategy: 
 Airplane installation drawings, wiring diagrams will be created by SAAB-EII for the modification of 
the SAAB-EII 300 airplane. 
 
 All modifications planned to the IMA Avionics platform will be accomplished by Company “A”. 
 See Company “A” Avionics System Development Plan for details of planned modification. 
A.3 APSCP300 5 Compliance Methods: 
 Compliance to the regulations will be shown by analysis, inspection and test. 
 
 Summary for 14CFR 25.1309, Systems, equipment and installations: 
o Installation and design appraisals will be accomplished to establish that the AGPWS 
installation supports the safety objectives. 
o IMA avionic system development process will be per AC20-174 using ARP4754A at 
assigned FDAL for activation of AGPWS functionality  Similarity and service experience are 
planned for use in accomplishing the IMA design evolution. 
o Airborne electronic hardware development will be per AC20-152 using DO-254 at assigned 
IDALs. 
o Airborne software development will be per AC20-115C using DO-178B at assigned IDALs. 
o Safety assessments (FHA, PSSA, SSA) per ARP4761. 
 IMA development per AC-148 and AC-170. 
 See Company “A” Avionic System Development Plan for details of modification process. 
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A.3 ASDP300 1 Introduction: 
 This Plan describes the system development process for the AGPWS installation modifications 
planned for the IMA hosted functionality installed on the SAAB-EII 300 airplane. 
 Plan addresses engineering life cycle evolution from ARP4754 to ARP4754A including function 
design, requirements generation, analysis, requirements validation, function verification for re-used 
functionality and modified functionality. 
 Plan includes the identification and assignment of the appropriate Functional Development 
Assurance Level (FDAL) rigor to be performed for changed or new systems functions as well as 
Item Development Assurance (IDAL) assignment for airborne software development of new 
functionality. 
 Plan fulfills the intent of system development objectives planning for: 
o Development (ARP4754A section 4), 
o Requirements Management (ARP4754A section 5.3), 
o Validation (ARP4754A section 5.4), 
o Verification (ARP4754A section 5.5). 
A.3 ASDP300 2 Avionic System Description: 
 The Company “A” IMA100 Avionics Flight Deck integrates multiple avionic functions into a single 
Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA) system implementation: 
 
 The Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA – ATA 42) includes the following functions: 
o Baseline IMA includes the following system functions:  
 Autopilot/autoflight (ATA 22),  
 Communications (ATA23).  
 Displays (ATA31),  
 Navigation/Flight Management (ATA34), and  
 Maintenance (ATA 45). 
A.3 ASDP300 3 Avionic System Development Overview: 
 The legacy Company “A” IMA100 avionic system was developed in accordance with ARP4754, 
DO-178B, DO-254 & DO-297. 
 The avionics legacy ARP4754 system development process will be evolved and structured to 
ensure satisfaction of ARP4754A objectives commensurate with a developed function 
development assurance level (FDAL) for revised and new functions. 
 
 This plan responds to the following ARP4754A planning objectives: 
o Requirements Management, 
o Requirements Validation, 
o Requirement Verification, 
o Configuration Management, 
o Process Assurance. 
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 The avionics system development process is based on re-using an integrated avionic 
implementation previously certificated on the same SAAB-EII 300 airplane type. 
 The SAAB-EII 300 avionics system development process will use a combination of 
similarity/service experience to previous program ARP4754 objective data and the generation of 
new ARP4754A objective evidence for the changed IMA functionality to satisfy the SAAB-EII 300 
ARP4754A development life cycle. 
 
 Figure 20 presents a high level summary of the Avionics System development activities. 
 Table 29 summarizes the objective evolution and highlights new configuration management (CM) 
system control (SC) category. 
 
o Changed Display function (ATA31): 
 Capture requirements associated with changed Display functionality (activation of 
AGPWS provisional function) per newly assigned FDAL. 
 Validate new or changed Display requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Validate unchanged Display requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality. 
 Verify old and new Display implementation meets intended Display function 
requirements. 
 
o Activate AGPWS function (ATA34) 
 Activate provisional AGPWS function requirements per newly assigned FDAL. 
 Validate new or changed AGPWS requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Validate unchanged AGPWS requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality. 
 Verify old and new AGPWS implementation meets intended function requirements. 
 
o Changed Platform function (ATA42): 
Input/Output (I/O)- 
 Capture I/O requirements for added AGPWS digital (ARINC 429), analog (audio), 
and discrete (landing gear status, warning, monitor) interfaces 
 Validate new or changed I/O requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Validate unchanged I/O requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality. 
 Verify old and new I/O implementation meets intended AGPWS function 
requirements. 
Communication (Comm) Network- 
 Capture Comm network requirements for added AGPWS digital (ARINC 429), 
analog (audio), and discrete (landing gear status, warning, monitor) interfaces 
 Validate new or changed Comm requirements per ARP4754A compliant process. 
 Validate unchanged Comm requirements per ARP4754A similarity to certificated 
functionality. 
 Verify old and new Comm implementation meets intended AGPWS function 
requirements. 
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Table 29 ARP4754 Objectives & Configuration Evolution Summary 
4754 Objective / Evidence 
Legacy 
CM SCC 
Category 4754A Objective / Evidence 
4754A 
CM SCC 
Category 
Display Function (ATA31) 
Display Function Requirement Set NA 
New and Changed Display 
Function Requirement Set 
SC1 
Requirements Validation (validation matrix, 
report) 
NA Requirements Validation per FDAL SC2 
Requirements Verification (verification 
matrix, report) 
NA 
Requirements Verification per 
FDAL 
SC2 
AGPWS Function (ATA34) 
AGPWS Function Requirement Set NA 
Changed AGPWS Function 
Requirement Set 
SC1 
Requirements Validation (validation matrix, 
report) 
NA Requirements Validation per FDAL SC2 
Requirements Verification (verification 
matrix, report) 
NA 
Requirements Verification per 
FDAL 
SC2 
IMA Platform 
I/O Requirement Set 
(A429, Analog, Discrete) 
NA 
New and Changed I/O Requirement 
Set 
SC1 
Comm Requirement Set 
(A429, Analog, Discrete) 
NA 
New and Changed Comm 
Requirement Set 
SC1 
I/O & Comm Requirements Validation 
(validation matrix, report) 
NA 
Requirements Validation per FDAL 
SC2 
I/O & Comm Requirements Verification 
(verification matrix, report) 
NA 
Requirements Verification per 
FDAL 
SC2 
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Figure 20 SAAB-EII 300 Avionics System Change Implementation Development Plan 
 
A.3 ASDP300 3.1 Reuse Analysis Plan: 
 Table 30 presents the top level SAAB-EII 300 Avionics Development plan and strategy for reuse of 
baseline avionic system functionality. 
 Table 31 presents the planned program strategy nomenclature descriptions. 
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Table 30 SAAB-EII 300 Avionics Reuse Strategy 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
System Functional Area
System 
Func or 
Item
Existing 
FDAL 
/IDAL
New 
FDAL 
/IDAL
Rigors 
Differ
Program 
Strategy
Autopilot/Autoflight (ATA 22) Sys NA NA NA Reapply
SW - AFCS App Item A A No Reuse
HW - AP Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Roll Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Yaw Servo Item B B No Reuse
HW - Pitch Trim Servo Item B B No Reuse
Communications (ATA 23) Sys NA NA NA Reapply
SW - Radio Tune App - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Datalink Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Comm Item Reuse
HW - Audio Control Panel Item Reuse
HW - TCAS Item Reuse
Displays (ATA 31) Sys NA A Yes Adapt
SW - PFD Graphics Common App Item A A No Reuse
SW - PFD Graphics Instrument "T" App Item B B No Reuse
SW - Warn Function App Item A A No RWC
SW - Warn Function Common App Item A A No Reuse
SW - WX Graphics App Item Reuse
HW - Display Control Panel Item B B No Reuse
HW - Standby Instrument Item Reuse
HW - Display Unit - PFD Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - EICAS Item A A No Reuse
HW - Display Unit - MFD Item B B No Reuse
Navidation/Flight Management (ATA34) Sys NA B Yes Adapt
SW - Flight Management App Item B No Reuse
SW - Take off Performance App Item B No Reuse
SW - MCDU Host App Item Reuse
SW - GPS Nav App Item Reuse
SW - Radio Tune App - Nav Item Reuse
SW - AGPWS Item C No New
HW - Inertial Sensor Item Reuse
HW - Radio Set - Nav Item Reuse
HW - Antennas - Nav Item Reuse
HW - GPS Antenna Item Reuse
HW - MCDU Item Reuse
Maintenance (ATA45) Sys NA C No Reapply
SW - CMC App Item D C No Reuse
IMA Platform Sys NA A Yes Adapt
SW - Operating System App Item A A No Reuse
SW - Middleware Apps Item A A No Reuse
SW - HW Abstraction Layer App Item A A No Reuse
SW - Comm Network Core App Item A A No RWC
SW - Comm Network Messaging App Item A A No RWC
SW - Dataload App Item A A No Reuse
HW - Power Supply Item A A No Reuse
HW - Cabinets Item A A No Reuse
HW - Multipurpose computers Item A A No Reuse
HW - Comm Network Item A A No Reuse
HW - Input / Output Item A A No RWC
Sensors Sys NA D No Adapt
HW - AGPWS Item NA No New
HW - Weather Radar Item Reuse
HW - Weather Radar Controller Item Reuse
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Table 31 SAAB-EII 300 Reuse Strategy Nomenclature 
 
A.3 ASDP300 4 Avionic System Safety: 
 The system safety process includes requirements development as well as implementation 
verification activities that support the avionic system development.  
 This process provides a methodology to evaluate airplane function failure conditions and the 
avionic system design performing these functions to establish that the identified hazards have 
been properly addressed.   
 
 The avionics systems development process will include the following safety activities: 
 
o Avionic System Functional Hazard Analysis 
 Updated hazard evaluation for activation of AGPWS on SAAB-EII 300 airplane. 
o Preliminary Avionic System Safety Assessment Supplement 
 Supplement IMA100V2 PSSA will be created to evaluate planned implementation of 
AGPWS function against system FHA failure condition(s). 
 Safety requirement development as necessary to support AGPWS implementation 
 FDAL / IDAL assignment (assignment substantiation) for AGPWS revisions 
development 
o Avionic System Safety Assessment IMA100V2 SSA (revision to existing analysis to 
incorporate applicable Display changes and addition of AGPWS failure condition analysis 
result), 
o Avionic System Common Cause Analysis (update as necessary to support PSSA/SSA 
revisions). 
 
Editor Note: IMA100V2PSSA and IMA100V2 SSA were not developed as part of the example. 
 
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reuse
Reusing an item (SW Application or HW element) from another aircraft program 
or previous certification without modification to the item itself.
Reuse with Change (RWC)
Reusing an item from another airplane program or previous certification with 
modifications to the item.
New
Develop a new item; i.e. this is the first instance of this function 
implementation.
Program Strategy (Column 6) Description
Reapply
Select Reapply if the entire system is being reused from another/same airplane 
program (i.e., all of the items in the system are identified as Reapply).  The 
activities are related to adding traceability from existing system requirements 
to new airplane program/revised Function requirements and integration of the 
system.
Adapt
Select Adapt if one or more of the items is identified as Reuse with Change 
(RWC) with other items are identified as Reuse.
New Select New if all or nearly all items are New
Determining the Item Change Type
Determining the System Change Type
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A.3 ASDP300 5 Avionic System Requirements Development, Validation & 
Verification: 
 Requirements development, validation and avionic system requirement verification plans are 
discussed in this section. 
 Figure 21 presents the high level avionics system development process flow. 
 Any changes in FDAL or IDAL assignments between the established baseline artifact level of rigor 
and the modification program assigned level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for a 
negotiated development approach. 
 
Figure 21 SAAB-EII 300 System Requirements Activity Plan 
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A.3 ASDP300 5.1 Requirements Development & Management: 
 The IMA100 Avionic System “X.Y” requirements set will form the baseline for the SAAB-EII 300 
Avionic System modification program. 
 The baseline requirements were developed to the level of rigor commensurate with the level of 
assurance assigned to the implementing software (though not identified as FDAL) as shown in 
Table 30. Each requirement includes the following information: 
o Unique requirement identifier, 
o Requirement text, 
o Rationale (reason for having the requirement if requirement was derived), 
o Parent trace link (if requirement traceable to a parent), 
o Safety related attribute. 
 
 As part of the SAAB-EII 300 development process, the baseline Company “A” avionic system 
Navigation and Display requirement sets will be evolved from the “X.Y” baseline to new IMA100V2.  
 
 See Figure 22 for the artifact evolution plan. 
 
 Requirements that need to be modified will be managed through the configuration management 
process to ensure traceability to the baseline. 
 Changed requirements will be revalidated using the requirement validation process. 
 New requirements (GPWS function) will be activated in the baseline requirement set using the CM 
process and validated using the validation process. 
 
 An illustration of the requirement levels and tracing between these levels is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 22 Baseline X.Y Evolution on SAAB-EII 300 
 
 
Figure 23 SAAB-EII 300 Baseline Requirements and Tracing 
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A.3 ASDP300 5.2 Requirements Validation: 
 The validation of requirements and specific assumptions ensures that the specified requirements 
are sufficiently correct and complete so that the developed product will provide the intended 
functionality. 
o Validation is a structured process for ensuring the correctness and completeness of the set 
of captured requirements. 
o The validation process also includes capture and evaluation of assumptions made during 
the requirement capture process to ensure: 
 Assumptions have been explicitly stated, 
 Assumptions are appropriately disseminated, and  
 Assumptions are justified by supporting data. 
 Validation activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their validation 
status. 
 Validation activities accomplished and the completed validation matrix will be included in the 
Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the validation process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
 A comparison of the ARP4754 legacy validation process and the objectives outlined for validation 
in ARP4754A to identify any areas of the legacy validation process in need of revision. 
 The validation process will be revised as appropriate based on the results of this analysis (no 
revision is anticipated to be required). 
A.3 ASDP300 5.2.1 Requirements Validation Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be validated using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be validated using combination of methods: 
 
 Methods of validation include: 
o Traceability,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Test,  
o Similarity or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 
 The bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be validated through similarity to the certificated 
baseline, “X.Y”. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the validation process for all changed or new 
requirements. 
 Validation of requirement sets will be accomplished with independence commensurate with the 
assigned FDAL. 
 Requirements will be summarized in a validation matrix. 
 This matrix tracks the validation status of each requirement or assumption and captures the 
validation methods used to establish the validation result and artifact references capturing the 
evidence. 
 The requirements validation process is invoked as part of the change management process for 
changed or addition of new requirements. 
 
 An example validation Matrix shown in Table 32. 
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Table 32 Example Completed Validation Matrix 
    
Validation 
Method   
Unique ID 
Text 
(Requirement or Assumption) S
a
fe
ty
 
Requirement 
Source I
n
s
p
e
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t 
A
n
a
ly
s
is
 
S
im
il
a
ri
t
y
 
T
e
s
t 
T
ra
c
e
 
Validation Artifact 
Reference 
Reqt 
Valid  
(Y/N) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y Derived X X X  X Insp-104 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N Derived X  X   Insp-517 Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N 
Assumption 
X     
ECM-SAABEII-
CompA-25 
Y 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N AVACFT-R-1490 X  X  X CN-1465 Y 
AVSYS-R-456  N Derived X X    CN-5137 Y 
           
           
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
Requirement Sources: Parent Reqt ID, Derived, Assumption 
Validation Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); S – Similarity; Test – Test; Trace -Traceability; 
Reqt Valid – Y if requirement has completed validation effort and artifact has found requirement valid. 
CN = Change Notice 
ECM = Engineering Communication Memo 
Insp = Inspection 
Reqt = Requirement 
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A.3 ASDP300 5.3 Requirements Verification: 
 Verification of requirements and specific assumptions is the process of ensuring that the 
completed system has successfully implemented the requirements. 
 Verification is a structured process for ensuring implementation complies with the set of captured 
requirements. 
 Verification activities will be tracked using a matrix containing the requirements and their 
verification status. 
 Verification activities accomplished and the revised IMA100V2 verification matrix will be included in 
the new Avionics System Validation and Verification Summary Report. 
 Deviations from the verification process will be captured and reported in the Summary Report. 
A.3 ASDP300 5.3.1 Requirements Verification Methods & Process: 
 Requirements will be verified using structured process accomplishing objectives of ARP4754A. 
 Requirements will be verified using combination of methods: 
 Methods of verification include: 
o Test,  
o Analysis (Modeling), 
o Service Experience or, 
o Inspection (engineering review).  
 It is anticipated that the bulk of the avionic systems requirements will be verified through test. 
 Artifacts will be generated as demonstration of the verification process for all requirements. 
 Verification artifacts will be managed appropriate for the function development assurance level. 
 Changed or New requirements supporting functions with FDAL A will be verified with 
independence. 
 Changed or New requirements supporting functions with FDAL B & C will be verified with 
independence as a process goal but may be verified by requirement originators as necessary. 
 Changed or New verification test procedures supporting FDAL A will be managed using change 
management system control category 1. 
 All unchanged functions and their requirements will be re-verified through execution of legacy 
verification methodologies so as to ensure unchanged and revised capabilities provide all intended 
functionality. 
 The IMA100 X.Y baseline verification matrix will be updated for completed verification activities 
and status. 
 This matrix tracks the verification status of each requirement and captures the verification 
method(s) used to establish the verification result and artifact references capturing the verification 
evidence. 
 
 An example verification Matrix shown in Table 33. 
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Table 33 Example Completed Verification Matrix 
   
  Verification 
Method(s) 
 
  
Unique ID Requirement Text S
a
fe
ty
 
F
D
A
L
 
Associated 
Function I
n
s
p
e
c
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
is
 
T
e
s
t 
S
e
rv
ic
e
 
Verification 
Procedure 
Reference 
Verification 
Artifact Reference 
Pas
s / 
Fail 
(P/F) 
AVSYS-R-010 
The primary display system and the 
standby display shall be 
independent. 
Y A Displays  X   NA 
Avionic System 
SSA V2 
P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N C AGPWS X X X  AGPWS1275 VVTest1275 V2 P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N A Platform X  X  Platform101 VVTest1476 V2 P 
AVSYS-R-xxx  N - Autopilot X  X  AP37 VVTest37 P 
AVSYS-R-456            
            
            
 
Matrix Coding: 
Safety – Y if requirement is safety related. 
 
Verification Methods: Inspect – Inspection; Analysis – Analysis (Modeling); Service – Service Experience; Test – Test 
(Demonstration) 
NA – not applicable 
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A.3 ASDP300 6 Avionic System Configuration & Change Management: 
 Configuration management of development artifacts are the responsibility of the Company “A” 
originating group. 
 The central Company “A” CM organization provides tools, services and process to assist in this 
task. 
 Artifacts created during the development and used as part of the certification process will be 
managed per the detailed process described in the “Company A Configuration Management Plan” 
appropriate to the level of rigor established for the artifact. 
 Artifacts to be managed include: 
o Avionic System Development Plan (this document), 
o Avionic system requirements documentation, 
o Avionic system safety assessments, 
o Avionic system validation evidence, 
o Avionic system verification procedures, 
o Avionic system verification evidence, 
o Avionic system validation & verification accomplishment summary. 
 Current ARP4754 CM objective satisfaction will be compared to ARP4754A CM objectives for 
areas of difference identification. 
 Any CM process differences will be noted for discussion and negotiated evolution. 
 Requirements, safety assessment and verification procedure artifacts will be managed using detail 
change management process (Change control level 1 aka System CM category 1) 
 All other program artifacts will be managed using version control change management process 
(change control level 2 aka System CM Category 2). 
A.3 ASDP300 7 Avionic System Process Assurance: 
 Process assurance is integral to the development activities to ensure that the system development 
and supporting processes are appropriate, maintained, and followed.  
 Process assurance is performed by the Company “A” Quality Assurance (QA) organization. 
 Process assurance is evaluated against: 
o ARP4754A objectives based on development assurance rigor (FDAL), 
o DO-178 objectives based on development assurance rigor (IDAL).  See PSAC for specific 
details. 
o DO-254 objectives based on development assurance rigor (IDAL).  See PHAC for specific 
details. 
Title Avionic System Development Plan Doc No. ASDP300 Date 5/28/2015
 
  122 
A.3 ASDP300 8 Certification: 
 Certification artifacts to be developed for the IMA100V2 changes include: 
o Avionic System Development Plan (ASD300 – this document), 
o IMA100 Validation and Verification Summary Report for V2 Configuration, 
o System Safety Assessment (SSA) for IMA100V2 as Installed on the SAAB-EII 300 
Airplane, 
o IMA100V2 Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, 
o IMA100V2 Version Description Document, 
o Other DO-178 life cycle documents as necessary, 
o Other DO-254 life cycle documents as necessary. 
 
Editor Note: Only the Avionic System Development Plan developed as part of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------ End of ASDP300 Avionic System Development Plan excerpt ----- 
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Appendix B Industry Survey Response Data 
B.1 1 Introduction 
This appendix summarizes the ARP4754A application lessons learned sought out from industry in order to 
augment the experiences of the case study data in Appendix A.  
B.1 2 Gathering Additional Information 
Two approaches were undertaken as part of the project to augment the lessons learned from the case 
studies presented in Appendix A.  First, a questionnaire was developed around the specific project task 
study interest areas and then disseminated to the aviation industry for response.  
 
A second, a group discussion roundtable was also accomplished to obtain additional ARP application 
information in three specific focus areas. 
 
The following subsections present the characteristics of each of these information gathering activities and 
the summarized themes resulting from the received data responses. 
B.1 2.1 Questionnaire Data 
A set of approximately 50 questions was developed to solicit individual or company lessons learned in the 
application of ARP4754A.  Section B.2 presents the disseminated questionnaire and format.  The 
questions were grouped so as to obtain a number of different perspectives on a specific ARP application 
area.  The following application experience groupings were used: 
 General, 
 Certification, 
 Planning, 
 Development Process, 
 Safety, 
 ARP4754A Document and Authority guidance Material and, 
 Respondent Characteristics. 
 
Eleven (11) responses were received to the questionnaire.  Responses were received from: 
 Regulatory authority, 
 Aircraft Manufacturer, 
 Engine Manufacturer, 
 System Supplier, 
 Aviation Consultant. 
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B.1 2.2 Roundtable Discussion 
Additional industry experience was solicited through a roundtable discussion held with twenty (20) 
ARP4754A experienced SAE S18 Committee members.  Three different focus areas were discussed: 
1) Lessons learned in applying ARP4754A (e.g. DAL assignment, objective satisfaction), 
2) Engineering judgment in ARP4754A (where used, how leveraged, making up for a lack of 
experienced engineering judgment), 
3) Certification lessons learned on application of ARP4754A (e.g. issues with guidance, issues with 
ARP application, issues with certification policies). 
Discussion Participants have been encoded in the notes as follows: 
 AC – Aircraft manufacturer, 
 SYS – System manufacturer, 
 EQ – Equipment manufacturer, 
 REG – Regulatory authority. 
 
Section B.3 contains the captured notes from the roundtable discussion. 
 
B.1 2.2.1 Discussion Area 1: Lessons Learned Summary 
Three basic themes were identified in the lessons learned and DAL assignment area.  The themes 
include: 
 Users are having difficulty in applying concepts of FDAL/IDAL assignment especially where non-
complex items are involved. 
 Users are experiencing AC/System FDAL escalation due to assignment of IDAL using alternate 
means. 
 Users found new ARP contains improved wording that is different from original ARP and first 
impressions of “extra” work were mitigated through better understanding of the objectives vs what 
was already being accomplished. 
B.1 2.2.2 Discussion Area 2: Engineering Judgment 
The primary themes identified during the engineering judgment discussions include: 
 Validation activity needs domain knowledge and experience history in order to review 
requirements.  Two ways to obtain domain knowledge: buy it or experience it over time. 
 Regulatory authority also needs experience in order to apply appropriate engineering judgments. 
 Company cultures influence specific judgments made during the process (culture is safety 
focused- the judgments will be safety focused, culture is cost focused – judgments will be 
influenced to minimize expenditures). 
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B.1 2.2.3 Discussion Area 3: Certification Lessons 
The primary themes identified during the certification discussions include: 
 Industry should not have to spend time educating the regulatory authority on the process 
objectives. 
 Variability in regulatory expectations by individual and location.  Difficult for industry to determine 
appropriate program scope when there are significant differences in satisfying the ARP objectives 
program to program. 
 Variability in establishing the means of evaluating the means of ARP satisfaction.  Some regulatory 
authorities look for intent of accomplishing objectives while others look for checklist style 
compliance. 
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B.2 – Study Questionnaire 
 
NASA ARP4754A Study Questionnaire  
 
Background 
 
This questionnaire is being circulated in the commercial aviation industry to gather and expand the 
experiences, issues and lessons learned on the application of ARP4754A.  Questionnaire responses will be 
consolidated and analyzed to provide additional inputs to the SAE ARP4754A industry document revision 
process and published as part of NASA Contract NNL13AA06B, Task NNL14AB74T, “Application of SAE 
ARP-4754A to the Development of Complex and Safety-Critical System”. 
Please use this opportunity to relate your experiences on the application of ARP4754A system development 
objectives on a specific project or within your organization. Your experienced based comments provide a 
valuable perspective on the clarity and application of current industry development assurance objectives.  
Please be as descriptive in your responses as time allows. It is anticipated that you may require 30-45 
minutes to complete this questionnaire. 
Raw response data will only be seen by EII researchers. All questionnaire responses will be held in 
confidence and all sources de-identified prior to response consolidation and final report development 
activities. 
 
General: 
1 
Describe the extent and circumstances of your ARP4754A application (e.g. TC, ATC, STC project(s), other). 
Click here to enter text. 
2 
Describe any prior experience with the legacy ARP4754 systems development document that your organization 
may have had. 
Click here to enter text. 
3 
Based on your current work environment, how does your management interpret the scope and purpose of 
ARP4754A? 
Click here to enter text. 
4 
If your company has (or had) a system development process equivalent to ARP4754A, please describe how the 
equivalency was determined, validated and accepted?  
Click here to enter text. 
5 
If the application of ARP4754A required and/or resulted in a change to an established business process, please 
provide examples of any significant process changes your company initiated. 
Click here to enter text. 
6 
Please describe any aspects of ARP4754A that your company determined were unnecessary or impractical to 
apply. 
Click here to enter text. 
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7 
Please describe any benefits you discovered in applying ARP4754A. 
Click here to enter text. 
8 
What type of training, if any, did you receive to better understand ARP4754A?  
Click here to enter text. 
What type of training, if any, did you develop to implement ARP4754A?  
Click here to enter text. 
9 
In your opinion, how does the application of ARP4754A result in better products and systems? 
Click here to enter text. 
In your opinion, how does the application of ARP4754A adversely impact products and systems? 
Click here to enter text. 
10 
In what ways would/did the application of ARP4754A impact program cost and schedule? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
Application Experience - Certification 
11 
Describe your experience of ARP4754A process negotiation with the certification authorities or OEM,  i.e. what 
was considered necessary to show “compliance” to ARP4754A? 
Click here to enter text. 
12 
What key issues(s) was/were the subject of any certification authority or OEM negotiation? 
Click here to enter text. 
13 
What data/documentation do/did you submit to your certification authority or OEM to support ARP4754A? 
Click here to enter text. 
14 
How many Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) or Authorized Representatives (ARs), who specialize 
in ARP4754A objectives, does your company have? 
Click here to enter text. 
15 
What, if any, concerns do you have with the current regulatory policies governing development and assurance? 
Click here to enter text. 
16 
What, if any, concerns do you have with the regulatory guidance for development and assurance? 
Click here to enter text. 
17 
If you are or have been involved in Part 23 certification programs – what has the ARP4754A application 
relationship been on your development program? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
Application Experience – Planning 
18 
Please identify any area(s) of ARP4754A that you have had the most difficulty in applying (i.e. Planning, 
Requirements (management, validation, verification), Configuration Management, Process Assurance or Safety 
Assessment)? 
Click here to enter text. 
19 
Please describe any ARP4754A planning difficulties encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
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20 
Please describe issues, if any, that you may have experienced with the roles and responsibilities for the 
development identified in the program plans. 
Click here to enter text. 
 
Application Experience – Development Process 
21 
Please describe how the airplane manufacturer was involved in the requirement management processes at the 
system and lower tier equipment supplier levels, as applicable. 
Click here to enter text. 
22 
Please describe any ARP4754A requirements capture/ management issues encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
23 
Please describe your experience with the adequacy of system design tools in the ARP4754A development 
process. 
Click here to enter text. 
24 
Please describe any ARP4754A requirement validation issues encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
25 
Please describe any ARP4754A requirement verification issues encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
26 
Please describe any ARP4754A configuration management issues encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
27 
Please describe any ARP4754A processes assurance issues encountered as it related to your development 
activities. 
Click here to enter text. 
28 
With regard to ARP4754A and engineering judgment, what, if any, difficulties did your company experience? 
Click here to enter text. 
29 
Please describe any boundary definition issues, between systems and items, that were encountered and how 
they were manifested. 
Click here to enter text. 
   129 
 
Applications Experience – Safety  
30 
How was your company’s safety focal involvement on the project(s) defined and managed? 
Click here to enter text. 
31 
Please elaborate on your experience of airplane manufacturer management of ARP4754A safety process 
activities, as applicable. 
Click here to enter text. 
32 
Please describe any safety process activity issues you or your organization experienced. 
Click here to enter text. 
33 
Describe the ARP4754A safety process activity issue(s) (e.g. FHA, PASA, PSSA, FTA, CCA). 
Click here to enter text. 
34 
Please describe any issues associated with definition or assignment of “safety related requirements”.  
Click here to enter text. 
35 
Please describe the context of any architectural mitigation strategies successfully used in the assignment of 
Functional Development Assurance Levels (FDALs). 
Click here to enter text. 
36 
Please describe the context of any architectural mitigation strategies successfully used in the assignment of Item 
Development Assurance Levels (IDALs). 
Click here to enter text. 
37 
What, if any, tools have you used to assign FDALs? 
Click here to enter text. 
38 
What tools, if any, have you used to assign IDALs? 
Click here to enter text. 
39 
What FDAL assignment levels were assigned and satisfied? 
Click here to enter text. 
40 
Please describe any issues or difficulties in selecting between ARP4754A Option 1 or 2 in Table 3 for FDAL or 
IDAL assignments that were encountered. 
Click here to enter text. 
41 
Briefly describe any Table 3, Note 1 issues encountered during the assignment of FDAL or IDAL on the project. 
Click here to enter text. 
42 
Looking back, how did your understanding of Functional/Item DAL assignment process evolve throughout the 
project. 
Click here to enter text. 
ARP4754A Document and Authority Guidance Material 
43 
What, if any, concerns do you have with the current ARP4754A industry guidelines for development and 
assurance? 
Click here to enter text. 
44 
What, if any, additional guideline material(s) would help to satisfy regulatory expectations? 
Click here to enter text. 
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45 
How did SAE AIR6110, the industry application example for ARP4754A, aid your understanding of the 
development process described in ARP4754A? 
Click here to enter text. 
46 
What information or issues in AIR6110, contributed to confusion in satisfying ARP4754A objective expectations? 
Click here to enter text. 
47 
What, if any, issues or concerns do you have with the current certification authority guidance material for 
application of development and assurance? 
Click here to enter text. 
48 
What, if any, issues or concerns do you have with the current certification authority policies related to the 
application development and assurance? 
Click here to enter text. 
49 
What additional case study application examples would be helpful in understanding development process expectations?  
Why would these examples be helpful? 
Click here to enter text. 
 
 
Respondent Characteristics 
Please describe the sector of the industry in which you work (e.g certification authority, airplane manufacturer, 
integrated system supplier, equipment supplier, etc.) 
Click here to enter text. 
Please describe which regulatory framework you normally address (e.g. Transport (Part 25), Normal, Utility (Part 23), 
Rotorcraft (Part 27-29), other, etc). 
Click here to enter text. 
Please discuss (in general terms) any current or future ARP4754A applications? 
Click here to enter text. 
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B.2 1 Questionnaire Response Data 
01 Describe the extent and circumstances of your ARP4754A application (e.g. TC, ATC, STC). 
 R1 STC- Avionic modernization program  
 R2 As regulators, we generally encourage companies to apply ARP4754A. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Landing Gear System Development-ATA Chapter 32 e.g. MLG/NLG Structure, Steering 
System, Ext&Ret System, Position Indication and Warning System, Brake Control System. 
 R5 TC project 
 R6 I have read 4754A and compared it to 4754. 
 R7 Development of FCS and LGS and related Equipment. Compliance to ARP4754(A) part of 
work process as per company standard and work flow process required by TC holder. 
Application of ARP4754A or equivalent/derived integral processes from project start 
(Aircraft Manufacturer input requirements) throughout Systems and Equipment 
requirements definition, validation and verification to final steps of certification by TC- 
holder. Problem reporting, configuration management and safety considerations tied to the 
process. 
 R8 We apply ARP in our avionic and weapon systems development activities which are 
generally supplied to Military Aircrafts (fighters, trainers, rotorcrafts, UAVs). Application of 
ARP4754 or ARP4754A is being specified as requirement in our contracts by the aircraft 
manufacturer or main contractor responsible from aircraft. Although these are the military 
system development projects, civil certification requirements are in place to adhere. The 
authority is not a civil authority like FAA or EASA but a military certification authority 
established by the acquisition. 
 R9 Two TC projects under development. 
 R10 TC 
 R11 My company is the airborne equipment supplier, we use ARP4754A mainly for TSO. 
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02 Describe any prior experience with the legacy ARP4754 systems development document 
that your organization may have had. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 As regulators, we had only seen applicants use the legacy document in the areas of DAL 
(more specifically IDAL in current 4754A) assignments. 
 R3 The development process was mostly following the ARP 4754 as it is a clear proceeding; 
however it was not reflected in whole detail in the internal development process 
 R4 ARP4754, was applied in our organization for the development of control units for landing 
gear systems, flight control systems and environmental control system as the level above 
RTCA DO254 and 178B  
 R5 Small gas turbine FADEC development project for helicopters, and turbine engine 
development for civil  aircraft  
 R6 The PROGRAM NAME was developed under 4754.  This covers a product line for the 
PROGRAM NAME and the development of four different applications. 
 R7 Airplane 1 LGS, Airplane 2 & 3 LGS, Airplane 4 & 5 LGS, Airplane 1 FCS 
 R8 Application of ARP 4754 was a contractual requirement in many of our current and 
previous development programs.  
 R9 Three TC projects and type design changes (post-TC) in one of them. 
 R10 Don’t know 
 R11 We do not have formal prior experience with ARP4754, but we have followed the idea of 
the ARP4754 in some project. 
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03 Based on your current work environment, how does your management interpret the scope 
and purpose of ARP4754A? 
 R1 I think benefit of using this standard is not well understood by management.  We need to 
measure some metrics during application process. 
 R2 As regulators, we generally view 4754A as state-of-the-art guidelines 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Initially after the release of the DRAFT ARP4754A and the request, by our customers, 
apply the ARP for new development programs, it created confusion, as interpretation of the 
ARP content was varying inside the organization heavily. It was not clear how the existing 
development processes have to be tuned in order to show compliance. The management 
accepted the ARP as a burden in the beginning, which changed with the first projects 
ARP4754A has been applied to the common consensus that the application of the ARP 
adds maturity to all development phase. (brings our products closer to first time right). 
 R5 Comply with Rev A for new design.  Airframer got Issue Paper to follow rev A. 
 R6 Concerned that any extra work to become 4754A compliant was not in the original budget 
and is not easily  
 R7 Necessary and acceptable mean to ensure development process of complex systems and 
product quality. Reference and link to cost for extensive application of integral process not 
defined and measurable yet despite development planning and transition criteria 
guidelines. 
 R8 Management knows the importance of application of ARPs since they are stated in the 
contracts in military projects. Also the aim is to get TSO in the near future for our products 
meeting civil certification requirements so they know ARPs are part of this process.   
 R9 A kind of certification requirement and, to some extent, and under certain conditions, good 
practices for product quality and maturity assurance. Recently, due to a certain inflation in 
number of requirements being captured either due to situation described in q. 22 below or 
because those recommended practices being carried  for non-direct engineering 
requirements at product high level specification (like maintenance, operational and 
customer support requirements – see also q.5), there is also the perception that it 
represents a burden activity. 
 R10 It’s understood within management that the application of ARP4754A is needed in any 
system development  
 R11 The CAAC authority may take the ARP4754A as the certification requirement for the 
system product, though there is no formal AC for it. My company management use 
ARP4754A as guidance to improve the development process rather than only for 
certification. 
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04 If your company has (or had) a system development process equivalent to ARP4754A, 
please describe how the equivalency was determined, validated and accepted?  
 R1 Military applicants have used system engineering processes defined in ISO/IEC standards. 
They also started to organize their processes according to 4754A. Especially safety related 
processes that are not well defined in system engineering standards. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 The development process in our company was reworked in 2010 with respect to the 
AIRPLANE PROGRAM NAME development guidelines. So with the release of ARP4754A, 
an assessment was done in order to identify if there are discrepancies existing to be 
corrected, adjusted. Further on we stepped into new development programs where our 
customers had different approaches to show compliance to the ARP4754A. One customer 
required for example a line to line compliance matrix to the ARP4754A. The comparison 
ARP4754A versus our development process was made and adjustments applied to the 
process where necessary. One beneficial task prior to the assessment was the ARP4754A 
training at our company done by Eric Peterson to reach a common understanding of the 
ARP. 
 R5 Closest that comes to mind was PROGRAM NAME. No equivalency established 
 R6 As far as I know there isn’t one. 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 We are trying to update our system development process to make it fully compliant with 
ARP 4754A. In order to determine the gaps between ARP process and our existing 
processes we conducted gap analyses performed by an independent consultant. 
 R9 Company has adapted its engineering processes across projects. For the projects under 
development this question is not applicable (all systems/functions are covered by 
ARP4754A based processes). The last project’ TC adopted ARP4754 (legacy version) 
based processes, with some features from version A; and for the first two projects’ TC, 
there were a scope analysis based on complexity, level of integration and criticality of 
systems/functions to identify which ones would be covered by each process (company 
equivalent and ARP4754 based). 
 R10 Don’t know 
 R11 We have established a development process followed ARP4754A at the LRU level, we 
have internal review and approval procedure to check against the ARP4754, but there is no 
way to determine the equivalency by the third party at the moment in Chinese case. 
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05 If the application of ARP4754A required and/or resulted in a change to an established 
business process, please provide examples of any significant process changes your company 
initiated. 
 R1 Especially requirement validation and safety assessment processes needed to be updated.  
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, the “business change” is our recognition that 4754A has a 
role in the certification process, via our ACs and other vehicles. 
 R3 It was not really a fundamental change rather than a determination of the process in more 
detail 
 R4 The application of the ARP4754A resulted in a change of the Requirements Based 
Engineering process, with correction of the validation and verification process steps and 
content. The result was the implementation of a generic Validation and Verification Plan for 
the company.  
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Introduction and application of requirements engineering   
 
2) Establishment and application of System Development Plan, Requirements Validation 
Plan, Requirements Verification Plan, Process Assurance Plan, Configuration 
Management. 
 R8 Requirement validation process had to be improved considering ARP. Safety requirements 
generation and flow down to SW/AEH had to be improved. In general system requirements 
management process and requirement decomposition structure had to be improved. 
 R9 No change at business level was identified in the projects so far (considering the 
application of ARP4754A in the strict sense of technical scope of the projects and in the 
level of airframe and systems development). There are, however, two points to highlight: 
The first: those recommended practices were somewhat spread out to higher-level product 
definitions, outside the usual product definition engineering areas (like maintenance, 
operational and customer support areas), which have more impacts and visibility in 
business process (through data like direct operation cost, direct maintenance cost, etc.) – 
this point contributes, to some extent, with the perception described in q.3. Second point: 
there is the possibility to move toward on introducing more detailed criteria, metrics and 
indicators based on requirements management practices in the project development 
framework, refining the decision and risk assessment processes around project phases and 
gates. 
 R10 The verification and validation processes between requirements owners and implementers 
have been reviewed completely under the guidance or ARP4754A. 
 R11 My company established business process is the general requirements for airborne product 
development, the rigor is the average level which means it is more rigor than DAL D but is 
less rigor than DAL B. So the DAL allocation process and control in different rigor impact 
the process significantly. 
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06 Please describe any aspects of ARP4754A that your company determined were 
unnecessary or impractical to apply. 
 R1 DAL allocation Table 3. Using option 1 and 2 is not as easy in real environment as it is 
described in 4754A in terms of showing compliance to independence requirements.  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 FDAL-determination: it is not fully clear, down to what level this should be performed 
Validation: It was understood, that for requirements with FDAL A or B two means of 
verification should be applied. This is in some cases not feasible or impossible 
 R4 FDAL and IDAL Assignment Process created discussion and inconsistency within our 
development process. As our customers do not identify FDAL’s in their specifications In 
consequence we used the SFHA as done in legacy projects. The further item difficult to 
handle was the issue how to determine complex versus noncomplex equipment mainly for 
structural or hydro-mechanical equipment. For electronic HW and SW it was clear. This 
was a discussion with our customers, as well the authorities as it was not clear from ARP 
how to handle non electronic equipment. During audits with customers and authorities it 
was not clear at all how to deal with para 5.5.5.4 b. “unintended functions “ of ARP4754A. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Ambiguous explanation (e.g. Table 6 Requirements Validation Methods and Data) often 
leads to mismatching interpretation and expectation with Regulatory Authorities and TC-
holder. This concerns both the process to be in put in place and the acceptable level and 
extent of data/results to be provided. 
 
2) The concept of eliminating “unintended function” during verification and/or integration 
activities gained wider popularity and some acceptance with ARP4754A. It is however too 
summarily defined to provide assistance or guideline: some interpretation might be 
unintended function = “everything that is not required from the system”, thus any attempt to 
define a process gets out of hand. 
 
3) Formal allocation FDAL A/B/C sufficient to address failure criticalities affecting 
development process. Focus is usually put on FDAL A/B investigation and assurance. 
 R8 Section 6 
 R9 Although some aspects have been controversial issues, both internally and externally in 
discussions with cert. authorities and suppliers, we could not find, to the extent of 
application we’ve exercised so far, anyone that we could firmly say it’s unnecessary or 
impractical. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Because we are the LRU supplier, so most of the safety assessment process except FMEA 
is unnecessary to us. Typically we follow the requirement from the customer, including DAL 
and safety requirement. 
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07 Please describe any benefits you discovered in applying ARP4754A. 
 R1 It provides companies a structure way to develop their processes. Giving a systematic path 
to follow in design and development. 
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, the benefits are better understanding of applicants’ 
development process which in turn helps us provide better guidance to applicants toward 
showing compliance 
 R3 Clear relationship between safety, requirements capture process and (system) design 
 R4 Guideline for development process development and predecessor to RTCA DO 178 and 
254 
 R5 More rigorous requirements traceability 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Possibility and opportunity to apply a single development process for complete System 
2) Compatibility with other standards or guidelines already established in the Company, 
such as DO254x,DO178x, ARP47613) Compatibility with Company Business Process, 
though adjustment might be necessary 4) Wider acceptance among development and 
verification engineering. 
 R8 ARP is a key tool when applied logically and in an organized manner because it is a 
detailed guideline which provides a bridge between the civil certification requirements and 
SW development (DO 178)/AEH development (DO-254). Since all our existing programs 
requires SW developed according to DO 178 and in recent programs DO 254 is also 
required, the appliance of system level development processes according to ARP is very 
crucial. ARP gives a detailed guideline starting from deriving system functions to 
implementation. While doing this, the focus is system level development (for our usage) 
and system safety assessment but the relations with other levels like aircraft level, item 
level, SW level, HW level are very well established. The flow of information between these 
layers and the borders of each layer has been drawn to clarify top-down approach that has 
been adapted. Hence it is good to know when adapting company processes to ARP, which 
pieces of information is related with systems engineering or SW engineering or HW 
engineering and what should we expect from aircraft level. 
 R9 The ones that highlight are: # is to set up a framework to perform a requirements-oriented 
development, which provides means to correlates program/development phases/events 
with key processes activities that allow us to set up and to measure product quality and 
maturity expectations. 
 R10 Structured and controlled V&V activities throughout the development process 
 R11 The work is well ordered and well controlled. Though we have taken more time for the 
design, less iterations are required for the verification process, etc. 
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08a What type of training, if any, did you receive to better understand ARP4754A?  
 R1 Skip 
 R2 As a member of the S18 committee, I have no need for this training.  However, we 
continually find ways to train our engineers in the agency. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 We got training by E. Peterson, two days for general walk through and another two days for 
dedicated question session. 
 R5 Presentations on introduction of Rev A. Organized workshops 
 R6 None 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 We received a 2-day training for ARP 4761 and 4754A, a couple of years ago. Also we 
conducted a gap analysis to reveal what has to be done in order to make our processes 
compliant with ARP4754A and ARP 4761. 
 R9 The great majority of people had no formal training; we have got understanding across 
projects from interacting with cert. authorities and suppliers, taking part in S-18 meetings 
and “on the job training” during the projects, exchanging internally experiences and lessons 
learned. 
 R10 Three days course on ARP4754A. 
 R11 We did not have formal training to understand ARP4754A. We do this by group discussion 
within the company. 
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08b What type of training, if any, did you develop to implement ARP4754A?  
 R1 We develop trainings related to 4754A and 4761 for our engineers (military authority 
certification specialists). 
 R2 We have internally developed a training course and a webinar. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Based upon the training and company development process adaptation to ARP4754A we 
developed a one day training session for company employees in order to make them aware 
of ARP4754A and respectively the company development process which is in line with 
ARP4754A. We also established training sessions for the company guidelines 
Requirements Engineering Policy and Requirements Engineering Process. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 None 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 We implemented internal System Safety and Development training covering ARP 4761 and 
ARP4754A processes. 
 R9 We developed a corporate introductory, overview, training (for version A and relevant 
changes from legacy) and project specific trainings focusing on operational aspects of each 
process implementation (functions list / requirements capture, validation & verification and 
related aspects of configuration management). 
 R10 None 
 R11 We did not have formal training to implement ARP4754A. We do this by group discussion 
and dry run the sample project within the company. 
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09a In your opinion, how does the application of ARP4754A result in better products and 
systems? 
 R1 4754A gives us a good understanding of what to do. I think companies should develop their 
own procedures according to their scope of work and criticality of the systems. Finding the 
best way that fits to company is important to get the benefit of applying 4754A. 
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, the learning curve for industry and ACO is still fairly steep 
at the present time.  But for those who have gone through it once, the benefit is 
better/smoother certification in the next program. 
 R3 The clear relationship between safety, requirements capture process and (system) design 
will help to avoid errors and late detection of non-compliance to safety requirements 
 R4 Identification of gaps in the forward path of the development with validation “are we building 
the right thing” and with verification “did we build the right thing”. 
 R5 Better requirements definition and management 
 R6 Higher levels of configuration management and control practices.  Also, the alignment with 
DO-178B/C makes it easier to work with the software group. 
 R7 1) Methods to ensure correctness, completeness and traceability provide more confidence 
at every single step of development process and problem management, more visibility is 
given for documentation during development and for/post-certification.   
 
2) ARP4754A is not depending on the software tool adapted for its application. 
 R8 I think before ARP, it is not clear how to relate our system safety engineering and other 
system development activities with the SW and AEH level. ARP provides a means of filling 
the gap between civil certification requirements and implementation in SW and AEH 
through the use of DAL assignment process, requirement validation and verification 
process. Since DO-178 or DO-254 for SW and AEH are not sufficient to produce a safe 
product without a systematic approach followed in system level, ARP serves as a “systems 
aspect of certification” standard to follow for developing better airborne products and 
systems.  
 R9 Anticipating issues as early as possible in the development and Entry Into Service (EIS), 
helping risk identification / mitigation and providing a systematic mean (requirements-
oriented development) to analyze, assessing and solving issues from the deployment of 
business / high level requirements into implementation, during the development, framework 
for communication with suppliers (e.g. requirements and interface control data),  EIS and 
operation. Additionally, it helps in the product change impact analysis; without the 
traceability framework its application provides, impact analysis requires much time (having 
to analyze the entire database and test data) and that is subject to much more errors. 
 R10 All the engineers participating in the system development have a better idea of the whole 
process. The life cycle of requirements from initial state to implementation and testing is 
better controlled, reducing the risk of missing steps during the development that would 
result in costly redesigns at a later stage in the program. 
 R11 Less remained errors, better controlled data for modification and duplication, it is also good 
for reuse. 
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09b In your opinion, how does the application of ARP4754A adversely impact products and 
systems? 
 R1 Documentation effort as output of 4754A may lead some delay in project. Common 
understanding is important. I don’t think both authority and applicant personnel are in same 
understanding level.   
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, there should not be adverse impact to the safety of 
products and systems. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 I see no adverse impact on products and systems 
 R5 Increase cost via Engineering hours 
 R6 No – it contains good engineering practices. 
 R7 Extensive application of ARP4754A as per the document for whole System and its 
Equipment often impacts cost and schedule. 
 R8 None 
 R9 One possible adverse impact is the pitfall of believing that setting down the processes, with 
checklists, activities workflow, etc., one could execute that without an engineering judgment 
and technical background with regarding the content being evaluated. For instance, a 
requirement captured by a beginner engineer, validated by another beginner engineer may 
not be of good quality, even though we have a checklist approved in a plan, fulfilled with 
independence and assured by another person that has no good knowledge on that 
technology area. The risk here is to believe that the processes can replace people 
knowledge about the artifacts being worked out under those process. 
 R10 Cost and effort is increased, mainly in the initial stages of the development process. 
Generally the initial investment pays off during the whole program. However, in some cases 
it is difficult to see the benefit. 
 R11 The cost. 
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10 In what ways would/did the application of ARP4754A impact program cost and schedule? 
 R1 We couldn’t apply all sections 100% in our military project. No metrics were measured. 
Therefore no objective evidence about the impact on cost and schedule. 
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, cost and schedule impacts should be neutral for the first 
application (i.e. pays for itself due to mitigation of late surprises) and then improved for the 
next project. 
 R3 Additional effort in development, requirements capture process and verification. Application 
in development process in some cases not clear - see also response to question 6. 
 R4 In the beginning for the first time application of the ARP4754A it was an increase of the 
cost of about 25% and a schedule impact of about 3-4 month, clearly owed the fact that the 
ARP4754A process common understanding was not given with a set of repetitions 
required. With the improved practice and mature and trained process, the impact is 
reduced to 10% cost and 4 weeks schedule. But consider that the maturity of the final 
system/product is heavily improved. 
 R5 Higher cost, longer development plan 
 R6 A small potential for addition hours to support the higher levels of CM 
 R7 1) Reviews might need to involve more resources, effort or loops before being deemed 
completed. However, this is usually the case for FDAL A/B and safety related items.  
 
2) Validation process is generally understood to need time, which is acceptable with 
regards to the final target. Often times, this process is being complicated when 
organizations/stakeholders to be involved are further apart (e.g. Customer/Supplier in 
different countries). Release of documents might take longer, or rework is necessary if 
validation is not directly performed with all stakeholders. 
 R8 There is no sufficient data for this evaluation in our hand since our experience is relatively 
low, newly developing. But I think the application of ARP should not adversely affect the 
cost and schedule when applied correctly because the real cost comes from SW 
development (appliance of DO 178) and AEH development (appliance of DO 254). On the 
other hand, appliance of ARP should serve for cutting cost and schedule in the appliance of 
these processes by timely identifying safety objectives, safety requirements and 
development assurance levels which are used as the main inputs and in fact are the main 
drivers for cost and schedule factors.  
 R9 Increase schedule and cost in early phases of projects (due to greater effort concentrated 
in requirements capture, discussion and validation, when compared to non-ARP4754 
based processes) and across all phases due to formalization of several data, process 
assurance activities and support for Cert. Authorities on-site reviews. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 In my opinion, to apply ARP4754A, we need qualified engineers to support the engineering 
activities, so cost more for the human resource.  As for the schedule, it may take more time 
for design, but it may save time for the verification. 
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11 Describe your experience of ARP4754A process negotiation with the certification 
authorities or OEM, i.e. what was considered necessary to show “compliance” to ARP4754A? 
 R1 As military authority side we more focused on planning (especially certification plan and 
safety program plan),  safety assessment and verification processes outputs.   
 R2 From the regulatory perspective, if an applicant is applying the ARP for the 1st time, 
regulators expect the company to have the infrastructure (and management support) to be 
able to perform the entire set of the “integral process”. Depending on the scope of the 
project, I have advised our ACOs to focus oversight on certain aspects of the integral 
process.  In all cases, the requirement validation aspect is at the forefront. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 The negotiation with authorities was in a way that it was presented to the customer and 
authorities how the company’s interpretation and implementation is. Audits, by the 
authorities and customer during the developments process, reviewed whether the 
presented ARP4754A process was applied as per initial presentation.  
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) General agreement on application and aim of ARP4754A  
 
2) Key divergence is related to the extent and depth of the process application itself and 
also the acceptable evidence to be provided.  
 
3) Negotiations are often affected by different or non-consistent interpretations among 
representatives of same organizations or roles (e.g. among Suppliers, or among Regulatory 
Authorities). Very personal interpretation of ARP4754A, in this case, is rather a barrier to 
come to an agreement than an added value. 
 R8 The implementation of safety requirements (FDALs, IDALs) are required to be in compliant 
with ARP4754A. 
 R9 In general, submittal of Certification and Development Plans, and Certification Summary / 
Compliance Report, along with on-site audits performed by CAs, usually regulated by 
agreement in an specific issue paper and / or Certification Action Item, usually covering us 
as OEM (system level) and our suppliers (sub-systems / equipment  
 R10 It has been well valued by the certification authorities the compliance to ARP4754A. No 
important points of discussion have taken place with the authorities so far. 
 R11 Certification support Plan, Safety Assessment data, identification and change control 
process and data, Requirements documents, Design documents and verification 
documents. 
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12 What key issues(s) was/were the subject of any certification authority or OEM negotiation? 
 R1 It was a modification project so as authority side we tried to follow section 6 of 4764A but 
some issues raised to agree on impact analyses and output documentation. I think section 
6 should provide more information to manage the modification of an aircraft. Also 
modifications are mostly performed by companies rather than TC holder and those 
companies usually don’t have enough information about aircraft to assess the modification 
impact (for example no original safety assessments). 
 R2 Looking from the regulatory perspective, the main concern I have is the “ARP4754A 
process specialists” at the companies are too busy designing the processes, they are 
removed from the development itself (which often runs concurrently) and consequently 
there can be disconnects between what they think is done vs what is actually done. Thus 
the full spectrum of benefits of applying the ARP is not realized until the next program 
(cost/schedule/quality of product/smoother cert). 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Compliance to ARP was one of the mandatory subjects. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Amount of validation/verification methods to be applied;   
 
2) Involvement of Safety Engineer in reviews, problem and change assessment. 
 R8 Item DAL levels. 
 R9 Their level of involvement and the rigor in the compliance demonstration, considering the 
systems that is introducing any new technology or whose architecture is highly integrated 
and complex, or, yet, if the supplier has few previous experience either in the development 
of the sub-system or equipment being supplied or in the ARP4754 compliance 
demonstration for it. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 DAL allocation. 
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13 What data/documentation do/did you submit to your certification authority or OEM to 
support ARP4754A? 
 R1 As military authority side we incorporated all documents that we required in the contract. 
We also referenced 4754A in the contract but Contract Data Requirement List took priority. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 As system supplier we submit validation and verification plans, system development plan, 
safety and reliability plan to the aircraft manufacturer 
 R4 Compliance Matrix, System Development Plan, Process Assurance Plan, Validation and 
Verifcation Plan 
 R5 SSA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 System Development Plan, Requirements Validation Plan, Requirements Verification Plan, 
Process Assurance Plan, Configuration Management, System Requirements Document, 
System Validation Summary Report including matrix, System Verification Summary Report 
including matrix 
 R8 System Safety Program Plan, Certification Plan, FHA, PSSA, SSA. 
 R9 See 11. 
 R10 System Description Documents, Test Procedures, Test Results 
 R11 Certification support Plan, FHA/PSSA/SSA data, Verification plan, summary report. 
 
 
14 How many Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) or Authorized Representatives 
(ARs), who specialize in ARP4754A objectives, does your company have? 
 R1 We have trained our specialist to understand the objectives of 4754 but it takes time to 
specialize in this guideline. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 Don't know. 
 R6 NA 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 None 
 R9 Eleven (11) registered in Certification Authority records and, so far, four (4) had effectively 
acted in reviewing ARP4754() data for compliance. 
 R10 Two 
 R11 There are 2 DERs (system and equipment) in my company, in CAAC policy there is no 
specialized DER for ARP4754A objective, neither for SW or E HW. 
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15 What, if any, concerns do you have with the current regulatory policies governing 
development and assurance? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 Need more experience on Assurance 
 R6 NA 
 R7 Regulatory policies or boundaries, especially data to be provided for certification 
submission, need to be defined latest by PDR. Any communication or new insights and 
perceptions beyond this milestone impacts product design,  
 R8 None 
 R9 Not clear what question means by “policies”… Considering, for instance, the FAA AC 20-
174 / ARP4754(), there is no concern so far, because, it seems to us, they are somewhat 
“new” (considering an airplane development cycle) and were not exercised sufficiently so 
far (like the ones regarding integrated modular architectures, the FA AC 20-170 and DO-
297, for instance). However, based on similar question in other technologies (software and 
AEH, for instance), the concerns are not directly related to the policies themselves, but to 
some lack of alignment of agencies personal (both internally to each agency, and between 
agencies) about the understanding of their application and how to follow them: depending 
on the person the applicant faces in the room, or the one that reviews the data the 
applicant sent out, what has being done can be acceptable or not. 
 R10 None 
 R11 Skip 
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16 What, if any, concerns do you have with the regulatory guidance for development and 
assurance? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 There is one issue, recognized that the ARP4754A, which is similar to the experience made 
within our organization that different organizations (authorities) and also personal in these 
organizations show different interpretations of how things of the ARP shall be applied to the 
development process. (e.g. recommendation equals requirement). 
 R5 Guidance need to be part of training. 
 R6 NA 
 R7 Different references are generally mentioned for development and assurance guidance: 
Regulatory’s, OEM’s and Supplier’s business process. All of those might be based on 
ARP4754A or were considered when creating it. But since regulatory authorities’ guidance 
is determining, more effort for communication and at times discussion with SAE ARP4754A 
working group and the general industry is required on regular basis.  
 R8 None 
 R9 See 15 – for us, the distinction between a regulatory “policy” and “guidance” is not clear. 
 R10 None 
 R11 Skip 
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17 If you are or have been involved in Part 23 certification programs – what has the ARP4754A 
application relationship been on your development program? 
 R1 We involved in CS 23 Cat III aircraft development process with EASA. But in this project 
EASA didn’t require the application of 4754A.  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Since ARP4754A was released we have not be working on a Part 23 projects, but on Part 
29 programs. We as a company decided to follow the ARP4754A respectively ours 
company development process guidelines for Part 23/25/27/29 applications. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 None yet. 
 R8 We have ARP4754A requirement in our Part 23 aircraft system development programs. 
The activities are the same but it is difficult to classify failure conditions and substantiate 
them since most AC and TSO material include classifications made considering Part 25 
airplanes. 
 R9 Involvement occurred only with legacy version (ARP4754), through a Certification Action 
Item for the Type  
 R10 In my personal experience, the application of ARP4754A has been similar in Part 23 and 
Part 25 programs I’ve  
 R11 Skip 
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18 Please identify any area(s) of ARP4754A that you have had the most difficulty in applying 
(i.e. Planning, Requirements (management, validation, verification), Configuration Management, 
Process Assurance or Safety Assessment)? 
 R1 Each process has its own methodology and tool to apply. I think the biggest problem we 
had is communication and timely information flow between and within the processes.   
 R2 Skip 
 R3 FDAL-determination: it is not fully clear, down to what level this should be performed 
Validation: It was understood, that for requirements with FDAL A or B two means of 
verification should be applied. This is in some cases not feasible or impossible 
 R4 Safety Assessment (FDAL assignment); Verification process philosophy 
 R5 Config Management 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Challenging if not problematic involvement of Verification entities, i.e. Verification 
Engineers, during the development process starting during first validation reviews. The 
difficulties encountered partly reside in their theoretically “passive” role during development, 
in order for the independence policy to be ensured.  
 
2) Minor mismatch between currently valid items baseline (e.g. document or design build 
standard) and the items actually being investigated or used for further activities. 
 R8 Requirement validation was the most difficult area since engineers are used to define and 
perform verification work rather than validation of the requirements they are developing. 
Hence it was difficult to manage and complete validation work. 
 R9 Planning, Verification and Process Assurance. Regarding safety assessment, the scope of 
the ARP4754A and the relationship with the certification process (final full review versus 
early involvement accepting the process). 
 R10 Process Assurance and Safety Assessment integration with system requirements. 
 R11 I think the Process Assurance is the most difficult part, we know the basic idea, but we do 
not know how to guide the QA to do the work effectively.  The same for other activities, 
though we know what we expected to do, we are lack of experience on how to write good 
engineering documents, etc. 
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19 Please describe any ARP4754A planning difficulties encountered. 
 R1 Safety assessments should be started very early stage of the project. Because system 
criticality effects some planning activities. Without knowing system criticality we couldn’t 
plan some activities in detail.  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None, after the generic validation and verification plans have been established in the 
development process 
 R5 When to introduce Config Management 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) “Old school” verification, just like design, certainly still relies on experience and sees 
requirements engineering as subordinated.  
 
2) Beyond configuration management own issues, keep track of all currently valid items’ 
baselines in a way to coordinate complex actions and interactions is nearly impossible. 
E.g.: By the time of its delivery, the qualification procedures for the release of equipment 
might not be complete in its entireness. Written Evidence or Design Justification supporting 
applicability and minor/none effect of remaining portion to be qualified must be produced. 
 R8 It is difficult to plan the completion of requirement validation work. 
 R9 The most relevant difficulties were related to: 
  
a) timely definition and application of clear transition criteria and guidelines related to 
deviations from the plans (section 3.2);  
 
b) to set up process related to architecture / design definition and requirements allocation 
(sections 4.1.6/7, 4.4 and 5.8.4.4).  Additionally, about this last, in despite of figure 6 
suggests the existence of sub-systems, related sections suggest that systems are, at the 
same time, the entity to which aircraft level functions are allocated and from which software 
and hardware items are deployed (section 4.6). This situation does not match with real 
environment and introduce difficulties in planning requirements organization and integral 
processes. 
 R10 None 
 R11 The plans for all the projects seem similar, but it does not have too much help to the 
project. We do not know how to write a good plan to guide the specific project working 
effectively. 
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20 Please describe issues, if any, that you may have experienced with the roles and 
responsibilities for the development identified in the program plans. 
 R1 As military authority side we had some problem related to owning of 4754 processes by our 
system certification specialist. They mostly focus on their certification requirements. We 
realized that we need to provide more trainings related to 4754A in order to make them 
understand they have to manage whole processes related to their systems. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) For a requirement with identical validation method and verification method, for instance 
Stress Analysis, independency is not guaranteed since often the same Stress Analysis 
report would be used as a reference. Assessment whether the analysis results are 
sufficient to cover both purposes would need to be done by another engineer. 
 
2) Involving Senior Engineers’ (Chief, Airworthiness, Specialists, …) in reviews and 
decision pertaining FDAL A/B/C should certainly be a general aim, though application due 
to restricted number of Senior Engineer is not always possible. 
 R8 The responsibilities for the documentation and verification of safety requirements. The 
means for communicating derived requirements between the item level and system level. 
 R9 The most relevant issue was related to responsibilities of process definition (internal 
agreements and planning), communication (training) and Process Assurance execution 
being performed by the same team. 
 R10 None 
 R11 CCB, different people think differently about CCB. Some think it as a fixed organization, 
some think it as a meeting for the change. 
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21 Please describe how the airplane manufacturer was involved in the requirement 
management processes at the system and lower tier equipment supplier levels, as applicable. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 As an observation, airplane manufacturers currently have limited practical influence at 
lower tiers supplier levels, although most have processes to manage system-level 
requirements. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 The airplane manufacturer was involved in the system requirements by discussion and 
agreement to the compliance matrix to the customer specification as well as the 
participation in the system validation audits.  
 R5 Airframer review engine safety requirement, offer workshop  
 R6 The normal interaction with the airframer is through the publication of the ICD.  This 
process is the same under both versions of the ARP so there is no difference seen in this 
area. 
 R7 1) System Requirements Document is a child of the airplane manufacturer’s requirements 
documents. Traceability to the document  
 
2) Validation activities with airplane manufacturer to ensure completeness and coverage 
are part of standard process.  
 
3) System Validation/Verification Summary Reports including matrices containing agreed 
information are part of deliverables. 
 
4) Airplane manufacturer representatives witness verification activities on request. 
 R8 In some projects airplane manufacturer or main contractor gives us not only FDALs but 
also IDALs for system items that we are developing without validation evidence. This 
complicates the safety assessment process, requirement development and management. 
 R9 In our experience as airplane manufacturer, suppliers are involved in two moments, with 
two approaches. In the first moment, in the preliminary studies of a new project, before its 
formally launched, through interviews and procurement preliminary discussions (requests 
for information / proposal). Next, we set up a supplier oversight plan, based on a risk 
assessment and level of involvement processes. Those processes end up with activities 
similar to the ones defined for “Stage Of Involvement” reviews performed for software when 
finding compliance to DO-178() (“SOIs”), which the highest rigor is to have on-site 
development and verification reviews after the planning review performed for all cases.  In 
general, we’ve observed the suppliers of are not familiar with fulfilling ARP4754() 
objectives, usually because either their primary regulatory compliance does not require 
include ARP4754A as a means of compliance or that compliance is requested to be 
demonstrate by the airplane manufacturer only. 
 R10 Aircraft level requirements and supplier requirements are traces and controlled by the 
airplane manufacturer. 
 R11 Skip 
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22 Please describe any ARP4754A requirements capture/ management issues encountered. 
 R1 4754 tells us what kind of requirement can be captured and what methods can be used to 
validate them. But I think this phase mostly depend on the knowledge of each party 
(customer, manufacturer, etc) at the time of requirement review. We had to face incomplete 
and ambiguous requirements required by customers. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Not configured customer documentation e.g. specification plus a set of Change Requests, 
not formally validated on parent level. Missing requirements links, missing equipment 
allocation, incorrect means of validation/verification, duplication of verification tasks e.g. at 
equipment and system level the verification of the same functionality. 
 R5 Nacelle, TRU requirements capture and flowdown by engine manufacturer 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Linguistic difficulties and conflicts aside, requirements capture is rarely satisfying to an 
organization or an engineer during the course of the development. Different insights and 
realizings will always come down the way, sometimes leading most drastic action such as 
complete rework. This might be related to the general approach, the layout of information 
capture, the acceptability of a wording across diverse disciplines.  
 
2) Tool available for requirements capture/management not always satisfying every 
requirement and process within one organization or outside the organization. Misuse or 
mishandling of the tool and the ARP4754A process to comply with one aspect, e.g. 
document layout containing information deemed necessary to assess certifiability need to 
be produced although multiple relations on a single level are not to be managed. 
 R8 It was difficult to capture and manage system requirements in a consistent manner without 
a requirement standard employed like in DO178 and DO254 but ARP doesn’t call out for 
such type of standardization. Hence different type of requirements, in different granularities 
and different composition makes harder to evaluate them. 
 R9 The most relevant issue is related to engineers capturing as “requirements” information that 
may not represent indeed a “requirement” (like a design standard or assumptions) and 
having difficulties in validating it. This situation sometimes leaded to a requirements 
database bigger than the product actually needs. 
 R10 Suppliers don’t all work following the same processes and requirements capture and 
management worked well with some and not so well with others. 
 R11 We have DOORS for requirement management, but it is not clear for us how to connected 
the requirement management with the development process. 
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23 Please describe your experience with the adequacy of system design tools in the 
ARP4754A development process. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 DOORS is used as a standard for the validation and verification process. What is required 
is unambiguous defined process and therefore the verification and validation plan must be 
in place. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 As per Q22, available tools (e.g. Team Center, IBM DOORS) correspond closely to the 
expectation and application of ARP4754A development process. Inadequacy or possibly 
misuse results from expectations beyond process application, implementation and 
reasonable management effort. 
 R8 None 
 R9 Not sure what the question means by “system design tools”. Assuming the restrict sense of 
“design” provided in sections 4.1.6 and 4.4, and Simulink as one example of such tools, 
they have been widely used in supporting requirements validation through the usage of 
modeling and simulation cases as part of validation evidences. 
 R10 DOORS is the tool typically used. In some ways this tool is deficient and can be improved 
significantly. 
 R11 DOORS, Synergy, PDM, integrated development tools, verification tools. 
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24 Please describe any ARP4754A requirement validation issues encountered. 
 R1 The issue was that companies didn’t set a systematic correctness and completeness check 
process. Also only review process as a validation method was preferred by companies. 
Test and analysis methods were found as a  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Implementation during development process needed to be established, e. g. with respect to 
determination of disciplines to participate and resources planning 
 R4 Organization of the validation process, having the required people available for the 
validation process. Re-visit of already validated requirements with different results. Non 
availability of Verification engineering for validation, causing additional effort during 
verification back in the validation process. In complete requirements baseline from parent 
documentation means spread of requirements over a set of documents. We made the 
decision in the company to apply validation process as well for complex and non complex 
systems and equipment’s, as we recognized by doing so having a robust development 
process and less discussions with customers/authorities. 
 R5 Not covered yet 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Rationale of requirement often understood as self-explaining or “based on experience” is 
also often hard to formulate.  
 
2) Different linguistic backgrounds within one project, whether within one organization or 
outside, sometimes build a barrier for clear formulation and precise wording choice. Even 
the most skilled specialist might encounter this problem if not expressing himself in his 
native language or language of education. 
 R8 The responsibility of requirement validation work is not clearly described in ARP. 
 R9 Additionally to comment provided in question 22 above, recently we realized that sections 
5.4.3 and 5.4.4 (Correctness and Completeness Checks) seem to provide much more 
details than the current practices actually demands to address. Additionally, one of the 
most controversial issue is regarding the prevention of unintended function through 
validation methods and activities – usually, for textual requirements, this issue is explicitly 
addressed in the verification process only. 
 R10 Requirement owners don’t always understand the need to validate their requirements 
during the process. It is important to involve everyone in the process. 
 R11 One of the objective of the requirement validation is its integrity, but it is difficult to prove it. 
   156 
25 Please describe any ARP4754A requirement verification issues encountered. 
 R1 Verification process was more structure than validation process. Because seeing the 
results/outputs were the concern of each party therefore more attention was paid for this 
process. But documenting of what was done as guided by 4754A was an issue. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Implementation during development process needed to be established, e. g. with respect to 
determination of disciplines to participate and resources planning Verification rigor 
sometimes unclear. 
 R4 Traceability and coverage becomes a high effort, if the verification engineering was not 
deeply involved within the validation process, causing inconsistencies in the verification 
either verification of requirements was not done or duplicated at different levels. 
 R5 Not covered yet 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) First issue roots back to requirement capture and validation process: misinterpretation 
might raise on what needs to be verified, or possibly how it should be verified.  
 
2) For Verification Method “similarity”, it is unclear how much of the “similar” equipment or 
system need to be shown. The main issue is due to disclosure obligation with a third party 
airplane manufacturer.  
 
3) Combination of numbers of Verification Method to be applied (e.g. 2), FDAL 
classification (e.g. A) and mandatory method (e.g. test) as per System Verification Plan 
might not be feasible. Negotiation with Regulatory Authorities and Airplane Manufacturer is 
not avoidable. 
 R8 We are confused with the need to prepare a separate verification plan, the need for the 
plan and the content of this plan is not clear in ARP. 
 R9 Some minor issues were related to credits from verification performed at different levels of 
systems and items development; to the level of formalization of verification environment in 
the verification procedures and results; and to the definition of criteria for verification 
methods others than test. Some other issues were related to independence for verification 
activities with regarding design activities and to the level of details in description of test 
objectives and test cases, when considering the requirements set covered. 
 R10 None 
 R11 According to ARP475A, the requirement verification not only refers test after the prototype, 
to verify the design data against the requirement is also part of the requirement verification. 
But at moment we do not have good way for this except review. 
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26 Please describe any ARP4754A configuration management issues encountered. 
 R1 Mostly issues were raised in change control and problem reporting. Evaluating the effect of 
changes on each processes, systems, etc. was a challenging process. And ensuring the 
timely transfer of design data to all parties  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 PSSA goes through several iterations before final issue 
 R6 NA 
 R7 1) Short cuts and full run processes are defined based upon criticality of configuration or 
change. Still, short cut process would suffice in many cases, e.g.: correction of typos in a 
System Requirements Document would mean among others building a team of at least 5, 
alerting the Airplane Manufacturer for the upcoming update. If the typo affects 
understanding or design, this process is correct. However, removal of a misspelling or 
transposed word should be allowed to be done at any time, which is then likely to be at the 
opportunity of a major rework.  
 
2) Sensitization of every single member of a development team in the necessity of 
configuration and change management needs time to take effect. 
 R8 The time when the configuration baselines are established can be described more clearly 
giving example milestones in the certification process. 
 R9 Some issues occurred were related to the inclusion of design data in the configuration item 
identification for CM activities and to criteria procedures for archive and retrieval 
(applicability of SC2). Although there is some practices in place, not clear in the document 
what are the guidelines regarding interim and design completion configurations (figure 14). 
 R10 None 
 R11 The CM is too general in the ARP4754A. We need more specific guidance for the 
relationship between Part No, Mod, version, document id, etc. Also, the definition for CC1 
and CC2 is not clear, I think a criteria is needed for classifying the CC1 and CC2, so the 
engineers can judge CC for the data by themselves. 
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27 Please describe any ARP4754A processes assurance issues encountered as it related to 
your development activities. 
 R1 Process assurance activities was performed as part of independent system monitoring 
activities. But stand-alone assessment according to 4754A (with a 4754A questionnaire) 
should have been performed to assure better compliance. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 None 
 R9 Some issues identified: #1.  Not clear which level, or at least, which kind of, independence 
section 5.7 talks about, e.g.: who performs the assurance activities versus who defines the 
process versus who performs development activities? Individuals or organization level?  
Most of practices are based on experience from software domain… what about that 
“portability” – adequate?  Too rigorous?  
 
#2. Unclear guidelines regarding deviation from plans when considering the Process 
Assurance: section 3.2.1 (bottom line for all planning elements) has a general statement 
about that, but further guidelines are defined only for validation, verification and certification 
planning elements.  
 
#3. Sometime we have some difficulty in performing assurance due to supplier’s data 
access limitation, like Intellectual Property or ITAR restrictions. 
 R10 Requirements were initially written based on preliminary system design data which leads to 
a lot of changes during validation and verification process. Requirements traces have to be 
reviewed regularly in order to keep them up to date. High level requirements are also an 
area that causes difficulties, since they are written at the beginning of the program and not 
updated, with the risk of becoming obsolete and making the traces invalid. 
 R11 We know the basic idea PA, but it is not quite clear how to make the PA work effectively 
and typically what kind of person is qualified for the PA. 
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28 With regard to ARP4754A and engineering judgment, what, if any, difficulties did your 
company  
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 For engineering judgment, the point is that you have to have a proven database either from 
previous developments/lessons learnt or R&D programs/testing etc. which are documented 
to underline the engineering judgment position. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 NA 
 R7 Documentation of engineering judgment, possibly taken as an assumption, encounters 
reluctance, sometimes resistance. This is often explained as follows: Capturing the 
judgment as a requirement would make it necessary to be validated. The validation method 
used will confirm the “judgment”, changing its character to “analyzed” or “reviewed and 
assessed”. 
 R8 For military platforms, it is difficult to justify DAL requirement for some mission functions. 
 R9 Requirements using "engineering judgment" present evidence and documentation with very 
sparse quality (high and low) being very dependent, of course, on the person who is 
judging.  And as previously spoken (see q. 9, adverse impacts), there may be cases when 
that person does not have more experience or knowledge than who wrote the evidence, 
leading to a possible loss of knowledge or even errors that may have consequences on the 
next project phase. In general, we think that engineering judgment should be avoided. 
Methods such as analysis and simulation are more scientific and less subject to opinions as 
engineering judgment. Nevertheless, there may be ways to increase the quality of 
engineering judgment, like for example training, use of best practices records, etc. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 We are lack of the experienced engineers or experts to make good engineering judgment. 
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29 Please describe any boundary definition issues, between systems and items, that were 
encountered and how they were manifested. 
 R1 Especially LRUs were treated as item (hardware) by the companies rather than a part of 
system. Therefore problem raised to apply 4754A for development process of equipment. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None real boundary conditions, one point to mention to define in an early stage to what 
level of completion the validation must be done and released prior to the transition to the 
next level, that means for example SW development may need at an earlier stage validated 
requirements than a hydraulic valve block during the during the development phase. 
 R5 e.g., Boundary overlap between engine Controls and Installations 
 R6 NA 
 R7 The systems and items definition issues are not related to the boundary definitions but 
more to activities applicable on multiple levels: Credit is sometimes taken on a higher level 
from verification activities of sub-level items. Attempt to influence the verification activities 
on these sub-levels to cover both their and the one above might occur. Also, it is possible 
to have conflicting means of verification on two levels.  
 R8 The means for communicating derived requirements between the item level and system 
level. 
 R9 We are facing difficulties in the usage of REQUIREMENTS MODEL; boundaries when 
applying DO-331 (Model Based Development and Verification supplement to DO-178C) for 
such requirements are not clear and ARP4754A guidelines are not considering that 
supplement.  
 R10 Tracing requirements between the system and the individual components is difficult and 
sometimes not possible. Items are developed by suppliers, sometimes with different 
processes. It is particularly a problem when integrating COTS items in the system. 
 R11 Actually, the term “boundary” is not clear when I read the ARP4754A. 
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30 How was your company’s safety focal involvement on the project(s) defined and managed? 
 R1 As military authority we set a safety panel for the project and assigned panel coordinator. 
Safety panel was a transversal panel. It was responsible for setting the high level safety 
objectives, approving applicant’s safety program plan and aircraft level safety analyses and 
ensuring (by attending the system certification panels) that all system panels/experts are 
working according to that methodology  set by Safety Panel. Also safety panel organized 
safety trainings during the project to ensure a certain level of understanding for safety by all 
authority’s system certification experts. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 The company process description defines the involvement of the safety specialists in the 
projects. Several internal trainings make other disciplines’ specialists aware of the safety 
involvement. 
 R4 The safety organization/focal is involved from the early beginning in the development 
process and plays one of the  major roles in architecture/requirements based engineering 
together with system engineering and chief engineering. 
 R5 Develop the safety case observing Rev A. 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Safety Engineer has a key role in projects and the responsibilities are defined in System 
Safety Program Plans. 
 R9 The safety team participated as other technologies in the project definition and 
management. 
 R10 He prepared the PSSAs and reviewed system requirements. 
 R11 My company provides computer to the customer following their requirements, including 
DAL and safety requirements, we do not do much work on the safety assessment, typically 
we  provide  FMEA data to the customer to support their SSA, So I leave this table blank. 
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31 Please elaborate on your experience of airplane manufacturer management of ARP4754A 
safety process activities, as applicable. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 As system supplier we submit validation and verification plans, system development plan, 
safety and reliability plan to the aircraft manufacturer .The aircraft manufacturer reviewed 
and approved these plans. The aircraft manufacturer participated in technical meetings and 
reviewed and approved all safety documentation. 
 R4 What we have experienced so far it is poor from airplane manufacturer’s side, what we get 
is mainly the SFHA for the contracted systems that’s it. One other experience is that 
airplane manufactures contract consulting agencies, to review the ARP4754A processes at 
supplier level but at airplane manufactures level they do it differently (they cook their own 
soup as we say in country). 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Airplane manufacturers tend to give more stringent requirements than the actual required 
ones.   
 R9 The process describe in the ARP4754A regarding safety were similar to those described in 
ARP4761 and therefore applicable in several new type designs and modifications. 
Specifically on ARP4754A no project were fully certified although two current programs are 
under development following those safety intent of ARP4754A and one, the last project’ TC 
adopted ARP4754 (legacy version) based processes, with some features from version A. 
Regarding DAL allocation the intent, which were already in ARP4754, were considered in 
the last 7 new clean sheet developments, and FDAL allocation in the current 2 programs . 
It's worth to mention that all relevant considerations during the revision of ARP4754A and 
ARP4761A discussed during the S18 meetings were applied in the product development of 
several programs whenever applicable. 
 R10 PSSA tracing to system requirements has been difficult. 
 R11 Skip 
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32 Please describe any safety process activity issues you or your organization experienced. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 The relationship between safety, requirements capture process and (system) design needs 
to be better established for development programs. 
 R4 None 
 R5 Resource issues 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Derived requirement analysis is always an issue. Who should initiate this analysis and how 
it should be carried out always a problem. 
 R9 See 33. 
 R10 PSSA tracing to system requirements has been difficult. 
 R11 Skip 
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33 Describe the ARP4754A safety process activity issue(s) (e.g. FHA, PASA, PSSA, FTA, CCA). 
 R1 We had issues related to Common Mode Analysis outputs especially when applicant use 
architectural mitigation for DAL assignment. Companies didn’t want to show independence 
for DAL assignment (for HAZ and MAJ FC) by CMA. They provided evidence of CMA for 
only CAT failure conditions (for no single failure requirements).   
 R2 Skip 
 R3 As a system supplier we have always been involved in the whole V&V process form PSSA 
to SSA incl. FTA, CMA, PRA, FMEA. No special issues were experienced due to the ARP 
4754A. 
 R4 None 
 R5 All above necessary for Safety Case development 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 We had confusion on whether the probabilistic requirement should match with the DAL 
assigned to lower level events in a Fault Tree. We had confusion about how to transform 
the results of CMA into safety requirements.  
 R9 In general, the systematic and complete analysis performed for FHA, PASA, PSSA, FTA, 
CCA are generated late in aircraft development when the definitions are almost freeze due 
to the lack of resources in the early phases. This causes some rework late in design after 
the throughout analysis is completed for final certification. Also, due to the different mindset 
the communication between safety specialist to project management and the project 
designers. 
 R10 PSSA tracing to system requirements has been difficult. 
 R11 Skip 
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34 Please describe any issues associated with definition or assignment of “safety related 
requirements”. 
 R1 Safety related requirements are defined in different sections of 4754A. We required from 
applicant to mark safety related requirements (related to Flight Operation, Maintenance 
Tasks, function, independence, etc.) with kind of tag on requirement management tool to 
take everyone attention on critical requirements. But some management issues raised to 
assign and trace the requirements. 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 A detailed definition had to be established, when a requirement is safety related. In the 
process it must be ensured, that this determination can only be made by a safety specialist 
 R4 None 
 R5 Safety requirements developed by Safety. Safety related may come from a Sub-System 
SSDD. 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 We had difficulty when to flow down FDAL requirements (i.e. right after FHA completion or 
in PSSA stage) but we de [Ed note: response was incomplete.] 
 R9 The link/traceability between safety analysis and artifacts generated for safety (following 
the methodologies already in place for years in the industry such as ARP4761) and the 
development requirements and artifacts is a challenge, especially during the early design 
phases and across the suppliers chain. Also, as the number of requirements increase, the 
safety requirements, or the safety driven requirements are sometimes "lost" in the  middle 
of the numerous requirements decreasing its priority over other requirements, especially 
when a function , which is considered critical  (FDAL  A, B), could not be decoupled from 
other non-critical functionalities or goals.  An example is an aircraft performance function 
which has critical goals (such as maintain positive climb gradient) but also not safety driven 
goals (market driven) such as time to climb.  All the requirements related to this function 
might be FDAL A and therefore threated in similar way. 
 R10 PSSA tracing to system requirements has been difficult. 
 R11 Skip 
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35 Please describe the context of any architectural mitigation strategies successfully used in 
the assignment of Functional Development Assurance Levels (FDALs). 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Redundant and dissimilar functions, Separation of functions 
 R4 Introduction of dissimilar control- monitor channel control architectures;  dissimilar control 
architectures etc. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Independent systems performing same function. 
 R9 Independent functions allocated to different system and suppliers. Independent functions 
allocated to totally dissimilar technologies (ex: electronics versus mechanical). 
 R10 Redundancy and independence of control and monitoring functions has been used 
throughout the system development. Protection functions external to the system have also 
be used in limited cases. 
 R11 Skip 
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36 Please describe the context of any architectural mitigation strategies successfully used in 
the assignment of Item Development Assurance Levels (IDALs). 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 On Control Computers: Partitioning, Multiple Version Dissimilar SW, Safety Monitoring.  
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Different items having same output data. 
 R9 Low level dissimilarity (SW, AEH, HW - processors, A/D converters, sensors...) in some 
critical functions, hardwire solutions, relay logics, implementation of monitors in a different 
system or a specific dissimilar monitor for a specific failure mode and service experience 
for similar non-novel solutions with a significant accumulated field experience were used as 
mitigation strategies. 
 R10 Same as 35. 
 R11 Skip 
 
 
37 What, if any, tools have you used to assign FDALs? 
 R1 FTA 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Fault Tree Analysis, Event Trees 
 R4 None 
 R5 FHA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Requirements database, same used for requirements capture and management 
 R8 None 
 R9 Error trees, PASA activities. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Skip 
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38 What tools, if any, have you used to assign IDALs? 
 R1 FTA 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Fault Tree Analysis, Event Trees 
 R4 None 
 R5 FTA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Requirements database, same used for requirements capture and management. 
 R8 None 
 R9 Error trees, CMA (common mode analysis) internal process. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Skip 
 
 
39 What FDAL assignment levels were assigned and satisfied? 
 R1 FDAL A and B were satisfied in our project 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Up to FDAL A 
 R4 FDAL A,B,C,D 
 R5 DAL A 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Focus on FDAL A/B addressing Catastrophic/Hazardous failure condition. 
 R8 All levels. 
 R9 A to E. 
 R10 All system functions. 
 R11 Skip 
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40 Please describe any issues or difficulties in selecting between ARP4754A Option 1 or 2 in 
Table 3 for FDAL or IDAL assignments that were encountered. 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 For a combination of failures of mechanical items and electronic items leading to cat. 
failures: Can credit be taken of the mechanical item being DAL A, thus reducing the DAL of 
the electronic item to C? 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 When deciding the sufficiency of functional independence and item development 
independence. The intent and relationship with DAL assignment process of Common Mode 
Analysis should be updated to support this crucial part of ARP. 
 R9 Functional independence is always a difficult discussion, especially the same system or 
supplier team is used. The independence attributes are not clear variable/criteria and may 
vary from authorities and people mindset. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Skip 
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41 Briefly describe any Table 3, Note 1 issues encountered during the assignment of FDAL or 
IDAL on the project. 
 R1 For FDAL A single member function (software was assigned IDAL A too), we wanted from 
applicant to show evidence that SW architecture is robust enough to deal with errors. We 
also required software fault tree analysis to support the evidences.   
 R2 Skip 
 R3 None 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Note 1 does not give a clear idea for what is required extra in this type of situation, because 
if we have FDAL A system, the development rigor required in ARP demands maximum 
independent process in terms of validation and verification. 
 R9 The current authorities criteria/vision has been more restricted than the method proposed in 
the ARP4754A. The authorities still discuss in a case by case despite the process. The 
previous version of ARP4754 with the potential acceptable examples were more likely to be 
useful for aircraft development. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Skip 
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42 Looking back, how did your understanding of Functional/Item DAL assignment process 
evolve throughout the project. 
 R1 We had to deal with CAT function with DAL A software. Same software run on both 
computers. During the process the discussion was weather two independent level B 
software developed by different teams is better or not in terms of error. Some research say 
two different SW generates more errors. Benefit of using of Option 2 was another question.  
 R2 As a regulator, an observation is that because the company’s process specialists don’t do 
safety assessment, they often are not aware of how Table 3 is used. 
 R3 It was not fully clear, down to what level FDAL-determination should be performed: Down to 
each single requirement or only for top-level functions and thus one FDAL for the whole 
specification. In the process the latter was finally applied On IDAL determination there were 
discussions about combination of failures of mechanical items and electronic items leading 
to cat.  Failures: Can credit be taken of the mechanical item being IDAL A, thus reducing 
the IDAL of the electronic item to C?  The decision was, not to take credit of the mechanical 
item being IDAL A, however there is no clear substantiation for it. 
 R4 We faced lots of discussion how to evaluate FDAL if not assigned form the parent 
documentation, which was the case in our previous and actual running programs. 
Discussions lead to the point that in case of a system is identified with one Top Level 
Failure conditions “Catastrophic” the entire system is dealt as FDAL on System level. At 
equipment level we differentiated the architecture then to cover the FDAL A with dedicated 
IDAL’s for the electronic control units to show compliance. 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 It is in close relationship with the customer requirements (in A/C level), system functions, 
their allocations to subsystems and system architecture. We observed that since there are 
lots of factors driving DAL assignment process it is difficult to manage the changes. 
Because you have to catch up with or provide output beforehand the item level 
development processes. There are always schedule pressure, since all the activities 
performed concurrently, DAL assignment process or safety assessment process needs to 
be performed as early as possible but in practice it is difficult to complete these when you 
don’t have enough data for substantiation of results to derive safety requirements. 
 R9 For the common developer, it has been very difficult concept to be understood and applied. 
For most the users IDAL is a more straightforward concept but the FDAL itself and the 
mixing with IDAL in a FFS approach is a very confusing and complex to operationalize 
method. Even for a specialist it still causes misunderstanding and misalignment all across 
the company. 
 R10 It has improved, allowing to reduce the FDAL and IDAL in some particular cases. 
 R11 Skip 
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43 What, if any, concerns do you have with the current ARP4754A industry guidelines for 
development and assurance? 
 R1 4754A set a systematic approach to development. As a result of this, it increases 
documentation effort by applicants and assessment/acceptance effort by Authority. 
Concerns were mostly related to cost and schedule. 
 R2 The line between system engineering and safety engineering is vague, consequently the 
scope of application widely varies between aircraft manufacturers. 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 The ARP provides recommended practice with recommendations, but it seems that our 
customers and respectively the authorities interpreted recommendation as a “shall” 
required and are not open to accept a different approach. 
 R5 More work, not enough experience 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Transition criteria between the activities within the development processes and integral 
processes can be defined with an example. 
 R9 Besides the ones provided in questions 15/16, 19, 24, 27 and 29, we have the following: 
#1. Section 1 (SCOPE) is unclear in the following points: in the upper bound of product 
specification, it explicitly excludes from these guidelines some activities and technologies, 
like aircraft structural development. Nevertheless other aircraft level technologies, like the 
ones related to aeronautics, e.g. flight mechanics, performance, aeroelasticity, etc. remain 
undefined, once they are neither explicitly excluded nor can be fit the area of 
“…development  of  aircraft  systems…” stated in the first paragraph of that section. In the 
lower bound of product specification, once ARP4754A define it boundary where software 
and hardware start, it is not clear if a single “equipment” is part of its scope. Around this 
issue, it’s not clear as well how ARP4754A and DO-297 guidelines work together for the 
case of an “Integrated Modular Architecture” (IMA). 
 
 #2. There is a perception that the compliance plans (both internal and from the suppliers) 
are somewhat inefficient to promote product improvement by themselves. From one hand, 
it seems that ARP4754A has too open guidelines in such a way that any plan can be 
compliant with that; on the other hand, there may be too much rigor depending on who 
define, apply and oversight the plans and artifacts, to clearly identify the improvements 
desired (similar to situation described in q. 15). We have tried to mitigate that situation, both 
internally and at suppliers (see q. 21) through planned process reviews, similar to the 
software “SOIs” reviews. We are working on an internal policy to perform those process 
reviews on a regular basis in all programs and contracts, covering not only process aspects 
but also the related technology aspects (e.g., requirements validation and rational 
fundamentals and design choices) by involving people with good knowledge and 
experience in the technologies reviewed. 
 R10 Too long and complicated in some areas. 
 R11 1.The interface with DO178, DO254, DO297, etc, needs to be more clearly defined. 2. 
Some terms in definitions and the main body are not consistent, for example, the some 
context, the term “item” refers to LRU, in other context, “item” refers to single piece of SW 
or HW. 
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44 What, if any, additional guideline material(s) would help to satisfy regulatory expectations? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Prioritize the following 4 aspects of the integral process: Planning, Safety Assessment, 
Requirement Validation, Implementation Verification. 
 R3 More detailed explanations to the questions/issues raised in point 6, 18, 40 and 42 above. 
 R4 Training of the ARP4754A would help to understand the aim end reduce the window of 
interpretations 
 R5 Training 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 The details of the flow of information between guideline documents (ARP 4754, ARP 4761, 
DO-178, DO-254) can be presented with an example containing SW and AEH 
development. 
 R9 Although we have neither exercised nor studied them yet, we feel that the following FAA 
documents can be helpful on this matter: DOT/FAA/AR-08/34, Requirements Engineering 
Management Findings Report, May 2009. DOT/FAA/AR-08/32, Requirements Engineering 
Management Handbook, June 2009. 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 I understand that ARP4754A do not want to limit the applicant or suppliers, but I think it will 
be helpful if providing good Checklist and document template as examples. 
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45 How did SAE AIR6110, the industry application example for ARP4754A, aid your 
understanding of the development process described in ARP4754A? 
 R1 It helps for better understanding of 4754A but I think It is not well known by industry. When 
it becomes an appendix of 4754, it will make more sense.  
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 Examples given in AIR are very helpful to understand the application of the system 
development process described in ARP. It provides very valuable examples for all the 
activities defined in the process thus complements the application of ARP. Especially 
requirement validation example tables. 
 R9 We have neither exercised nor studied in deep that document up to now. 
 R10 I didn’t use it. 
 R11 I think current AIR6110 will be a great help for us to understanding the development, but I 
think besides the development process, it would be more help if the document includes the 
example for Process Assurance, Configuration Management process, requirement 
management, etc. 
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46 What information or issues in AIR6110, contributed to confusion in satisfying ARP4754A 
objective expectations? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 None, detailed description of process output data was helpful to understand ARP 
descriptions. 
 R9 See 45. 
 R10 None 
 R11 I am not quite understand the meaning of “contributed to confusion”.  Is it required to 
identify the inconsistent between the AIR6110 and ARP4754A? 
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47 What, if any, issues or concerns do you have with the current certification authority 
guidance material for application of development and assurance? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 The guidance of ARP 4754A is required by the authorities and may in some cases be over-
interpreted and result in unnecessary effort and impractical tasks due to unclear 
interpretation of the original spirit of the guidance. 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 None 
 R9 See 15 and 16. 
 R10 None 
 R11 Skip 
 
 
48 What, if any, issues or concerns do you have with the current certification authority policies 
related to the application development and assurance? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 NA 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 None 
 R9 See 15 and 16. 
 R10 None 
 R11 Skip 
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49 What additional case study application examples would be helpful in understanding 
development process expectations?  Why would these examples be helpful? 
 R1 Skip 
 R2 Skip 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 None 
 R5 FADEC Case Study 
 R6 No comment 
 R7 Skip 
 R8 The example system assesses in 4761, 4761A and AIR6110 are all the same, Wheel Brake 
System. This can be another system like cockpit display and flight management system 
since this type of systems are more interface with other systems and have more items to be 
integrated it will provide good guidance in understanding the DAL assignment process. 
 R9 A case of MBDV (Model Based Development and Verification), aligned with guidance of 
DO-331, top-down from aircraft level through system design and reaching software 
boundary. This would be helpful due to the lack of guidelines in using model both as 
requirements and as part of design data and the newness of usage of guidance provided 
by DO-331, raising difficulties on defining the boundaries. Another case that would be 
interesting and helpful due to similar reasons would be development of a system through 
the usage of an IMA (see q. 43). 
 R10 Don't know. 
 R11 Requirement management procedure. We have DOORS in the company, but we do not 
know how to use it affectively, what’s the relationship between the DOORS and CM tools, 
etc. 
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50 Please describe the sector of the industry in which you work (e.g certification authority, 
airplane manufacturer, integrated system supplier, equipment supplier, etc.). 
 R1 Military Certification Authority 
 R2 Certification authority 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Integrated system supplier for landing gear systems (ATA 32), primary and secondary flight 
control systems. 
 R5 Turbine engine manufacturer 
 R6 Engine supplier 
 R7 Integrated system and equipment supplier 
 R8 Integrated system supplier, equipment supplier. 
 R9 Airplane manufacturer 
 R10 Airplane manufacturer 
 R11 Equipment supplier 
 
 
51 Please describe which regulatory framework you normally address (e.g. Transport (Part 25), 
 Normal, Utility (Part 23), Rotorcraft (Part 27-29), other, etc). 
 R1 Part 25, MIL-HNBK-516 
 R2 Part 25 
 R3 Skip 
 R4 The main focus is on Part 25 and Part 29, with random activities on Part23 and Part 27 
 R5 Part 25 and 27 
 R6 AC 33.28 
 R7 Part 25, Part 23, Part 27-29 
 R8 Part 23, Part 27-29. 
 R9 Part 25 (mainly), Part 23. 
 R10 Utility (Part 23) 
 R11 We provide the computers for the different kind of customers, including Part 25, 23, 27,39, 
33,etc. 
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52 Please discuss (in general terms) any current or future ARP4754A applications? 
 R1 4754A is also a good guideline for military projects when it is tailored according to the 
scope of the project. There is no appropriate guidance material in military 
regulations/standards that integrates system development and safety processes together 
and no clear guideline to determine DALs. 
 R2 As regulators, we expect aircraft companies and systems suppliers will establish and 
maintain infrastructures apply the ARP and we anticipate that over time their activities will 
be streamlined to be more efficient than the first application. As the ACOs gain 
understanding and confidence in their applicants’ processes, we anticipate reduced 
involvement, and oversight will also be streamlined as a function of the 
scope/complexity/novelty of the product  
 R3 Skip 
 R4 Long Range Wide Body Commercial Aircraft Landing Gear (Part 25); Helicopter Landing 
Gear System (Part 29) 
 R5 Control systems for turbine engine 
 R6 None 
 R7 
 R8 Avionic system (primary flight displays, navigation sensors, internal communication 
systems) development for utility helicopter program. Avionic system(mission computers, 
display systems, navigation and communication equipment),  and weapon systems 
(integration of various weapons to platform) development for fighter jet program. Equipment 
(mission computers, displays, communication and navigation equipment) development for a 
trainer aircraft program. Avionic system development for civil transport category airplane. 
 R9 See q. 1 – in one of the first program, certification authority requested ARP4754A as one of 
the means of compliance with 25.1309 through an issue paper; in the second program, 
they understood that an issue paper is not needed – the compliance with 25.1309 would 
require to follow ARP4754A, based on the AC 20-174. 
 R10 Currently applying it in a Part 23 airplane. 
 R11 Compliance mean for System, LRU, SRU Guidance for the companies to improve their 
development process. 
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B.2 2 Roundtable Discussion Notes 
Facilitator Introduction: 
This is an informal System Development Process discussion with SAE S18 Committee Members 
to enhance the SAAB-EII NASA ARP4754A study project with additional industrial experience 
inputs through round table discussions.  The discussion commentary, with only aircraft, system, 
equipment or regulatory identification nomenclature will be attempted.  The assembled SAE S18 
participants should provide their individual opinions and experiences on lessons learned.  The 
inputs should fulfill the guidance and process materials on the white spaces without pointing the 
problems on recommended practice. 
 
Discussion Area 1: Lessons learned in applying ARP4754A: Are there any difficulties in DAL 
assignments or satisfying the objectives?  Is there any difficulty to assign the DAL? Are they all 
level A or B? Any FDAL lower than B? 
 
AC A: I have not seen many DAL assignments at level B. Most of the assignments fall into 
category A or C. 
SYS B: I actually have seen many assignments at level B. Functional Decomposition is the key. It 
is dependent on how the functionality is assigned to FDALs and allocated to IDALs. The problem is 
derived requirements. When you derive requirement at the system level, how to allocate to item 
level and assign DALs. A good allocation make the program management have less DAL 
assignment arguments. 
AC A: This is based on the requirement flow down. I agree that in the SW level or box level 
assignment that was passed down to avionic suppliers. However, in the system level we always do 
one level better, so it will result in a hazardous assignment increasing to be catastrophic [level A].  
EQ A: There is a great sense of impact and argument of ARP4754A since the management knows 
it will directly impact the DAL assignments; however, it seems to be getting easier to deal with DAL 
assignment argument recently. 
I believe Section 5.2 of ARP4754A is written in such a way that it is clearer than the original 
ARP4754 for DAL allocation. People are assuming ARP4754A is the same as ARP4754, but we 
have enough to go back to them and say: “No your DAL location breakdown happens once” and it 
is very clear once you show them the recommended practice. They will go back and say: “Oh! We 
missed that”.  
AC B: We try to make it as objective as possible. Something that is fundamentally a subject of 
process. 
EQ A: There are a couple people want to further reduce down, but once we show them Section 5.2 
of ARP4754A then the arguments are done. 
Sys B: The only issue I have seen is that we have 18 level “As” and I want to do one to level D. We 
cannot do that anymore based on the written in the table. 
 
AC A: Let me tell you another experience. When you go back and go to item level, and people say, 
I have so much more work to do. We set down and talk about what Validation means and the 
activity we just done is called owner engineering course of action. We realized that the validation 
was done in the past, and the only thing that was not done is to take credit. I ask them to take 
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schematic, Simulink, engineering review and test cases and call them validation as done with 
independence. The credit has never received in the past with those Validation while they are 
already DAL A and B, but now we can get the credit with the improved guideline. 
It is not difficult to assign DAL assignments, but the assignment might result in additional work. The 
ARP4754A has a clear comparison to show the differences with ARP4754; however, people are 
assuming they are the same, while it is not true. The subject of objective allocation needs to be 
further broken down. It is incorrect while people assigning 18 level A with only one level D. There 
needs to be an explanation for each process to evaluate the work; otherwise, there is too much 
work to be done. The Validation will take credit on ARP4754A, but we do want to avoid extra work 
that is not going to take credit. 
SYS B: One of the challenges I have is to understand what is an IDAL. An IDAL applies to the 
whole life. It divides the concepts to where you are applying to. I have a single item that has mixed 
many IDALs. There become a discussion on the level A has a level D coding SW behind it 
internally. It shows it is being activated appropriately, so I have an FDAL. 
SYS C: It is the problem that we have a DAL A partition and a DAL D in there. You cannot do it by 
looking at the table. The case is like, you have a simple switch in the hardware; therefore, by 
ARP4754A, it is DAL A. I used DAL A switch to detect DAL B. We cannot do that either per table, 
but common sense it is OK. Those are common sense that we can fix in ARP 4754A. 
SYS B: The other one that I dislike with is that by definition DAL C is not catastrophic. We 
programming in the wrong time. I do not know if I need to do anything or not, but it has to be DAL 
C according to the system because the wording in the ARP. However, I cannot proof confidentially 
and I cannot stop either because catastrophic by definition. 
There needs to be a good understanding of IDAL. IDAL is for the whole item, so the single item 
may have mixed items. Per ARP4754A table, it is incorrect to have a level A partition with a level D 
allocation, but sometimes it seems to be fine in common sense. An example for a level A assign to 
mechanical devise is like a simple DAL A switch to detect DAL B. 
AC A: By definition, DAL C is not catastrophic; however, the combination of DAL in mechanical 
and electrical objectives in each level may result of level increasing. 
SYS B: It is an issue that if there was no agreement up front. Every hazardous failure condition has 
something not making sense or misleading, which cause argument and rework. 
AC A: When you look at the aircraft level if I go to PASA to talk about DAL assignment. Not a big 
deal since they use DO178, 254. When I go to ECS for flight control systems that has never done 
this before, they do not know what to do, and I will have to explain them the concept and let them 
know that they have done it before, and now you can get credit for it. It is depend on who your 
audience is. 
SYS B: It is documenting what you actually did to satisfy the objectives. We did many things and 
we cannot know what we did, so we document it to now to know the steps. 
AC A: It is important to know who you are talking to and understand from their stand point. If I talk 
to an ACO regulator it will be smooth, but if I talk to a purely mechanical flight control system or ice 
protection system specialist, and they will be asking: Why are you giving this material to me? We 
need to have the local regulator training to resolve cross ways. 
It is depend on who your audience is. While interfacing organization that is using DO178B and DO 
254, they are audit friendly. The documents are actually mentioning what you actually did. You 
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only need to explain your concepts. There can be issues while dealing with purely mechanical 
flight control system or ice protection system specialist that are not familiar with DAL assignments. 
AC A: Question on satisfying objectives while we wrote the ARP 4754A material. The regulator 
looked at appendix A and told me that I gave him a prescriptive checklist, which he can go around 
to ask for evidences on the checklists. There was a regulator challenge stuff on ARP4761 CMA 
stuff and told me that things are missing. I explained to them that this is a guideline, but the 
regulator told me that we need to follow ARP 4761 appendix. 
AC B: Tell him to go back and read page one. There are also many places in the documents telling 
you that is not true. They chose to interpret that way then they are blinding themselves how the 
ARP works. 
AC A: The result was that it went into debate and I had to go back and propose a deviation for 
compliance. I have to re-adjust to show the deviation is still compliant to ARP 4761. 
AC B: You are then non-compliant to a non-compliance document. 
Facilitator: In DO we use compliant, but we should use satisfying the objectives in ARP because it is only 
a guideline and there is no rule there. 
AC B: Shall and must do not exist in the ARP guideline. 
It is possible that the regulatory authority to use the appendix as a prescriptive checklist and 
enforce the company to be compliant while the goal is supposed to be only on satisfying the 
objectives. The incorrect usage on the recommended practice may result of providing additional 
deviation in order to show the compliance. 
EQ B: I had an experience that we were forced to do a DAL A in Software. The FDAL becomes a 
level A while we do not want to mess with it, so we will just do them all. This is a gray area while 
we are mandated from the bottom. 
Facilitator: One thing that we learned by comparing ARP and DO is that if the DO is assigned as level A 
then it also migrated to systems to the same level. Even though ARP4754A level is not A, but be get stuck 
with it by the lower level bottom up. It turns out that it’s OK while the objectives for A and B in ARP4754A 
are the same. 
AC A: While dealing with the engine supplier, FADEC were B on two of them. The suppler had 
identical FADEC channel with no independence and they thought they can have B on them per 
using the table in ARP4754A. 
In order to show compliance to DO and satisfy the objectives of ARP, the recommended practice 
of FDAL may end up required even if it is not. There are cases the lower level A forces ARP to 
comply while most likely there is a bottom up impact. 
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Discussion Area 2: Engineering Judgment 
 
Facilitator: What are your experiences with regards to engineering judgment? What should developers do 
if they have no experience? How do you accomplish if you have never done it before?  How to fill in the 
blanks? 
EQ B: By reading ARP, there are 3 levels of decomposition. There is no reason that we cannot 
take the principle of the ARP and increase the layer for higher complexity. We are not going to 
commit and assume the small layer of decomposition is enough. 
REG A: There is a need to have background of domain knowledge to ask the correct questions to 
review the documents. The process depends on experience people who have the history of 
lessons learned. 
AC C: There needs to be better definition on the objects to support engineering judgment if there is 
not enough history or lessons and learned. The assumptions are not based on technical activity, 
but by the objectives and principle that you want to archive. This is challenge to write the policy 
and guidance to help the engineers to understand the objectives to achieve.  
AC D: There are extreme cases that the certification authority needs experience to do something 
first. Maybe the training for certification authority is needed. 
SYS B: While assuming something is the same and consistent, the assumption is also engineering 
judgment.  
AC D: How do people start? They build experience from something that does not need to be 
certified first to build up their domain knowledge. After they get their experiences then they can 
move to a Part 23 then Part 25 aircraft. All those experiences are engineering judgment, and there 
is no way to skip all that unless hiring the talent people. 
SYS C: If we look at the basic, there is not much differences when a good functional allocation is 
needed. If you have a system development knowledge background then it will help support 
facilitate engineering judgment. If we do not have the experience then we hire experience people, 
which can do good functional allocation. 
SYS B: There is a dependency of company culture differences. Some companies focus on safety, 
but some of them want the minimum cost. The requirements are driven by the company behavior 
on their culture differences. The company culture philosophy will drive the engineers to make some 
decisions, which are engineering judgments.  
AC A: We have never been good systems engineering organization. Since 1927, we have been 
able to design build and certified aircraft in local office. Now we have a hiccup on AC20-174. In 
ARP there are all kinds of engineering judgment for the reviews that we can take credit for. 
Somehow locally for my experience is to that if you are not compliant of 8110-3 or 8100-9 and 
unable to show the engineering judgment from experience people, it will be hard to take credit from 
them. 
REG A: Can I just clarify something? The AC is about development assurance process for 
complex systems. The ARP is a means, but not the only means. We only use it to design and build 
a better aircraft. Maybe we need to have a development assurance process for company start up. 
The engineering judgment should focus on strict objectives to in accordance with the planning. If 
you can go back and show what you should do, and what you need to add on due to any 
unresolved problems. That would be great. We do not need everything to be blindly compliant to 
ARP4754A. 
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AC A: There is no good way to maintain or archive lessons learned information.  In some cases, 
they (lessons learned) are only captured in an engineer’s note book. The experienced people who 
have the knowledge are behind the story. For the process now the certification plan should control 
the roles, responsibility, negotiation and planning. We do want to follow the objectives, but we also 
need engineering judgment to set the priority of the objectives in order to improve the “selling” of 
the process.  
 
Item 3: Certification lesson learned on application of ARP4754A 
Facilitator: ARP is a means of compliance. Map how you accomplish the objective in the ARP. 
System B: The ARP is a mean of compliant to the regulations. Where is the compliance matrix for 
the regulation? It is difficult to map the requirement and the matrix.  
Facilitator: ARP 4754A Appendix A is a summary only.  In order to approach the satisfaction of ARP, we 
need to read the text for detail objectives.  There maybe 30 objectives in the appendix, but 90 objectives in 
the ARP content.  Another approach is like, Do you understand the [ARP] objectives?  Have you setup to 
accomplish your plan?  Understanding ARP and include in your plan is necessary.  The DOs are easier to 
audit since it tells you what to do. 
Person ?: It is possible to fall into strictly compliant to ARP with no background on what the 
purpose is. Good planning is needed to find problems if they need to be compliant with real values. 
It is not a good practice to blindly to be compliant to all the artifacts.  
REG A: Enough or not enough is an engineering judgment from regulatory stand point, which 
needs artifacts to support process in order to comply only on necessary objective and avoid 
negotiation during the audit. 
AC A: ACO specialist scope is different than each other and also cause differences on different 
programs. It is hard to determine when or when not to exercise the particular aspect.  
EQ B: Develop partnership is needed to handle disagreements. The agreement between you and 
the ACO management can resolve different cases under different levels, which can be refer to 
PSP. 
SYS B: Fundamentally, the higher level authority does not have good understanding on the lower 
level sub-system. It is common that the system get overworked while certifying the sub-system by 
reading the guidance with checking boxes.  
Facilitator: There is a lack of consistency for interpreter side for certifying.  It may be recommended 
instead of revising the ACs we can create some standards or guidance for people doing evaluation.  Kind 
of like a lessons learned for regulatory standpoint. 
Person ?: There is a battle on training our own people or training the regulatory authority. There 
needs to be a trust of each other in order to have a smooth certification. 
REG B: Pre-audit can resolve problems. The pre-audit can have the supplier understand the 
objectives and where they come from. Try to meet the intent of assigning DALs. For example, to 
perform more robustness testing to meet the intent of unintended function. In this case, the audit 
will go smoother. 
AC A: There are problems on the AC 8110.15. Need experience on brand new process. This issue 
has grown locally, but there were no people to support it. There is culture shift for individual 
authority, which does not support locally while the ARP get interpreted locally. The lack of process 
understanding needs to be addressed in FAA manual. 
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There was a case that ACO get questioned if they overviewed the AC before the audit. Only one 
out of a few ACO confirmed while they even think the AC is only the few sentences presented in 
the FAA page. 
EQ B: There was a case that DO178B get audited for the project for 15+ times. The level of FAA 
involvement on carry the assurance is needed to minimize the times of re-auditing. 
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Appendix C Objectives Correlation Study 
C 1 Introduction 
During the project kick-off meeting, additional questions were identified for project study. This appendix 
responds to establishing a justification for the ARP4754A aircraft and system level process objectives and 
guidelines question.  The study herein approaches this question with two considerations;  
1. How are ARP4754A guidelines used for regulatory compliance support? And, 
2. How do the guideline objectives in ARP4754A compare to the other industry development 
life cycle objectives? 
C 2 ARP4754A Support of Regulatory Compliance 
The authors of the 2002 Arsenal Draft proposed 14CFR Part 25.1309 rule and advisory circular noted a 
concern regarding the ability to adequately address the safety assessment of “highly” integrated systems.  
They noted that traditional design and analysis techniques may be inadequate for complex systems due to 
non-deterministic risks and inadequate safety coverage.  To address these concerns the Authors noted 
that a systematic use of assurance techniques increases the confidence that errors are adequately 
identified and corrected.  These “assurance techniques” should consider: 
 Development assurance using a combination of process assurance & verification coverage 
criteria, 
 Structured analysis, 
 Airplane-level assessment techniques, and 
 Inter & Intra system interactions. 
 
The application of these “assurance methods” would help ensure errors, which may cause failures, are 
mitigated to an extent practical. 
 
AC20-174, Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, recognizes that ARP4754A establishes an 
acceptable method for instituting a development assurance process to support compliance to  
§25.1309. Figure 24 presents the overall summary then for showing compliance to the regulation using a 
combination of safety assessments of the final implementation and development process satisfying the 
objectives of ARP4754A and the other “DO” life cycle processes. 
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Figure 24 ARP4754A Certification Support Summary 
 
C 2.1 Development Process – Historical Perspective 
A look at the timeline associated with the creation of the various industry development process documents 
helps establish a basic consideration as to what and why ARP4754A objectives were established.  Figure 
25 presents a synopsis of guideline/guidance document publications over the last 23 years.  It is 
reasonably safe to assume that a synergy with DO-178, published in 1992, was established for the 
systems objectives published in ARP4754 in 1996. 
 
The rationale for the resultant objectives and guidelines in ARP4754 and subsequently ARP4754A, are 
thereby primarily based on similarity to those objectives that were established earlier in time by DO-178B. 
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Figure 25 Development Processes Historical Timeline 
 
C 3 ARP4754A to Other Industry Development Documents 
This section performs a comparison analysis of the objectives identified in Appendix A of ARP4754A, 
“Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems” with the corresponding objectives identified in 
the software (DO-178 B/C Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification) and hardware 
(DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware) life cycle process guidance 
documents.  The high-level ARP development process objectives are highlighted in Figure 26.  This two-
dimensional graphic summarizes the objective areas identified in ARP4754A Appendix A, including the 
recommendations as well as the configuration management data control categories. 
 
In order to provide an “apples to apples” comparison, the ARP objectives were arranged so that an 
effective comparison between the life cycle activities, data and configuration management control could be 
achieved.  The following process objective areas of Figure 26 are compared: 
 
 Planning, 
 Development process (requirements capture, management), 
 Validation process, 
 Verification process, 
 Configuration Management and, 
 Process Assurance. 
 
The safety process activities (FHA and general safety process) are acknowledged as applicable only to 
the airplane/system development levels, so were omitted from the comparison activities. 
 
Section 4 provides the comparison results for the above selected process objective areas. 
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Figure 26 ARP4754A Objective Areas & CM Categories by Assurance Level 
C 3.1 References 
The documents listed in Table 34 were used in performing the life cycle process (LCP) comparison study 
presented in section C 4. 
 
Table 34 Reference Document List 
Document No. Document Title 
ARP4754A Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
DO-178B Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification 
DO-178C Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification 
DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
DO-297 
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certification 
Considerations 
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C 3.2 Definitions 
The definitions captured in Table 35 are noteworthy for the life cycle objective comparison activity. 
 
Table 35 Noteworthy Comparison Definitions 
Term Definition 
Guidance Recommended procedure for complying with regulations. 
Guideline 
Supporting information that can be helpful but is not considered to be 
guidance. 
Independence 
The separation of responsibilities that assures the accomplishment of 
objectives evaluation (e.g. validation activities are not performed solely by 
the developer of a requirement for a system or Item (ARP4754A)) 
 
C 4 Life Cycle Objective Comparisons 
This section presents the comparison of objectives identified in ARP4754A and the equivalent objectives 
identified in DO-178 and DO-254.  Each sub-section provides analysis description highlights of the major 
commonalities, and the significant activity objective or configuration control category differences.  The 
following process objective areas are compared: 
 
 Planning, 
 Development process (requirements capture, management), 
 Validation process, 
 Verification process, 
 Configuration Management and, 
 Process Assurance. 
 
C 4.1 Planning Process Objectives Comparison 
Figure 27 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for planning between ARP4754A 
and the DO LCPs.  The Planning objectives are consistent across the processes for assurance levels A 
through D; with only differences of CM control categories depending upon the planning data.  There are 
significant CM control differences highlighted between the software LCPs and ARP4754A. 
 
Objective Commonality: 
1. The Planning Objectives across the different life cycle domains are consistent, with each LCP 
recommending objectives at assurance levels A through D for: 
 Certification planning, 
 Development planning, 
 Verification planning,  
 Configuration management planning and, 
 Process assurance planning. 
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Figure 27 Planning Objectives Comparison Summary 
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Differences Summary: 
Table 36 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
Table 36 Planning Process Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Validation Plan X  
A-D 
D 
DO178B/C 
DO254 
Verification Plan X  D  
Development Plan  X A-B DO178 
Verification Plan  X A-B DO178 
Configuration Management Plan  X A-B DO178/DO254 
Process Assurance Plan  X A-B DO178 
 
Objective Differences: 
1. As highlighted in Table 36, the software LCP does not identify the need to accomplish a validation plan 
for any assurance level. And AC/Sys validation planning is “As Negotiated” for assurance level D 
without a corresponding objective in the DO life cycles. 
 
Analysis: A more detailed review of the software LCP finds that the corresponding objectives to those 
identified in AC/SYS LCP for validation planning can be found under the Verification Planning activities. 
So even though planning for a specific set of planning data is not called out, the objectives are to be 
accomplished.  The “As Negotiated” identification for AC/SYS LCP versus no entries for the DO LCPs is 
not a real difference since accomplishment is as negotiated on all projects. The analysis conclusion is that 
the objectives for validation planning are consistent across the LCPs for assurance levels A-D. 
 
2. The AC/Sys LCP Verification Planning objectives are noted as “As Negotiated” for assurance level D 
while “Recommended” for the DO LCPs.   
 
Analysis:  As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable for the AC/SYS LCP assurance level D, 
verification planning objectives may need to be accomplished in order to have consistent development 
processes across a project containing all of LCPs.  
 
The AC/Sys LCP authors should consider revising ARP4754A Verification Planning to “Recommended” 
for assurance level D for process consistency. 
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Data CM Category Differences: 
1. The CM control categories for assurance level A and B differ between the software LCPs and AC/SYS 
and hardware LCP.  All of the software planning objectives are managed using CM category 1 while 
hardware and AC/Sys planning data is managed using CM category 2. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the software life cycle manages the planning activities for assurance levels A 
and B to the CM category 1 stringent criteria. The certification equivalent documents between the life 
cycles are managed consistently at CM category 1 and it is these data artifacts that are specifically used 
to plan the regulatory certification compliance criteria. CM category 1 increases the burden on industry 
without justification or benefit since the certification planning data artifacts would need to be revised 
commensurate with any subordinate plan revision. 
 
The software LCP authors should consider relaxing the software configuration management control 
category for development, verification, configuration management and quality assurance as the more 
rigorous activities are unnecessary for certification or for the mitigation of development errors. 
 
C 4.2 Development Process Objectives Comparison 
Figure 28 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for development process between 
ARP4754A and the DO LCPs.  In general, the basic Development Process objectives are consistent 
across the processes for assurance levels A through C; with only minor differences of CM control 
categories.  There are significant differences highlighted between the four LCPs at assurance level D for 
both the objective recommendations and CM category assignments. 
 
Objective Commonality: 
The Development Process Objectives across the different life cycle domains are consistent, with each 
LCP recommending objectives at assurance levels A through C for: 
 Identifying and capturing requirements, 
 Identifying system architectures and, 
 Performing integration. 
The Development Process objectives for identifying requirements and architectures are consistent with 
“Recommended” for development assurance levels A and B, with the data managed per CM category 
1. There are objective differences identified at assurance levels C and D (see Objective Differences). 
There are also CM data control category differences identified at development assurance levels A and 
B for performing integration objectives (see CM Differences). 
 
No Development Process Objectives are identified for development assurance level E across all four 
LCPs. 
 
Differences Summary: 
Table 37 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
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Figure 28 Development Process Objectives Comparison Summary 
 
Table 37 Development Process Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Perform integrations  X A-D  
Perform integrations X  D  
Architecture defined  X C DO178C/DO254 
System Reqts / LL Reqts defined  X C DO178B 
Derived Reqts defined X X1 D 1 Differs by HL/LL 
Architecture defined X X D  
Allocate Reqts to Items / LL Reqts X2 X3 D 2 DO178C /3 DO254 
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Objective Differences: 
1. As highlighted in Table 37, there are three objectives which are “Recommended” by the 
hardware/software LCPs but are “As Negotiated” for the AC/Sys LCP for the Level D assurance level.  
These “As Negotiated” objectives include: 
 Defining derived requirements, 
 Defining architecture, and 
 Performing system integrations. 
 
Analysis: As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that the system level “As Negotiated” 
objectives would be de-facto considered as “Recommended” in order to have consistency with the HW 
and SW LCPs on the same project.  
 
Data CM Category Differences: 
1. The Development Process CM objectives for performing integration in AC/SYS LCP differ from the 
other LCPs for assurance levels A-D. AC/SYS system integration data is managed per CM category 2 
while in the other LCPs, the data is managed per CM category 1.  
Analysis:  As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable for the AC/SYS LCP assurance levels A 
through D CM category may need to be escalated to use CM category 1 in order to have consistent 
development processes across a project containing all of LCPs.  
 
2. The CM category for development of system/software or hardware architecture data across the LCPs 
is inconsistent across assurance levels C and D. ARP4754A and DO-178B are category 2 for both 
levels while DO-254 maintains level 1 across all levels.  DO-178C controls the SW architecture data, 
for assurance level C, at CM category 1 and at category 2 for level D. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the architecture data, which is identified to be captured in all life cycles by the 
Design Description, needs the category 1 level of CM management and attention for Levels C and D as 
prescribed in DO178C and DO254.  This difference could be due to a nomenclature or an objectives 
mapping issue.  The SW “Design Description” is actually a low level requirements document where the 
system level design description is as titled, a system description narrative. 
 
3. At assurance level C, the DO-178B objective to define low level requirements managed by CM 
category 2 was inconsistent with the ARP4754A and the other life cycle assignments of CM category 
1.  This difference is mitigated on forward projects using DO-178C. 
4. The derived requirement output data CM management across the LCPs for level D is mixed.  System 
derived requirements are maintained at category 2 while the DO LCPs maintain this data is maintained 
using CM category 1. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the software and hardware derived requirements data is so rigorously 
maintained for Level D.  As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that AC/SYS LCP CM 
category may need to be escalated to use CM category 1 in order to have consistent development 
processes across a project containing all of LCPs. 
The LCP authors should establish consistency and revise the LCPs accordingly. 
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5. DO254 maintains all requirement data at assurance level D to CM category 1.  ARP4754A and 
DO178B are consistent at CM category 2. DO178C maintains only HL requirement data to category 1. 
Analysis:  Again, it is unclear why the requirements data is so rigorously maintained for Level D.  As a 
consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that AC/SYS LCP CM category may need to be escalated 
to use CM category 1 in order to have consistent development processes across a project containing all of 
LCPs. 
The LCP authors should establish consistency and revise the LCPs accordingly. 
C 4.3 Validation Process Objectives Comparison 
Figure 29 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for validation of requirements 
between ARP4754A and the DO LCPs.  In general, the basic Validation objectives are consistent across 
the processes for assurance levels A through C; with only minor differences at assurance level D.  The 
caveat however, is that the AC/Sys LCP objective to validate and justify assumptions which has no 
equivalent objective in either of the software or hardware LCPs. 
 
Objective Commonality: 
Establishing the completeness and correctness of requirements is a consistent objective across all of the 
LCPs.  Assurance levels A and B are consistent for AC/Sys and software LCP as “Recommending” this 
objective being satisfied with independence. Derived requirement validity and requirement traceability are 
also consistent at “Recommended” across all of the LCPs for assurance levels A and B. 
Differences Summary: 
Table 38 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
 
Table 38 Validation Objectives Process Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Reqts complete & correct X  A-B 
Lack of independence 
in DO254 
Reqts complete & correct X  D DO178/DO254 
Assumptions X  A-D DO178/DO254 
Derived reqts X  A-B 
Lack of independence 
in DO178/DO254 
Derived reqts X  C-D DO178/DO254 
Validation records X  A-D DO178/DO254 
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Figure 29 Validation Objectives Comparison Summary 
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Objective Differences: 
1. The DO254 LCP “Recommends” ensuring hardware requirements are complete and correct but is 
inconsistent with the AC/Sys and software LCPS in not accomplishing the objective with independence 
for assurance levels A and B. The AC/Sys LCP also has “As Negotiated” for validation of requirements 
at assurance level D, while the DO LCPs maintain “Recommended”. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the hardware requirements validation is not accomplished with independence 
similarly to AC/Sys and software LCPs. As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that 
hardware validation activities would be adapted to implement independence in order to have consistent 
development processes across a project containing all of LCPs. 
Similarly, if the HW and SW LCPs recommend validation of requirements for assurance level D, the 
AC/SYS LCP would need to be negotiated to “Recommended” to maintain project consistency. 
The AC/Sys and hardware LCP authors should establish consistency and revise the LCPs accordingly. 
2. Validation of assumptions has no equivalent objective identified in the DO LCPs.  
Analysis:  This seems to be a set of “missing” (or at least not highlighted in the guidance material) 
objectives from the DO life cycle processes regarding assumptions.  Many assumptions are made at these 
lower levels of development which may experience the same benefits experienced at the aircraft and 
system levels had the validity been tracked and/or validated prior project completion. 
The DO LCP authors should consider adding objective or highlighting validating assumptions made during 
hardware and software development and revise the LCPs accordingly. 
3. Derived requirement objectives vary across the LCP with different accomplishment criteria or by not 
having any objectives. For assurance levels A and B, all of the LCPs “Recommend” accomplishing 
validating captured requirements. The AC/Sys LCP recommends accomplishing this object with 
independence whereas the DO LCPs do not. Additionally, the recommendation disappears for 
validation of software requirements for assurance levels C and D. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why some categories of derived software requirements are not validated with 
independence.  It is also unclear as to why the software LCP varies the objectives within the domain 
based on high and low level requirement definitions. 
The software LCP authors should identify the rationale that validates high software requirements with 
independence yet validates the traced children low level requirements without independence.   
4. Validation records generation has no equivalent objective identified in the DO LCPs. 
Analysis:  This result is probably due to the comparison strategy used in this analysis.  The hardware and 
software DO LCPs contain the generation of validation data, as noted by the common satisfaction of 
establishing requirement completeness and correctness. The DO LCPs do not call this out as a separate 
or unique completion objective.  
 
Data CM Category Differences: 
There were no configuration management category differences identified for validation objectives between 
the ARP and DO LCPs. 
C 4.4 Verification Process Objectives Comparison 
Figure 30 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for verification of requirements 
between ARP4754A and the DO LCPs.  In general, the basic Verification objectives are consistent across 
the processes for assurance levels A through D; with only minor differences at assurance level D.  
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Objective Commonality: 
The verification of requirements is a consistent objective across all of the LCPs.  Each of the life cycles 
has assurance level A thru C objectives “Recommended” for: 
 Ensuring verification test procedures are correct, 
 Verifying intended function, 
 Verifying implementation meets requirements, and 
 Safety requirements are verified. 
Differences Summary: 
Table 39 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
 
Table 39 Verification Objectives Process Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Test Procedures Correct X  B 
With independence for 
DO254 
Test Procedures Correct X  D DO178/DO254 
Verify intended function X  B 
With independence for 
DO178 
Safety requirements X X A-C DO178/DO254 
Verification evidence X   DO178/DO254 
Safety impact identified X   DO178/DO254 
 
Objective Differences: 
1. The DO254 LCP “Recommends” ensuring hardware test procedures are correct at assurance Level B 
with independence which is inconsistent with the AC/Sys and software LCPs recommendations.  The 
hardware also “Recommends” test procedure correctness at assurance level D where the software 
LCP has no similar objective and the AC/Sys LCP has “As Negotiated”. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the hardware test procedure verification is accomplished with independence 
at assurance level B. As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that AC/System process 
activities may need to be adapted to implement independence in order to have consistent development 
processes across a project containing both LCPs. 
The hardware LCP authors should establish consistency with the AC/System and software LCPs. 
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Figure 30 Verification Objectives Comparison Summary 
2. The Verify intended function and Verify implementation software objectives have accomplishment with 
independence for the software LCP in difference to the AC/Sys and HW LCPs. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the software verification is accomplished with independence at assurance 
level B inconsistently with the other LCPs. As a consequence of this difference, it is conceivable that 
AC/System and HW process activities may need to be adapted to implement independence in order to 
have consistent development processes across a project containing all LCPs. 
The software LCP authors should establish consistency with the AC/System and hardware LCPs. 
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3. Specific safety requirement verification is “Recommended with Independence” at the AC/Sys LCP 
assurance levels A and B only software LCP assurance level A having a similar objective.  
Analysis:  It is unclear why the hardware LCP does not have a specific objective to ensure safety 
requirement verification. It is also unclear why the software LCP does not maintain the verification with 
independence to assurance level B. 
Since safety is predominately an aircraft and/or system activity, it is conceivable that the authors of the 
hardware and software LCPs had a more narrow definition of “safety requirements” than that of the ARP 
authors. The discrepancy may also be attributed to the comparison strategy used in this analysis.  The 
hardware LCP contains the generation of verification data but does not call the objective out as a separate 
or unique completion objective. 
Further detailed comparison analysis should be completed so that LCP authors can establish consistency 
in objective completion. 
4. The AC/Sys life cycle has two objectives identified where there is no comparative hardware or 
software LCP objective 
Analysis:  A more detailed comparison analysis would undoubtedly find that these two objectives are 
inherent in the activities of the HW and SW LCPs though they are not highlighted in the summary matrices 
in each process. 
Further detailed comparison analysis should be completed so that LCP authors can establish consistency 
in objective completion. 
 
Data CM Category Differences: 
1. Safety requirement verification is maintained using CM category 1 in the AC/Sys LCP for assurance 
levels A thru C which differs from the software LCP at CM category 2 at those levels (the HW LCP has 
no safety verification objectives). 
Analysis:  Since safety is predominately an aircraft and/or system activity, it is conceivable that the 
authors of the hardware and software LCPs envisioned that CM of true “safety” data would be 
accomplished in the AC/Sys life cycle.  The “safety data” created by the subordinate HW and SW life 
cycles would be effectively managed for certification purposes at the higher levels. 
Further detailed comparison analysis should be considered so that LCP authors can establish consistency 
across the LCPs in objective completion. 
C 4.5 Configuration Management Process Objectives Comparison 
Figure 31 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for configuration management 
processes between ARP4754A and the DO LCPs.  The basic configuration management objectives are 
consistent across the processes for assurance levels A through D; with only minor differences with the 
software LCP due to non-equivalent objectives. 
 
Objective Commonality: 
All of the development process documents have consistent “Recommended” CM objectives for: 
 Defining configuration items, 
 Establishing baselines and derivatives, 
 Establishing change control,  
 Establishing archive and control capabilities. 
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Differences Summary: 
Table 40 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
 
Table 40 CM Process Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Baselines & derivatives X  D  
Baselines & derivatives  X C,D  
 
Objective Differences: 
1. The AC/Sys objective to establish configurations and baselines is “As Negotiated” for assurance level 
D which differs from the HW and SW LCP which have this objective as “Recommended”. 
Analysis: It is unclear why the HW and SW LCPs find it a necessary objective to maintain control of 
implementations with such a minor impact on aircraft safety.  As a consequence of this difference, it is 
conceivable that the system level “As Negotiated” objectives would be de-facto considered as 
“Recommended” in order to have consistency with the HW and SW LCPs on the same project.  
 
The software and hardware LCP authors should explore the rationale for the present recommendation to 
establish baselines at assurance level D when the AC/System LCP indicates there isn’t a need.  
 
Data CM Category Differences: 
1. The configuration and baseline data is maintained using control category 1 in the HW and SW LCPs 
for assurance levels C and D but at category 2 for the AC/Sys LCP. 
Analysis: It is unclear why the HW and SW LCPs find it a necessary to maintain such stringent control of 
implementations with such a minor impact on aircraft safety.  As a consequence of this difference, it is 
conceivable that the system level would be de-facto considered as category 1 in order to have consistency 
with the HW and SW LCPs on the same project.  
 
The software and hardware LCP authors should explore the rationale for the present control category 
assignment when the AC/System LCP indicates there isn’t a need. The software and hardware LCP 
authors establish consistency with the AC/System LCP. 
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Figure 31 Configuration Management Objectives Comparison Summary 
 
C 4.6 Process Assurance Objectives Comparison 
Figure 32 graphically summarizes the objectives and control categories for process assurance between 
ARP4754A and the DO LCPs.  The Process Assurance objectives are consistent across the processes for 
assurance levels A through C; with minor differences at assurance level D. 
 
Objective Commonality: 
All of the development process documents have consistent “Recommended” PA objectives for: 
 Evaluating process activities and processes in accordance with developed plans. 
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Differences Summary: 
Table 41 summarizes the noted differences between the ARP and DO processes. 
 
Table 41 Process Assurance Differences 
Objective Accomplish 
CM 
Category 
Assurance 
Level Comment 
Plans developed & maintained X  A-D DO178/DO254 
Data complies with plans X  A-C DO178/DO254 
Implementation conforms to data X  A-D DO178/DO254 
 
Objective Differences: 
1. The AC/Sys LCP directly identifies creating and maintaining the development plan data while the DO 
LCPs do have an equivalent objective. 
Analysis:  In this case, it is obvious that the DO LCPs contain this objective since the remainder of the 
process assurance activities are based on evaluating compliance to these plans. So even though there 
appears to be a gap in objectives, it is predominately a depth of comparison analysis study issue. 
 
It would be advantageous though for the software and hardware LCP authors to explore adding an 
equivalent objective to enhance process consistency. 
 
2. There are differences in evaluating the process activities for assurance level D.  The software LCP 
maintains a “Recommended with Independence” for assurance levels A thru D while the AC/Sys LCP 
identifies only “Recommended” and DO254 has no equivalent objective. 
Analysis:  It is unclear why the SW LCP recommends the additional burden of activity monitoring with 
independence for functions which have such a limited impact on product safety.   
The software and hardware LCP authors should explore the rationale for the present recommendations or 
lack thereof at assurance level D when the AC/System LCP indicates there isn’t a safety need.  
3. The hardware and software LCPs contain objectives evaluating the implementation against program 
standards and specific project documentation.  There is not an equivalent AC/Sys LCP objective. 
Analysis:  This is an acceptable difference.  The DO LCPs define the items that are used to implement 
systems and aircraft.  It is reasonable therefore to have a process objective to establish that the actual 
implementation matches its documentation, since that documentation will be used at each successive 
level to establish compliance. 
Data CM Category Differences: 
There were no configuration management category differences identified for the process assurance 
objectives between the ARP and DO LCPs. 
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Figure 32 Process Assurance Objectives Comparison Summary 
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C 5 ARP4754A to DO-297 Objectives Comparison 
This section summarizes a comparison of the objectives and control categories between ARP4754A and 
DO297.  DO-297 does not vary satisfaction of objectives or CM control category by assurance level within 
its guidance.  All objectives identified are “Recommended” for accomplishment at the assigned 
configuration control category due to the Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA) system construction. 
There is no Development Assurance Level specified under DO-297; therefore, the comparison will focus 
on ARP4754A assignment level A for objective coverage and CM category. 
Objective Commonality: 
1. The Development Process Objectives for identifying requirements and architectures are consistent per 
CM category 1 between ARP4754A and DO297. There are differences identified at A/C level 
objectives (see Objective Differences 2 & 3). 
2. The Validation Objectives for V&V data are consistent to be CM category 2 between ARP4754A and 
DO297. There are differences in terms of having objectives (see Objective Differences 4). 
3. The Verification Objectives for V&V data are consistent between ARP4754A and DO297 with minor 
considerations (see Objective Differences 5). 
4. In general, CM objectives and control categories are consistent between ARP4754A and DO297. The 
CM objectives are always control categories 2 unless related to baseline (configuration) or 
environment (platform). 
5. In general, Process Assurance objectives are consistent between ARP4754A and DO297 and 
managed under control category 2 with single exception (see Objective Differences 6). 
 
Objective Differences 
The ARP4754A objectives differ from DO297 objectives in a few notable areas. 
1. Certification Plan objectives for ARP4754A and all the Planning Objectives for DO297 are maintained 
under CM category 1 while the remaining Planning objectives for ARP4754A are maintained under CM 
category 2. 
Analysis 1: As a result of this discrepancy, it is conceivable that DO297 Planning Objectives may need to 
align with ARP4754A objectives to have all the objectives to be maintained under CM category 2 except 
for Certification Plan. 
2. The ARP4754A Development Process Objectives of A/C & system integration is maintained under CM 
category 2 while in DO297, most of the objectives of A/C & system integration data managed per CM 
category 1. DO297 also have platform integration and V&V results data controlled at CM category 2. 
Analysis 2: As a result of this discrepancy, it is conceivable that ARP4754 Integration Objectives may 
need to align with DO297 objectives to have most of the objectives to be maintained under CM category 2 
except for platform integration and V&V results.  
3. Based on Objective tables under DO297, it is unclear if the Development Process Objectives of 
identifying A/C requirements and allocating A/C functions to systems are covered or not. The A/C 
function allocation objectives are actually mixed with system function allocation objectives under 
DO297 section 3.2, but DO297 A/C requirements identification equivalent objectives is not identified. 
Analysis 3: As a result of this discrepancy, it is conceivable that DO297 objectives of A/C function 
allocation and identification may need to be independent from system objectives in Chapter 3. 
4. The ARP4754A contains two additional Validation Objectives, justifying assumptions and providing 
validation substantiation which do not have DO297 equivalent objectives.  
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Analysis 4: After the analysis under DO297, it is conceivable that DO297 objectives justifying assumptions 
and providing validation substantiation may have already been covered as the of V&V record. However, 
the V&V record of the two objectives are only listed in Section 4.7.6.2 for reuse of module and application. 
It is recommended for DO297 to have the same objectives under the other V&V sections. 
5. It is not always clear to compare Verification Objectives between ARP4754A and DO297 while DO297 
is mixing Validation and Verification under objectives. In ARP4754A, the Verification Objectives are 
controlled by CM category 2 unless related to procedure or safety, where in DO297, V&V Objectives 
are managed per CM category 2 unless related to planning or safety analysis. 
 
Analysis 5: This discrepancy is resulted as different terminology in each guideline document. The overall 
objectives are still consistent if the terminologies are considered to be equivalent. It is suggested to have 
DO297 distinguish the objectives of Validation and Verification independently. 
 
6. The ARP4754A and DO297 Process Assurance Objectives for developing and maintaining plans, 
differ in terms of control category of the data. ARP4754A data is managed per CM category 2 and in 
DO297 the data is managed per CM category 1. 
 
Analysis 6: As a result of this discrepancy, it is conceivable that DO297 objectives of developing and 
maintaining plans may reconsider to be controlled by CM category 2 to align with ARP4754 objectives. 
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Appendix D Additional Study Areas 
D 1 Introduction 
This appendix summarizes various additional ARP4754A study results for questions identified during the 
project kick-off meeting.  The following topic objectives are included: 
 
 Development Assignment levels in AC23.1309.1E vs ARP4754A (AC 20-174), Differences – Why? 
Are the levels assigned equivalent?, 
 Insight as to why Options 1 / 2 of ARP4754A Table 3 are equivalent, 
 
D 2 ARP4754A & AC23.1309-1E 
Figure 33 captures a synopsis of the functional and item development assurance level assignments 
afforded by ARP4754A in support of Part 25 and the equivalent development assurance level 
assignments allowed by the guidance in AC23.1309-1E. 
As summarized in Figure 33, AC23.1309 does not advocate applying development assurance activities at 
the airplane or system function level (FDALs) for any of the Class I-IV airplane types.  It is apparent that 
the Authors of the AC are primarily interested in mitigating errors within the software and airborne 
electronic hardware domains.  Information as to why this emphasis was implemented was not publicly 
available. 
Within the assignment levels for the hardware and software domains (IDALs), the AC23 assignments are 
consistently more rigorous than those that would be allowed for Part 25.  This revelation means that the 
airborne electronic hardware and software developed to support Normal and Utility Category aircraft may 
be more rigorous than that developed for Commercial Category.  Therefore it is safe to extrapolate that 
the development assurance levels are not based on safety concepts and may be higher to compensate for 
the fact that there isn’t any rigor associated with the system development. 
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Figure 33 Part 23-25 Development Assurance Assignment Comparison 
Quantitative Quantitative Quantitative
FC Cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
/O
 In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
it
h 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
A
ir
pl
an
e 
Cl
as
s
Probability
Criteria D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
/O
 In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
it
h 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
Probability
Criteria D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
/O
 In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
oc
es
s
W
it
h 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
Probability
Criteria
Catastrophic A AC or BB ≤10-9 A AC or BB NA A AC or BB ≤10-9
Hazardous B BC or CC ≤10-7 B BC or CC NA B BC or CC ≤10-7
Major C
CC, CD, 
CE or DD
≤10-5 C
CC, CD, 
CE or DD
NA C
CC, CD, 
CE or DD
≤10-5
Minor D DD or DE ≤10-3 D DD or DE NA D DD or DE ≤10-3
No Effect E E NA E E NA E E NA
IV ≤10-9 NA ≤10-9
III ≤10-8 NA ≤10-8
II ≤10-7 NA ≤10-7
I ≤10-6 NA ≤10-6
IV ≤10-7 NA ≤10-7
III ≤10-7 NA ≤10-7
II ≤10-6 NA ≤10-6
I ≤10-5 NA ≤10-5
IV ≤10-5 NA ≤10-5
III ≤10-5 NA ≤10-5
II ≤10-5 NA ≤10-5
I ≤10-4 NA ≤10-4
IV ≤10-3 NA ≤10-3
III ≤10-3 NA ≤10-3
II ≤10-3 NA ≤10-3
I ≤10-3 NA ≤10-3
No Effect NA NA NA NA
Software (Item)
Qualitative
Electronic Hardware (Item)
NA
Qualitative
Ke
y 
A
tt
ri
bu
te
s
Aircraft - System Function
Qualitative
§ 
Pa
rt
 2
5
(p
er
 A
C2
0-
17
4/
 
AR
P4
75
4A
)
§ 
Pa
rt
 2
3
(p
er
 A
C2
3.
13
09
-1
E)
Catastrophic
Hazardous
Major
Minor
NA NA
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
BC
CC
CC
CD
AB
BC
CC
CC
AB
BC
CC
CC
BC
CC
CC
CDNone
Required
   210 
D 3 ARP4754A Option 1/2 Equivalence 
ARP4754A establishes that, should independence in the functional failure set be established, the 
functional or item development assurance level assignment may be accomplished using either of two 
options, 1 or 2.  How do the two options compare? 
Fault tree representations of functional failure sets (FFS) supporting catastrophic, hazardous and major 
failure conditions, respectively, were created to evaluate the options.  Each representative graphic 
summarizes the assurance objectives for a functional failure set, having a single member (i.e. no 
independence development attributes satisfied) as the leftmost branch and then the option 1 or option 2 
assurance assignment options with their objective attributes, left to right respectively.  Note that for Option 
1 or 2, the minimum allowable assignment pair from ARP4754A Table 3 is considered. 
D 3.1 Catastrophic Failure Condition FFS 
Figure 34 presents the FFS fault tree for a catastrophic failure condition.  A review of Figure 34 shows that 
satisfying the ARP4754A Level A objectives establishes sufficient rigor of process results to support the 
catastrophic Failure Condition. 
Option 1: Option 1 provides for assurance assignments of Level A in combination with Level B or C to 
support the catastrophic Failure Condition.  Since a Level A process alone is sufficient to satisfy 
the development process objectives, the addition of an independent error migration path at 
either level B or C provides additional error mitigation properties.  It is noted that even though 
the additional independent element may be accomplished as low as level C, the only significant 
deviation in objectives from level A is the requirements management activities are not 
accomplished with in-line independence.  This is certainly acceptable since any error is 
mitigated by the Level A development path. 
Option 2: Option 2 provides for two independent level B assurance assignments to support the 
catastrophic FC.  When the objectives of Level B are compared to those of Level A, the only 
difference is the lack of in-line requirement verification in each independent Level B process.  In 
this case, the independence is achieved by having two independent level B processes 
accomplishing independent and different requirement verifications.   
It is important to remember that Function F1 and F2 must have functional or Item development 
independence attributes satisfied in order to consider Option 1 or 2.  The establishment of these 
attributes by a safety analysis assures minimization of common mode errors in the development 
process. 
From a practical standpoint, these independence attributes mean that Function F1 and F2 have 
an acceptable level of differences in their requirement sets and development processes such 
that the independence attribute is true.  A comparison of the single member FFS with Option 2 
at this lower level may look like Figure 35.  For the Single Member FFS on the left, we see that 
we have independent in-line requirements validation and independent in-line requirement 
verification to satisfy the objectives of the ARP and mitigate errors.  In the Option 2 case (on the 
right of Figure 35) we have two independent requirement sets and development processes. 
Each process still has an independent in-line validation activity with non-independent (but 
different between F1 and F2) verification activity.  
The independent in-line validation of two different requirement sets as well as the verification of 
two different requirement sets, using the equivalent configuration management and process 
assurance rigor, assures that the equivalent level of common mode error mitigation as the 
single member FFS case is achieved. 
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Figure 34 Option 1-2 Comparison for Catastrophic FC 
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Figure 35 Option 2 Error Mitigation Equivalence to Single Member 
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D 3.2 Hazardous Failure Condition FFS 
Figure 36 presents the FTA showing the single and multiple member FFS that may be used to satisfy a 
hazardous Failure Condition. 
The single member FFS objectives that support a Level B assignment are summarized under the leftmost 
branch. 
Option 1: Option 1 provides a single level B in combination with additional members at any level but not 
lower than Level D (objectives shown).  In this option, there is significant difference between the 
Level B and Level D processes but the single level B alone would be sufficient to address the 
safety needed for the hazardous failure condition.  The addition of the independent 
development process supporting the same functional failure set provides a measure of error 
mitigation properties since both the level B and level D must contain the same error to result in 
the failure condition. 
Option 2: Option 2 establishes two independent level C processes to support the hazardous FC.  In this 
case, the small difference from the single Level B process is the lack of independence in-line for 
safety and requirement validation of Level C process.  In this case, the independence is 
achieved by having two independent level C processes accomplishing independent and 
different safety and requirement verifications.  The independent Level C processes are therefore 
equivalent to the single Level B process. 
D 3.3 Major Failure Condition FFS 
Figure 37 presents the FTA showing the single and multiple member FFS that may be used to satisfy a 
major Failure Condition. 
The characteristics and analysis presented for the catastrophic and hazard failure conditions also apply to 
major.   
The single level C process, or a level C process in combination with any other assurance level (option 1) 
or two level D processes provide equivalent error mitigation.   
 
D 3.4 Equivalence Analysis Summary 
As discussed and visually compared herein, both of the ARP4754A Table 3 options provide equivalent 
error mitigation capabilities through almost identical objectives.  Option 1 provides an unquantifiable level 
of development rigor “goodness” over the single member FFS by having an independent development 
path.  Option 2 lacks in-line independence assurance objective characteristics but still accomplishes the 
overall error mitigation goals through the multiple (independent) member FFS paths. 
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Figure 36 Option 1-2 Comparison for Hazardous FC 
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Figure 37 Option 1-2 Comparison for Major FC 
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